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The Wisdom of Adam Smith 
"The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. 
The time ofpayment, the manner ofpayment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be 
clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person. Here it is otherwise, 
every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, 
who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the 
terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himse1r. The uncertainty of 
taxation encourages the insolence andfavours the corruption of an order ofmen who 
naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty 
of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, 
that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the 
experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of 
uncertainty. " 
"Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of 
people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into public treasury of the 
state. A tax ma either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal y 
more than it brings into the publics treasury, in the following four ways. First, the 
levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the 
greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another 
additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, 
and discourage theinfrom applying to certain branches of business, which might give 
maintenance, and employment to great multitudes. While it obliges the people to pay, 
it may thus diminish, orperhaps destroy, some of thefunds, which might enable them 
more easily to do so. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those 
unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade tax, it may 
frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which community might 
have receivedfrom the employment of their capitals ..... .. Yhe [tax] law, contrary to all 
the ordinary principles ofJustice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those 
who yield to it, and it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the 
very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the 
crime. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious 
examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, 
and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly 
equivalent to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himset(from 
it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently so 
much more burdensome to the people that they are beneficial to the sovereign. " 
The Wealth of Nation, Book 5, Chapter 2, Part 2: "Of Taxee', maxims II & IV. 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research is to identify and define the characteristic behaviour of and 
factors that influence taxpayers in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) when they 
either evade tax or comply with tax law. The study also attempts to assess the extent of 
tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia. In addition, another concern is also to explore both the 
actual and potential role of forensic accounting with the focus on improving current 
enforcement strategies for deterring tax evasion by SMEs. The research findings will 
contribute to the current limited literature on the tax compliance of SMEs and forensic 
accounting, especially with respect to Malaysia. 
Using a multi-method approach, the results of this thesis suggest that the extent of tax 
evasion by SMEs in Malaysia is both widespread and frequent. The findings also indicate 
that the offences tend to be deliberate evasion without any sophisticated tax-planning 
scheme. Understatement of gross profit and overstatement of expenses other than the cost 
of goods sold are the most frequently used methods. The fact that most taxpayers are 
unlikely to be detected and penalised by the tax authority is also another factor shaping 
tax evasion by SMEs. Most SMEs are heavily reliant on tax practitioners to guide them to 
comply with their income tax matters and will remain with the same tax practitioner in 
general; however, there is a tendency for some to switch tax practitioner for whatever 
reason they think fit. 
Forensic accounting is a field that encapsulates all other areas in the use of accounting for 
investigative purposes. Forensic accounting is a relatively new discipline in Malaysia; 
however, the awareness of forensic accounting by tax practitioners and IRB (Inland 
Revenue Board Malaysia) personnel is strong. The techniques used in forensic 
accounting are not new to the IRB; however, the IRB personnel need further exposure to 
and training in these techniques. The finding indicates a lack of sophisticated planning in 
tax evasion by SMýs in Malaysia. Despite this, forensic accounting technique could be 
added to the existing tools necessary to bring about the successful investigation and 
prosecution of those involved. The study was carried out at a time of change for the IRB. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Taxation is a game and tax evasion is a genuine sport in making a profit. One should not, however, look 
for the winners in this game. 
Editorial. - CA TA Newsletter (June, 1990) 
1.1 Preliminaries 
Tax evasion is presumably as old as the history of taxation. Webley et al. (1991: 1) pointed 
out that "taxation and evasion have always gone together and income tax evasion ... is as 
old as taxation ". Many questions still remain, and probably will for as long as taxes exist. 
Income tax evasion per se is thus not a modem problem. According to Tanzi and Shome 
(1993), Plato commented on this phenomenon in his writing over two thousand years ago. 
Despite this lengthy existence, the only surprise is how little attention this phenomenon has 
received, especially in Malaysia until recent years, probably due to its sensitive nature. 
Very little theoretical or empirical research has been conducted in Malaysia, with the 
majority of studies undertaken in developed countries such as the United States and 
Australia. This study is being undertaken to make a contribution to filling this gap. 
Since the introduction of the self-assessment system (SAS) in Malaysia in 2001", 
awareness of tax evasion has escalated. The realization that taxpayers with similar incomes 
often end up paying very different taxes because of different opportunities for tax evasion 
has led the government and the tax authorities to be concerned about the implications of tax 
evasion. As a developing country, it is very important for Malaysia to increase its revenue 
so as to foster its economic growth. Therefore, an increase in revenue through a reduction 
of tax evasion is one of the options available for achieving higher revenue. Thus, the 
government is concerned with tax evasion for two principal reasons (Cowell, 1990: 45); it 
1*1 The SAS of taxation is operative in Malaysia for companies' files with effect from the year of assessment 
2001. The system has been introduced gradually to cover different categories of taxpayers: businesses, 
partnerships and cooperatives in the year of assessment 2003, and finally individual / salaried groups in the 
year of assessment in 2004. 
I 
harms the interest of the general public, and it harms the means by which the state can look 
after the interests of the general public. 
According to Cowell (1990), the interests of the general public are broadly represented by 
goals for achieving social justice and efficiency in pursuing economic policy. Yet the 
activity of tax evaders may frustrate the pursuit of each of these two ob ectives. In terms of 
social justice, the rich may be more able to avoid tax while the poor have to pay their share, 
which offends one's sense of distributional justice as the principles of equity are being 
violated. In terms of efficiency, the administrative cost of enforcing taxes can be increased 
by uncertainty caused by the game of 'hide and seek'in dealing with these tax evaders. 
Evasion can also have a major impact on the structure of prices and incomes and can distort 
the effectiveness of any macroeconomic policy. It can erode the tax base and in some 
circumstances make the effect of alterations in tax rates indeterminate and unpredictable. 
The apparent elasticity of the labour supply and public revenue with respect to tax rates 
may have less to do with conventional factors such as work disincentives than with the 
inducement to conceal income and productive activity. The observed unemployment 
figures may be unreliable indicators of the economy's performance if a substantial 
proportion of"workers are in the black economy. 
Income tax has become one of the main sources of revenue for the Malaysian Government. 
In the year 2001, RM40.136 billion (E6.4 billion)'-2of taxes were collected, whereas for 
2002 this figure was forecasted to increase to RM43.932 billion (E7.01 billion) and by 2003 
it was forecasted to reach RM48.043 billion (0.66 billion) (Economic Report, 2002-2003). 
This represents approximately 50 per cent of the total revenue of the Federal Government 
of Malaysia. For the year 2001, the biggest contributors to the collected income tax were 
the incorporated businesses, which made up about 52.53 per cent of the total tax collected 
(Inland Revenue Board, Annual Report, 2001). 
1*2 El = approximately RM6.2699, based on the yearly average foreign exchange rates from IRB available at http: //www. hasilnet. org. my. 
2 
In 2001, RM397.3 million (f63.36 million) were collected as back taxes from 748 
investigation cases as compared to the years 1999 and 2000, where back taxes collected 
from the taxpayers for their various evasion schemes were RM407.36 million (L64.18 
million) (688 cases) and RM428.14 million (E68.29 million) (672 cases) respectively 
(Inland Revenue Board, Annual Report). As there has been no obvious improvement in the 
process of collecting back taxes by the IRB, these figures suggest that the problem of 
taxpayer non-compliance is getting worse. 
1.2 Motivations and purpose of the study 
The motivations of the study are based on a recognition of the severity of the evasion 
problem, and the concomitant need for an increased understanding of the phenomenon and 
the problems associated with the activities of SMEs, since little, if anything, concerning 
this issue is yet known in Malaysia. In Cowell's (1985: 163) view, like pornography, the 
subject of tax evasion seems to arouse a mixture of outrage, guilty curiosity and 
incredulous admiration. It is in area about which one knows little but suspects much, and 
which perhaps one simply ignores in the majority of economic and social activities. One 
has held one's own personal experiences (minor, of course) or word-of-mouth accounts 
concerning the practice, and one's led to believe that there are people who are involved in 
it in a big way, yet one is not entirely clear how to fit it into the general pattern of life's 
above-board experiences. OJf1cial statistics are rare and it is not clear whether they should 
be believed anyway. 
Rice (1992) pointed out that despite the fact that corporation or business tax evasion has 
accounted for an increasingly large portion of total evasion, it has to date attracted nearly 
no scholarly analysis as compared to individual income tax evasion'-3. One reason for such 
an imbalance in the development of this research direction is that the conceptual difference 
1*3 Evidence from US tax, reformed in 1986, slowing the growth of individual income tax evasion, however 
not for corporate income tax. The IRS estimated ratio of the corporate tax gap to the gap for individual filers 
increased from more than 20 per cent through the early 1980s, to about 40 per cent in the 1990s (Rice, 
1992: 125-126). No precise figure available for Malaysia, however the fact that the increase in the collection 
of back duties cases are indicative of the tax evasion. 
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in an evasion decision between an individual and a business is hard to capture analytically. 
The reason is connected with the fundamental dilemma about empirical research on tax 
compliance; how much faith to place in the ability of financial audits to uncover and to 
accurately measure accurate corporate activity. Since corporations have strong incentives to 
avoid disclosing misconduct, any tax compliance data will invariably suffer from 
substantial measurement errors (Rice, 1992: 126). Another reason is that essentially no 
corporate income tax compliance data has previously been made available to researchers, 
either in Malaysia or other countries, with the exception of the United States' .4. 
The purpose of this study is to present and analyse findings concerning the tax evasion 
activities of SME taxpayers in Malaysia, in an attempt to gain an insight into and explore 
possible influences on the phenomenon of tax evasion and the role of forensic accounting. 
The aim is to identify and define the characteristic behaviour of SME taxpayers and factors 
that influence SME taxpayers as well as the extent of tax evasion in Malaysia. In addition, 
another concern is to explore the actual and potential role of forensic accounting with the 
aim of improving current enforcement strategies in deterring tax evasion by SMEs. Most 
studies in Malaysia (for example, Wallschutzky and Singh, 1995; Kasipillai, 1998; 
Kasipillai, 2000) have explored the overall relationship between taxpayers' characteristics 
and taxpayers' compliance but none have focussed on SMEs". 
In general, SMEs are susceptible to offences that result in compliance gaps (the difference 
between tax receipts based on voluntary reporting and what the tax authority views as the 
correct amount of tax due) and loss of revenue (Silvani, 1992). According to Tekper 
(2003), many SNEs do not voluntarily register and so widen the gap between actual and 
1.4 Data became available for the first time in US in the mid 1970s as a result of extensive litigation under the Freedom of Information Act by Susan B. Long (Long and Swingen, 1991). Aggregate as well as individual data level Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data files (except those individual level data 
used in Discriminant Function (DIF) development) were released along with all internal analyses and reports. Prior to this litigation, the IRS had generally withheld even aggregate TCMP statistics, not only from the 
public but also from Congress and its government auditors. The same scenario applies in Malaysia, whereby data is still not made available to outside researchers and even the files of the investigation cases are 
completely withheld from the government auditors. 
1*5 A recent study by Mottiakavandar et aL (2004) explored the compliance level of small businesses (sole 
proprietors and partnerships) with regard to their demographic profile and determined the level of taxpayers' knowledge of general tax laws. See Chapter 3 for literature review. 
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potential taxpayers at the early stage of the tax effort. Those who register often fail to 
keep 
adequate records, file tax returns or settle their tax liabilities promptly. When SMEs choose 
to evade taxes, they typically use unsophisticated methods. SMEs generally lack internal 
accounting and tax experts; consequently, they often rely more on outside professionals to 
deal with tax and accounting issues. 
The attention given to SME taxpayers in Malaysia reflects the fact that SMEs are 
understood to represent an important breeding ground for large, profitable, tax-paying 
employers of the future and they experience high growth rates in comparison to large 
enterprises in the country's economic growth process and plans (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2003). In Malaysia, SMEs contribute an average of 50 per cent of the revenue collected by 
the tax authority each year (Inland Revenue Board, Annual Report 2001); SMEs currently 
represent more than 92 per cent of the total number of established businesses in the 
economy (Bank Negara Malaysia, 2003). 
There is no universally agreed definition of an SNE. According to the International Labour 
Organization, no single definition can capture all of the dimensions of 'small' or 'medium' 
business size, nor can it expect to reflect the differences between firms, sectors or countries 
at different levels of development. In this research, SMEs will be broadlydefined to include 
directors of SMEs, management of SMEs, sole proprietors, partnerships and businesses 
within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's definition of Small and Medium- 
Sized Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC) by being companies having the 
following characteristics: (1) turnover of less than RM 25 million, (2) employee number not 
exceeding 150, (3) companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, including those 
registered under the Registrar of Business. 
Findings by Bank Negara Malaysia (2003) indicate that 88 per cent of SMEs are family- 
owned businesses with 72 per cent being private limited companies. Directors, managers 
and owners are included in the scope of the SME category to reflect the practice of the tax 
authority of including SME entrepreneurs (owners, directors and managers) in most of the 
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back duty cases of the private companies, where a means test/net worth analysis is 
examined and unreported income is taxed and a penalty imposed. 
1.3 Research questions 
Due to the lack of current information about tax evasion by SMEs and forensic accounting 
in Malaysia, this research is an exploratory study. The less developed a research area, the 
more likely that an exploratory study design should be used (Adam and Schraneveldt, 
1991). Since it is an exploratory study, it will be less structured, which permits the 
researcher to seek new insights. This does not, however, mean that it has lost its sense of 
direction or focus. Adam and Schraneveldt (1991) argued that the researcher must be 
constantly adapting, willing to change and open to revelations from the data. The flexibility 
inherent in exploratory research does not mean an absence of direction to, the inquiry, rather 
the flexibility means that the focus is initially broad and becomes progressively narrower as 
the research goes on. 
The research is carried out with three important areas of interest. First, to determine the 
existence, extent and impact of tax evasion by SME taxpayers in Malaysia so as to provide 
a better understanding of the subject matters. Second, to explore both the actual and 
potential role of the forensic accounting technique in detecting tax evasion. Third, to make 
some recommendations for improving the tax policies and tax administration with regard to 
the loopholes in the Malaysian income tax system, especially in deterring the tax evasion 
by SNEs. Thus, this study broadly addresses the following research questions: 
(1) Gain insight into the extent and impact of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia. 
(a) To what extent do SMEs commit tax evasion in Malaysia? 
(b) What are the impacts of tax evasion by SMEs? 
(2) Gain an understanding of cases of tax evasion by SMEs in practice. 
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(a) What are the characteristics of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia? 
(i) Is tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia cyclical or repetitive in nature? 
(H) Is tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia characteristically deliberate (intentional) or 
accidental (unintentional) in nature? 
(iii) Hat are SMEs'relationships with tax practitioners? 
(b) What are the factors influencing tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia? 
(c) What are the approaches and methods used in tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia? 
(d) What are the roles of tax practitioners? 
(3) To explore both the actual and potential role of forensic accounting in relation to tax 
evasion. 
(a) What are the forensic accounting techniques for detecting tax evasion? 
(b) To what extent can forensic accounting be relevant in detecting tax evasion by 
SMEs in Malaysia? 
In addition, another concern is also to make recommendations for improving the tax system 
and current enforcement strategies, especially in deterring tax evasion by SMEs. 
The broad objective of this study is, therefore, to study, examine and investigate the 
perceptions and expectations of different groups in society (SME taxpayers, tax 
practitioners, and IRB personnel) on the tax evasion by SN[Es and forensic accounting - 
especially the extent and characteristics of tax evasion by SMEs, including factors 
influencing and approaches used by SMEs, the role and character of tax practitioners, the 
probability of detection, current methods used to detect tax evasion, methods of settlement, 
perceptions of the role of forensic accounting, and other possible ways forward. Figure I -I 
indicates the variables studied. 
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Figure 1.1 
Imaginative framework of the study 
Forensic 
SMEs Accounting 
Tax Evasion 
1.4 Importance of the study 
The main contribution of this research is the evidence concerning the preliminary analysis 
of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia. Whilst gaining an understanding of the existence, 
extent and the factors that influence compliance is an interesting exercise in itself, the 
research also attempts to locate ways that could possibly increase compliance, and thus 
increase revenue. 
The findings of the research will give the government and IRB insight into future strategies 
to focus on the SME sector. The identification of the existence and extent of the evasion 
could enhance their knowledge and-may be able to provide a base for a course of action to 
deal with tax evasion behaviour more effectively and efficiently. It is also believed that the 
findings of this study have relevance to other governments that will no doubt recognise the 
similarities that may exist and evaluate the suggested strategies accordingly. 
To date, not much research material in published form is available for Malaysia, especially 
with regard to tax evasion by SMEs and the role of forensic accounting techniques. Hence, 
this research will fill a gap in the literature, especially in terms of the Malaysian perspective 
on tax evasion by SMEs and the role of forensic accounting. 
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1.5 Structure of the study 
The opening chapter sets out clear objectives for this thesis, coupled with the direction of 
the research questions. It introduces the area of study, motives and the significance of the 
study. 
Chapter 2 introduces the subject of Malaysian taxation. The Malaysian tax system is 
discussed, beginning with its history and then reviewing the current state of affairs. The 
importance of the Inland Revenue Board in Malaysia is described, together with its impact 
on tax compliance over recent years. The issue of tax compliance and tax evasion is also 
addressed, along with how it is affecting compliance behaviour in Malaysia. 
To address the relationship between evasion and forensic accounting it was necessary to 
review both the evasion and forensic accounting literature. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the 
subject matter critically. Chapter 3 is the first of the two literature review chapters. This 
chapter is devoted to a discussion of tax evasion, outlining the issue to date so as to develop 
an appropriate background for the research. The first section discusses conceptual issues 
dealing with the characteristics of the related ideas of tax evasion and tax avoidance. Next, 
the chapter reviews the behavioural studies, which suggest that the decision to evade taxes 
is sufficiently complex to merit the distinction between intentional and unintentional tax 
evasion and the description of tax evasion characteristics as either cyclical or repetitive in 
nature. The chapter also looks at the key studies that have been conducted to date in respect 
of SMEs. In addition, the issue of tax practitioners and how their role influences taxpayers 
as a whole is subsequently discussed. The chapter also discusses the issues of methodology 
with respect to research on tax evasion. 
Chapter 4, the second of the two literature review chapters, seeks to examine the role of 
forensic accounting, tracing its origins, definition and significance in the taxation world and 
reviewing the current status in Malaysia with regard to the use of techniques or methods for 
detection by tax authorities. Unfortunately, the evidence from academia is scant. 
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Chapter 5 discusses in a broad context the methodological perspective of the research and 
statistical issues with a view to selecting and formulating an appropriate research 
framework for this study. The chapter begins with an overview of the research 
methodologies and a justification of the research design for the current study by outlining 
the research framework for data collection, data analysis and validation of research 
findings. 
A multi-method approach is adopted, drawing on the strengths of both the quantitative and 
qualitative method and analysis. The quantitative method uses a randomised mail survey of 
SME taxpayers and tax practitioners, made possible with the co-operation of the Inland 
Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRB) and the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). The 
qualitative component was based on file data/actual case analyses from IRB documents and 
the views of IRB personnel that were expressed in the open-ended comments. Using 
different sources and methods strengthened each type of data collection and minimised the 
weaknesses of any single method. This helped in producing a more authoritative piece of 
research by increasing the strength of the research design. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the findings based on the questionnaire surveys of tax practitioners 
and SME'taxpayers (see Appendix I and II for the respective questionnaires). The first 
section encompasses the administrative aspect of the survey with an analysis of the 
response rate and non-response bias and reliability test. The chapter continues with the 
analyses, and interprets and summarises the tax practitioner survey results. The following 
section presents the SME survey results. 
Chapter 7 presents the results obtained from the analyses of the actual cases taken from the 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRB). Given the confidentiality requirements 
surrounding tax data due to the secrecy provision of section 138 of the Income Tax Act 
1967, only certain data was made available for the analysis. The aim of the chapter is to 
establish an understanding of the practices within the IRB and SMEs with regard to tax 
evasion. Each section analyses data obtained from corresponding files with respect to the 
methods of detection and settlement by the IRB, approaches/methods used by SMBs for 
10 
evading taxes, and the degree of culpability. The information was gathered using a 
formatted sheet so as to ensure the systematic consistency of the collected data (see 
Appendix III). 
Chapter 8 discusses the data drawn from open-ended questionnaire (see Appendix IV) 
responses from IRB personnel. The chapter examines the perceptions of IRB personnel on 
IRB stances and practical overviews of tax evasion by SMEs. It begins with a general view 
of tax evasion and SMEs followed by the current views on how the IRB emphases and 
recent trends in deterring tax evasion. Next the chapter explores the forensic accounting 
perceptions of the IRB personnel. The chapter also looks at their perspective on the 
recommendations and improvements suggested by the IRB. 
Chapter 9 examines the research findings from the questionnaire survey, file data/actual 
cases and, the opinions of IRB personnel. The chapter triangulates all of the results obtained 
within the context of the research questions. Due to its relatively recent emergence in 
Malaysia and as it has been the subject of numerous. overviews by practitioners (mostly 
outside of Malaysia) rather than in the academic literature, discussions and implications on 
forensic accounting will, to a very large extent, fall back on the literature review in Chapter 
4. Assumptions and limitations of the study are also highlighted so that observations are 
interpreted within a defined context. 
The final chapter, Chapter 10, provides a summary of this study, conclusions obtained from 
conducting this study and an evaluation of the research. The first section presents a brief 
summary of the study. The next section provides conclusions obtained from conducting this 
research. Subsequent sections will focus on an evaluation of the research, i. e. 
recommendations to deter tax evasion by SMEs and suggestions for possible ftulher 
research to yield more contributions to the on-going effort to learn more about tax evasion, 
especially by SMEs, and forensic accounting.. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MALAYSIAN INCOME TAX 
It is one of the empirical certainties of history that no structural society has ever arisen without taxation. 
7he power of taxation is one which is particularly liable to abuse, either in the hands of an individual 
autocrat or of a sectional oligarchy such as may wield the sceptre of authority even under the forms of 
modern Parliamentary system; but without the power no Government, as we understand the term, is 
possible. 
Isaacs J in Rv Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the Malaysian tax system, beginning with its humble history and 
then reviewing the current state of affairs. The role of the IRB is discussed, as is the impact 
it has had on tax compliance in recent years. Finally, the chapter also highlights the issue of 
tax evasion and how it is affecting compliance behaviour in Malaysia. 
2.2 The Malaysian tax system 
ZZI Historical background 
There is no precise period when income tax was imposed in Malaysia. Income tax was, 
however, instituted by the head of the state or Sultan (King) in the civilization of the 
Sultanate era in the early sixteenth century-, this tax was collected from individuals but the 
revenue so gained only benefited the royal family and nobility. Tax gathering of this nature 
continued intermittently until the early twentieth century: the British had made the Malayan 
peninsula part of the British colonies in the late nineteenth century. 
According to Heasman2,1, a bill 'for imposing a Tax on Income' was introduced by the 
Straits Settlements (comprising Singapore, Malacca and Penang) Legislative Council in 
1910. The bill was so strongly opposed that it was withdrawn at its second reading in 
January 1911. 
2" Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to advise the Malayan Government on the subject of Income Tax in 1946. 
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No further public reference to income tax appears to have been made until June 1916, 
when, in the course of a debate in the Legislative Council on a motion to make 
contributions towards Imperial War Expenditure, a proposal was put forward to supplement 
the contributions by means of the proceeds of an income tax. Toward this purpose, the War 
Tax Ordinance was introduced and remained in force up to the year 1919. In 1920, the War 
Tax Ordinance was converted to an income tax, which was re-imposed in 1921 and 1922. 
The proceeds continued, wholly in 1920 and partly in 1921, to be used for war purposes, 
however, but when in 1922 it was proposed to retain the tax as an income tax pure and 
simple for the general revenue purpose of the Colony, public agitation brought about its 
removal. This resulted in the premature repeal of the income tax in that year until 1940. 
The first modem income tax was introduced during 1941 in the Federated Malay States (as 
Malaysia was then known) in order to pay the expenses of the Second World War. At this 
time, the Federated Malay States only comprised four of the British Protected States of the 
Malayan Peninsula. Although the tax was to be renewed in 1942, apparently the bill, which 
had been prepared and passed, never became law, as the Japanese occupied the Malayan 
Peninsular from 1942 to 1945. After the Malayan Peninsular was liberated, the nine British 
Protected States and two remaining British Colonies of the Malayan Peninsular were united 
to form the Malayan Union in 1946. 
Subsequently, an income tax was introduced in the Malayan Union in order to raise revenue 
for reconstruction of the country after the Second World War. A report regarding the 
practicability, administration and draft legislation for an income tax was provided by an 
advisor appointed by the British Secretary of State for the Colonies (R. B. Heasman, 1947). 
The income tax, known as Income Tax Ordinance 1947, was introduced in the Malayan 
Union, still under British protection, in 1947, and has remained part of Malaysian law ever 
since. The provisions of the ordinance were based on the Model Colonial Territories 
Income Tax Ordinance 1922, which had been designed for the British Colonies. As such, 
common traits exist to this day in the tax legislation of Malaysia and Commonwealth 
countries (for example Singapore, India, Australia and South Africa). 
The Malayan Union became the Federation of Malayan in 1948 but did not secure 
independence from Britain until 1957, when it became an independent nation. The 
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Federation of Malaya was expanded in 1963 to include the two British colonies of Borneo 
(Sabah and Sarawak only) and the British colony of Singapore (which thereby gained their 
independence from the British) forming the Federation of Malaysia, although Singapore 
separated in 1965. The Ordinance survived these changes, even though the states admitted 
to the Federation in 1963 brought their own income taxes with them. 
The income tax laws of the Federation of Malaysia, however, were unified in 1967 to 
become a single statute, which remains the basis of the present Malaysian income tax 
system. This was in the form of the Income Tax Act of 1967, which came into effect in 
January 1968. The Act actually consolidated the three laws of income taxation which were 
then in existence, the Income Tax Ordinance 1947, which was only applicable in Peninsular 
Malaysia, the Sabah Income Tax Ordinance 1956, which was applicable only in Sabah, and 
the Sarawak Inland Revenue Ordinance 1960, which was applicable only in Sarawak. 
Z2.2 Yhe philosophy and rationale of taxation 
Taxation in its various forms has existed since mankind began organising itself into 
civilised communities. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (1992: 29) defined the tax as the compulsory, unrequited payments to general 
government. Taxes are unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government to 
taxpayers are not normally in proportion to their payment. 
Most tax scholars believe that for a tax system to work there has to be some consensus and 
consent on the part of the taxpayers. They believe that if taxes are compulsory, people need 
to feel that they have some say when decisions are taken to change them. 
In terms of a need for taxes, Wilkinson (1992: 5) argued that real taxation is necessary to 
reduce the private sector claims on an economy's resources so that they can be released for 
use by the public sector in a non-inflationary way. This is the allocation role of taxation. 
The market does not provide certain essential goods, or either over or under provides, so 
the public sector must correct this misallocation and taxation is one half of the process, 
while public spending and provision is the other half. Taxes are also used to redistribute 
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income and for Keynesian macro-economic policy, they have a role to play in the 
management demand in the economy. 
The philosophy and rationale for the collection of tax in Malaysia is similar to that adopted 
in most of the countries in this world. When the Governor General of the Straits Settlement 
of the Malay States first mooted the idea of establishing a modem taxation system in the 
then British Colony Malaya, 'it was with the feeling that it was the moral obligation of the 
colonial government to develop the country into an advanced, civilised region. In this 
respect, income tax system is seen as a means to generate income for the purpose of 
spending by the government to meet expenses for development of education, health, roads, 
transport and the like (SGATAR, 1984). The Income tax system in Malaysia is also based 
on the philosophy of the distribution of wealth, whereby a portion of people's income is 
made available to the government through the collection of taxes from the public. The 
revenue collected is then distributed amongst the public in ways such as providing support 
to pensioners, the unemployed, the sick and other welfare beneficiaries. In fact, the practice 
is intended to reduce the inequalities of income between income earners while at the same 
time not victimising any group of the public (MIEP, 1989). 
In theory, the Malaysia tax system has integrated income taxes with Zaka ?. 3. This is based 
on the tax statute that allows zakat payment to be credited against income tax. The system 
is, however, still deficient in that the assessment and timing of collection are not parallel. 
Effort is being made to appoint the IRB as the official amie. 4 or zakat collectors, to be paid 
fees amounting to as much as one eight of the total collection, though this will need some 
reconciliation of the law since zakat is governed by the state government under the Islamic 
Councils headed by the Sultan. 
2.3 Muslims are required to pay a flat rate of 2.5 per cent of their incometwealth to the Islamic Religious 
Councils. Administration of the Zakat system is governed by the Sultan as the head of the religious councils 
in each state. 
2.4 A person who is authorised to collect zakat. 
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2.2.3 Types of taxes 
The types of taxes imposed by the Malaysian Government can be divided into two broad 
classifications, direct and indirect taxation. The responsibility to administer direct taxation 
lies with the Director General of the Inland Revenue Board (DGIR), while the Director 
General of the Royal Customs and Excise Department administers indirect taxation. 
Tax revenue continues to be the main source of income for the Malaysian Government as 
the country continues to experience rapid growth. In 2001,52.5 per cent of the total Federal 
Government revenue was from direct taxes, the remainder being indirect taxes and non-tax 
revenue2 .2 (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 
Federal Government of Malaysia Revenue (2001) 
RM (E) Percentage 
billion 
Direct taxes 41.8(6.67) 52.5 
Indirect taxes 19.4(3.09) 24.4 
Non-tax revenue 18.4(2.93) 23.1 
Total revenue 79.6(12.69) 100 
Source: IRB Annual Report (2001) 
Corporate income tax is the largest source of direct taxes in Malaysia, followed by 
petroleum income tax. In 2001, corporate income tax constituted 51.6 per cent of total 
direct taxes (Table 2.2). 
2 *2 Non-tax revenue includes royalties from the petroleum sectors, collection from licences, permits, road tax 
and registration fees. 
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Table: 2.2 
Source of Direct Taxes (2001) 
RM (E) Percentage 
billion 
Corporate Income Tax 21.6(3.45) 51.6 
Petroleum Income Tax 9.9(1.58) 23.6 
Personal Income Tax 8.4(1.34) 20.1 
Other Direct Tax 1.9(0.30) 4.7 
Total Direct Tax 41.8(6.66) 100 
Source: IRB Annual Report (2001) 
Direct taxes collected in 2001 amounted to RM41.8 billion (E6.66 billion) compared to 
RM29.1 billion (U64 billion) in 2000, an increase of approximately 30.4 per cent (Table 
2.3), this being largely due to more efficient and effective programmes comprising payment 
schemes, tax assessment and debt management (IRB, Annual Report, 2001). This amount 
accounts. for 52.9 per cent of the Federal Government income for 200 1, thus illustrating the 
importance of direct taxes to the Government. 
Table 2.3 
Trend In Revenue Collection from Direct Taxes* (1991 - 2001) 
Year RM (E) Percentage 
Billion to Govt. Fund 
1991 13.2(2.11) 38.9 
1992 15.4(2.46) 39.2 
1993 17.2(2.74) 40.9 
1994 20.1(3.21) 41.0 
1995 22.6(3.60) 45.0 
1996 25.8(4.11) 45.7 
1997 30.5(4.86) 48.2 
1998 29.9(4.77) 46.8 
1999 27.1(4.32) 47.8 
2000 29.1(4.64) 45.9 
2001 41.8(6.66) 52.9 
Source: IRB Annual Reports (Various years) 
* Direct taxes include non tax revenue 
2.2.4 Basis of income tax in Malaysia 
The basis of income taxation in Malaysia is limited by the principle of territoriality or 
derived scope. Income is only assessed if it is derived from Malaysia or remitted to 
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Malaysia from overseas2 .5. Resident companies are not chargeable for income tax with 
respect to foreign sourced incoMe2.6 . Non-resident are 
liable for tax only with respect to 
income having a source in Malaysia2.7 . The income tax rate 
has been on a steady downward 
trend since 1987, for corporate income tax rates from 40 per cent to the current 28 per cent. 
This rate is applied with respect to the taxable income of both resident and non-resident 
companies. However, certain incomes of non-resident companies are subject to a 
withholding tax, for example interest, royalties, rents, and service and management fees. 
Withholding tax rates vary between 10 per cent and 15 per cent and may be further reduced 
under a double tax treaty-8. Resident individuals are subject to income tax at graduated 
rates, ranging from zero per cent to 28 per cent, on their chargeable income within the 
relevant range. A non-resident will, however, be taxed at a fixed rate of 28 per cent on 
his/her chargeable income. 
Section 3 of ITA 1967 imposes income tax upon any person on income accruing in or 
derived from Malaysia. A person includes a company, a body of persons or a corporation 
sole2-9. While income is not precisely defined in ITA 1967, section 4 sets out six sources of 
income chargeable to tax, as per Figure 2.1. The sources include profits from business; in 
this case, Malaysia uses a net income concept, generally based on financial statements. 
Income derived under section 4 is referred to as "gross income". Gross income is adjusted 
under Chapter 4 of Part 111; section 33 providing for certain deductions (including the 
deduction of expenses wholly and exclusively incurred in producing taxable income) and 
section 39 for specific non-allowable deductions. Other expenses may be deducted if 
considered ordinary expenses of trading. Income after allowable deductions and certain 
ITA 1967 s. 3 
1-1 rrA 1967 s. 3C. An exception exists in the case of banldng, insurance and air or sea transport operations. 
With respect to such operations, residents may be assessed on their worldwide income (whether remitted to 
Malaysia or not); ss. 54(2), 60B and 60C. However, various incentives may be available with respect to such 
operations. 
2.7 ITA 1967 Schedule 6 Part I paragraph 28 exempts non-residents with respect to foreign sourced income. 
2.9 Withholding tax is generally imposed by ITA 1967 ss 109 - 109B. Withholding tax rates are set out in Schedule I Parts Il and V and based on gross payments. In the case of contract payments to non-residents or 
services rendered in Malaysia, the withholding tax is not a final tax. Non-resident contractors will need to file 
a tax return and set tax withheld against any tax assessed; s 107A. 
2,9 ITA 1967 s. 2. 
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capital allowances granted under Schedule 3 is referred to as "statutory income". All 
sources of statutory income are aggregated and certain other amounts deducted (including 
provision for losses) to arrive at "total income". Finally, taxable or chargeable income 
equals total income less certain personal reliefs. 
In addition, tax is also chargeable on special classes of income under section 4 of the ITA, 
1967: (1) amounts received by non-residents in consideration of services rendered in 
connection with the use of property or rights belonging to or the installation or operation of 
any equipment purchased from that non-resident; (2) amounts received by a non-resident in 
consideration of technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with 
technical management or administration of any scientific, industrial or commercial 
undertaking, venture, project or scheme; and (3) rent or other payments (excluding film 
rentals subject to film hire duty) to a non-resident under any agreement or arrangement for 
the use of any moveable property. 
Personal income tax is imposed on individuals either employed in their capacity or as 
individuals operating 
' 
businesses as sole proprietors and also as partners in any partnerships. 
Under the ITA, income that is subject to tax not only includes business and employment 
income but also unearned income such as rent, dividends, interest, royalties and premiums. 
Figure 2.1 
Chargeable Income under section 4 of Income Tax Act 1967 
Section 4(a) Gains or profits from a business, for whatever period of time carried out; 
Section 4(b) Gains or profits froms an employment 
Section 4(c) Dividends, interest or discounts; 
Section 4(d) Rents, royalties or premiums; 
Section 4(e) Pensions, annuities or other periodical payments not falling under any of 
of the foregoing paragraphs; 
Section 4(f) Gains or profits not failing under any of the foregoing paragraphs. 
Source: Income Tax Act 1967 
2.2.5 Tax collection and administration problems 
Under the previous system, at the end of accounting year, every taxpayer was responsible 
for preparing the necessary documents required by the law, completing a tax return, 
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calculating the tax liabilities and submitting the return to the IRB. The IRB assessed the 
reported information on every return to determine the amount of tax that should be paid by 
taxpayers and a Notice of Assessment was issued. Taxpayers were obliged to settle their tax 
liabilities within 30 days of the issuance of the Notice of Assessment. However, if 
taxpayers failed to submit their returns, the IRB was empowered to determine those 
taxpayers' chargeable incomes according to their best judgement and make an assessment 
10 accordingly'- . 
The assessment ftinctions of the IRB arc subdivided into three broad categories: (1) 
assessment based on tax returns. without any queries; (2) assessment made after some form 
of field audit or desk audit - written queries are made and taxpayers are expected to respond 
in writing before assessments are raised and reviewed; and (3) investigation of cases on a 
selective basis. 
The self-assessment system (SAS) has now been implemented in Malaysia; the 
implementation occurred in stages up to the year 2004, when it became fully operational", 1. 
Under the SAS, taxpayers are expected to comply voluntarily with their obligations under 
the tax law. The concept of taxpayers protecting themselves by making full and correct 
disclosure in lodging their returns is no longer possible; rather, taxpayers are expected to 
determine their taxable income, compute tax payable and submit tax returns to the IRB. For 
the IRB, this is a shift in focus away from the examination of returns and the computation 
of tax liabilities to reviewing, auditing and investigation work. 
The broad rationales for the SAS of taxation in Malaysia include the following factors 
(Singh and Bhupalan, 2002): (1) to improve compliance by taxpayers; (2) to speed up the 
assessment process; (3) to reduce compliance cost; and (4) to facilitate collection of taxes. 
Each of these factors naturally follows from the others. Where taxpayers are tax compliant, 
this would invariably result in a swifter assessment process, which would in turn reduce 
both the taxpayer's and the tax authority's compliance and administrative costs. The end 
result would facilitate swifter and easier collection of taxes by the authorities. 
2.10 ITA 1967 ss. 90(2) 2.11 See footnote 1.1 
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2.3 The Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRB) 
Organisational changes were made with effect from I' March 1996 when the tax authority 
in Malaysia became a statutory board (previously known as Inland Revenue Department 
[IRD]). The aim of converting the IRD to the IRB was to give the latter more autonomy and 
flexibility of operation. Such a move was aimed to improve the quality and effectiveness of 
income tax administration in Malaysia, for which the IRB became responsible under the 
overall direction of the Ministry of Finance. The purpose of the IRB, according to the 
Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia Act 1995 (ACT 533), is to act as an agent of the 
Government and to provide services in administering, assessing, collecting and enforcing 
payment of income tax, real property gains tax, estate duty, stamp duties and such other 
taxes as may be agreed between the Government and the Board; to advise the Government 
on matters relating to taxation and to liaise with the appropriate ministries and statutory 
bodies on such matters; to participate in or outside Malaysia in respect of matters relating to 
taxation; and to perform such other functions as are conferred on the Board by any other 
written law. 
The IRB's strategies plan for compliance set out two objectives to achieve voluntary 
compliance. The first strand of their approach to encourage voluntary compliance was to 
make the system easy for the public to understand and aimed to minimise opportunities for 
error or abuse. The second strand was aimed to help taxpayer accuracy. The IRB continue 
to be guided by the principles laid down in the Taxpayer Charter when dealing with the 
public. These principles were later endorsed by key themes, which guided their 
management planning (set out in IRB) and their compliance strategy. 
The other theme of the IRB compliance strategy was to deter and tackle tax evasion. The 
task was entrusted to the Investigation and Intelligence Division of the IRB. The Director 
General of the Inland Revenue, Nvho is directly assisted by the four Deputy Director 
Generals, heads the Investigation and Intelligence Division. 
The general operations of the IRB are highly decentralised and there are currently 36 
branch offices located throughout Malaysia, headed by State Directors, carrying out the 
operational functions of the IRB. Most branches have an Investigation and Intelligence 
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Centre and depending on the size of the branches and the concentration or density of 
taxpayers, are staffed by experienced officials. 
The IRB perceives that the tax law places a number of important obligations on the public. 
Clearly the fairest and most efficient way of running the tax system is for everyone to meet 
his or her obligations voluntarily and in full. There are, however, some who do not, either 
deliberately or through error or misunderstanding. Where this occurs, the IRB 
acknowledges that it has a duty to the majority to take suitable actions to put matters right. 
The IRB also has aresponsibility to demonstrate to others who may be considering evading 
their proper liabilities that the risk of evasion is not worth taking. 
2.4 Compliance activity 
Roth (1989a: 2) pointed out that compliance with reporting requirements means that the 
taxpayers file all required tax returns at the proper time and that the returns accurately 
report tax liabilities in accordance with the regulations applicable at the time the tax returns 
are filed. Under this definition, both underreporting and overreporting are forms of non- 
compliance. Misclassification that does not affect the reported tax liability is not treated as 
non-compliance. 
The policy of the IRB is to achieve as far as possible voluntary compliance with the ITA 
1967. The ITA 1967 provides for varying penalties, fines and periods of imprisonment for 
tax evasion in order to demonstrate that understatement of income does not pay in the final 
analysis. The penalties also provide compensation to the government for having been 
deprived of revenue due to deferred tax payment. As mentioned earlier, the special task of 
investigating or monitoring suspected cases of tax evasion is entrusted to the Investigation 
and Intelligence Unit. The main objective of an income tax investigation is to trace 
understatement or unassessed income by examining books of accounts and other primary 
records or documents. The initial task of an investigating officer is to establish that the 
income in the taxpayer's books is taxable and that the evader has failed to declare it in the 
tax returns. The officer would then have to obtain all evidence to show that the omission is 
wilful with intent to evade. 
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In detennining whether or not to investigate, it is clear that the powers vested with the 
DGIR must be used for the purposes of the ITA, 1967. Nevertheless, there are several 
factors that the DGIR would take into account. According to Kasipillai (1998) and from 
experience, it has been noted that several factors are taken into account. The DGIR would 
take into account the cost to the taxpayers as a whole of having resources tied up and 
expended in a normally prolonged detailed investigation. A heavy-handed approach would 
attract an adverse response from certain taxpayers with vested interests. The DGIR would 
also have to demonstrate that certain persons are not above the law of the land. Press 
releases highlighting tax evasions are necessary to ensure that the public believes that 
taxpayers, irrespective of their status, comply with the law as it stands. The cost and likely 
benefits to raise revenue are also considered by the DGIR. The upgrading of computers and 
the use of sophisticated hardware have raised efficiency and reduced the cost and time 
factors in carrying out investigation work. Such a move has had the effect of increasing the 
productivity of the investigating staff and boosting revenue. 
It has become increasingly clear that non-compliance with income tax regulations seriously 
impairs the capacity of the government to raise public revenue. Tax evasion is, however, 
extremely difficult to investigate. Nevertheless, analysts have relied upon divergence 
between income and expenditure estimates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure 
of the extent of tax evasion. A recent study by Schneider and Enste (2000) estimated that 
between approximately 38 and 50 per cent of GNP escapes legitimate taxation in 
Malaysi2' 12 . Kasipillai (2000) used the monetary demand approach of Tanzi (1983) to 
develop a plausible estimate of the size of the hidden economy and the extent of tax evasion 
in Malaysia for the period 1971 to 1994. Estimates of the size of this tax evasion range 
from 8.7 per cent of the GNP in 1980 to a low of 3.7 per cent in 1993, with tax evasion 
accounting for an average of just over 20 per cent of actual income tax collected over that 
period. 
2.12 The study was based on the average of 1990-1993 using the physical input (electricity) and currency 
demand approach. The study assumed that world economic activity and electricity consumption appears to 
correlate relatively closely. A percentage increase in electricity consumption indicates a similar percentage 
increase in economic activity. Thus, electricity consumption can be used as a proxy measurement for the size 
of the economy. By subtracting the size of the official economy from the estimated size of the economy based 
upon electricity consumption, an estimate of the size of the tax evasion/underground economy can be 
obtained. 
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Some critical views by way of background to'the extent of tax evasion are worth 
mentioning. Although precise figures are difficult to obtain, the following are indicative of 
the problems of tax non-compliance in Malaysia. 
The total number of taxpayers investigated in 1991 and 2001 were 429 and 748 
respectively. The 2001 figure reflects an increase of approximately 43 per cent 
compared with 1991. However, the back duty taxes and penalties collected in 2001 
relative to 1991 were greater by 47.1 per cent (Table 2.4). 
e In 2001,33.5 per cent of 2.85 million tax returns issued to taxpayers were not returned 
(IRB, Annual Report, 2001). While this fact does not necessarily imply non-compliance 
(for example, there may have been duplication of files or taxpayers may have passed 
away), some non-compliance may be indicated. 
Table 2.4 
Additional tax and Penalties Recovered (1996 - 2001r 
Year No. ofcases RM(E) 
seftled Million 
1991 429 207.1(33.0) 
1992 341 267.8(42.7) 
1993 454 210.2(33.5) 
1994 485 251.1(40.1) 
1995 504 261.4(41.7) 
1996 504 426.1(67.9) 
1997 514 509.8(81.3) 
1998 609 362.1(57.7) 
1999 688 407.4(64.3) 
2000 682 428.1(68.3) 
2001 748 397.3(63.4) 
Source: IRB Annual Report, Various Issues 
*These are the back duties taxes cases only. 
9 In 1996, fines imposed by the court for failure to furnish tax returns were RM826,377 
(L131,800), reflecting a decrease of RM140,525 (E22,412) from the year 1995 (Table 
2.5). However, the compound fees collected in 1996 were RM4,874,331 (L777,417-66), 
reflecting an increase of RMI, 097,403 (L175,027.19) or a 29 per cent increase from 
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1995 2.13 . The substantial increase in compound 
fees collected, averaging 26 per cent 
annually over the four-year period up to 1996, indicates the seriousness of the IRB's 
14 
efforts to curtail tax evasion2' . 
Table 2.5 
Number of cases prosecuted and compounded* 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
No. of cases prosecuted 5,463 5,242 4,421 3,847 2,976 
No. of cases compounded 9,680 12,036 11,541 14,634 15,980 
Total 15,143 17,278 17,278 18,481 18,856 
Penalties imposed by Court RM 895,856 933,654 1,280,055 966,902 826,377 
(F) 142,882 148,910 204,158 154213 131,800 
Compounded fees RM 1,883,751 2,382,313 2,260,005 3,776,928 4,874,331 
(E) 300,443 379,960 360,625 602,878 777,790 
Total RM 2,779,607 3,315,967 3,900,060 4,743,928 5,700,708 
(E) 443,325 529,123 622,326 756,981 909,653 
Source: IRB Annual Report (1992 to 1996) 
* These are non-compliance cases such as failure to file a tax return; failure to pay taxes which 
are due and related document not submitted by the lodgment dateline 
Whatever the extent of tax non-compliance, according to Cowell (1990) it must be studied 
as a growing part of economic activity that is not recorded in official accounts of national 
income, national expenditure or national output. To that extent, it conceals the volume of 
national economic activity, the distribution of income, and the distribution of factors of 
production between activities according to the case or difficulty of tax non-compliance. 
What must also be taken into account is the attitude of citizens as employers or employees, 
spenders, producers and consumers, and all of these will be influenced by their attitude to 
the extent to which they distributed between legal/illegal and the moral/immoral aspects of 
tax non-compliance. 
2.13 More recent data has not been made available by the IRB in the Annual Reports. 
2.14 Compounding fees refers to the DGIR's powers to charge a person a certain amount of money as deemed 
fit, thus absolving the need to resort to the courts. 
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In terms of the causes of tax non-compliance, these are disputable. They range from a 
supposed general degeneration in moral standards to the increase in rates of taxes since the 
Second World War to meet expenditure that is evidently increasingly not approved by 
taxpayers. Taxpayers filing income tax returns are classified as non-compliant if they either 
underreport income or exaggerate deductions. Taxpayers also vary in terms of the 
opportunities available to them to conceal income or declare unwarranted deductions 
without risking detection. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has examined at the development of taxation in the Malaysian tax system, the 
current state of affairs and its administration, and the importance of the IRB to the 
Government in collecting revenue. Following this brief account, which is intended to give a 
basic understanding of the nature of the tax system, the IRý's role and the issue of tax 
evasion and how it affects compliance behaviour in Malaysia, the next chapter focuses on a 
literature review so as to develop the appropriate background for this research. 
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CHAPTER3 
UNDERSTANI)ING TAX EVASION 
Three things in life are definite: Death, Taxes and Mankind's pursuit to evade both 
Klepper and Nagin (1989) 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 is the first of the two literature review chapters and is devoted to the 
discussion of tax evasion, outlining the issue to date so as to develop the appropriate 
background for the research. This discussion will help to establish a structure for the 
current study and identify findings of previous studies relevant to the study being 
undertaken. The opening section of the chapter discusses conceptual issues dealing 
with the characterisation of the related ideas of tax evasion and tax avoidance. The 
chapter then reviews behavioural studies that suggest that the decision to evade 
taxes is sufficiently complex to merit the distinction between intentional and 
unintentional tax evasion. The chapter continues with a review of cycles and the 
repetition process in determining the nature of tax evasion. Understanding the 
process is essential for understanding the nature of tax evasion as well as the nature 
of the entire auditinglinvestigating function of the tax authority. The chapter then 
looks at key studies that have been undertaken to date in respect of SMEs, and 
highlights essential considerations. The later part of this chapter describes the role 
of tax practitioners and their decision-making processes, and highlights certain 
factors associated with the influence of tax practitioners on compliance activities. A 
number of methodological considerations are also raised in the following section, so 
that past studies and the present study can be put into context and compared without 
bias. Finally, a summary remarks of the chapter is provided. 
3.2 Tax Evasion: Background and definition 
According to Franzoni (1998), probably no aspect of tax compliance has escaped at 
least preliminary scrutiny. It is a major concern for all governments, and analytical 
investigation of tax evasion can be traced as far back as the work of one of the 
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pioneers of 'law and economics', Cesare Beccaria (1764) 
3*1. The modem analysis of 
tax evasion was introduced in 1972, when the seminal article by Allingham and 
Sandmo, (1972) was published. They applied the economic theory of criminal 
behaviour by Becker (1968) on law enforcement to taxation using modem risk 
theory that describes the decision on whether and to what extent to evade taxes 
32 
. 
This model has since been the basis for subsequent economic literature concerning 
tax evasion. 
3. Zl "atis tax evasion? 
The notion of tax evasion could be expected to seem quite evident, but this is not 
actually the case. There are many grey areas where the dividing line is not clear and 
sometimes the tax authorities may inappropriately characterise particular cases as 
either evasion or avoidance (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2000). It should be emphasized 
that tax evasion differs from such concepts as tax avoidance. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines evasion as the action of evading or escaping as by artifice or 
contrivance, escape, dodging, prevarication, shuffling, excuse or subterfuge, while 
avoidance is defined as to keep oneselffrom or refrain from. In general, most tax 
literature refers to tax evasion as the underreporting of taxable income with the 
intention to escape taxes. Taking advantage of tax law by exploring loopholes in the 
law is described as tax avoidance. 
In the absence of a statutory definition, the literature often distinguishes between tax 
evasion and tax avoidance. The two most illustrative and elucidating ideas from the 
literature are arguably those of Kay (1979,1980) and Cowell (1990). 
3.1 Cited in Franzoni (1998). Detailed article "Of Crimes and Punishments" available online at 
hLtp: //www. constitution. orz/cb/crim pun. htm. 
3 -2 Allingham and Sandmo were primarily interested in whether higher tax rates generate more or less 
compliance. Their answer, while intuitive, illustrates the difficulties and subtleties of studying tax compliance 
(Andreoni et aL, 1998). Becker outlined his premise that people decide whether to commit a crime by a 
comparison of benefits and costs. 
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Kay (1980: 136) pointed out that evasion is concerned with concealing or 
misrepresenting the nature ofa transaction; when avoidance takes place thefacts of 
the transaction are admitted but they have been arranged in such a way that the 
resulting tax treatment differs from that intended by the relevant legislation ... the 
incidence of evasion is therefore a function of the mechanisms by which tax is 
assessed and collected and the extent to which they can be controlled or monitored: 
the incidence of avoidance is ajunction of the tax base and depends on the extent to 
which legislation is successful in expressing the underlying economic concepts. 
Avoidance depends on the base, evasion on the assessment procedures. However, 
Kay also argued that there still remains the area of transaction, which lies in 
between the two - the intention or reason for the taxpayer's action as perceived by 
the tax authority. This is bound to create difficulties for the tax authority and offers 
scope for distortion and misrepresentation of activities by taxpayers. 
Cowell (1990) considered three approaches in distinguishing tax evasion from 
avoidance. First, the legal distinction between the two is unambiguous: tax 
avoidance is any legal method of reducing one's tax liability, while tax evasion is an 
illegal means of not paying tax or reducing one's tax liability. Second, the moral 
distinction in regarding what is legal to be moral and what is illegal to be immoral. 
The tax authorities' and taxpayers' judgements will then be to interpret the other's 
intentions - one side to enforce the law and the other side to try to reduce their tax 
liability. It can sometimes be argued that certain types of avoidance are just as 
morally wrong as evasion and therefore should be treated in the same way as 
evasion. Third, evasion and avoidance are just two arbitrary segments of a 
continuum that stretches from innocent tax planning to outrageous fraud". Cowell, 
however, pointed out that the legal distinction differs in specification and 
interpretation from country to country, moral views are difficult to translate from 
vague generalities to specific concepts of economic analysis, and the continuum 
thesis may be pressed almost to the point of vacuity. 
3.3 Since taxation is not always precise, Seldon (1979: 4) introduced a term tax "avoision" so as to explain further the blurring between tax avoidance and evasion and the loss of definition between the legal and moral. It is tax"minimisation with elements of both avoidance and evasion practised by the taxpayer who has difficulty in equating the legal with the moral and illegal with the immoral. 
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Lewis (1982), however, pointed out two major distinctions within tax evasion itself 
that need to be looked at; namely evasion by commission versus evasion by 
omission and that between intentional and unintentional evasion (this will be 
discussed in a later section). Evasion by commission requires some positive actions 
on the part of the taxpayer, for example claiming deductions for non-existing 
expenditure. However, evasion by omission requires a negative action on the part of 
the taxpayer, such as not reporting all income or a certain amount of taxable 
income. These give rise to the differences between intentional and unintentional 
evasion. Thus, the actual tax assessed may depend on the income the taxpayers 
choose to report, which may not necessarily be the same as their true legally taxable 
income, so long as they go undetected or where no actions are taken by the tax 
authorities. 
A certain degree of disagreement not only persists about the dividing line but also 
concerning the extent of tax evasion. Estimations of the extent of tax evasion have 
been indirect and open to a great deal of error, as there are no best or accepted 
approaches, with each approach having its own specific strengths and weaknesses 
(Lewis, 1982). Thus, interpretation must be cautious depending on the technique 
adopted and the country, as the size, causes and consequences of tax evasion vary 
(e. g. Tanzi and Shome, 1993; Andreoni, 1998; Schneider and Enste, 2000). 
In Malaysia, the ITA, 1967 spells out, under section 114, the following actions of a 
person3 .4 as wilful evasion of tax; namely, if the person omits from a tax return any 
income that should be included, makes a false statement or entry in a tax return, 
gives a false answer (oral or written), prepares or maintains false accounts or 
records, falsifies accounts or records, or makes use of any fraud (section 114 will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
Further, under section 113 of the ITA, 1967, any person making incorrect returns by 
omitting or understating any income is considered to be committing an offence 
3.4 Section 2 of ITA 1967 defines a person to include a company, a body of persons and a corporation sole. 
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unless the taxpayer satisfies the court that an incorrect return or incorrect 
information was made or given in good faith. 
The Malaysian taxpayers, however, are at a disadvantage when their actions come 
very near to the dividing line between tax evasion and tax avoidance. It appears that 
the Director General of the Inland Revenue (DGIR) has been given the discretion to 
draw the elusive line that divides tax avoidance and tax evasion. Under section 140 
3*5 of the ITA, 1967 , the DGIR has the power to 
disregard certain transactions where 
he has reason to believe that any transaction has the effect of altering the incidence 
of tax which is payable, relieving any person from any liability to pay, or evading or 
avoiding any liability to pay tax. The DGIR appears not only to have the power to 
act against tax evasion, but he seems also to have the power to act even against tax 
avoidance (Section 140(l)(c). The principle established on this legislation is that all 
transactions must be carried out for bonafide commercial reasons or in the ordinary 
of a business. Nevertheless, the actual tax assessed may depend on the income the 
taxpayers choose to report, which is not necessarily the same as their true legally 
taxable income (Reinganum and Wilde, 1985), so long as they go undetected or 
where no actions are taken by the tax authority. 
3.2.2 Factors influencing taxpayer behaviour in evading taxes. 
There is no easy answer to what influences a taxpayer to evade taxes. Ahsan (1995) 
outlined the following factors as significantly influencing tax evasion in developing 
countries: 
Rationality. People are assumed to be rational decision makers if they are able to 
perceive the feasible set of alternative courses of action and then to choose the one 
that is expected to give them the maximum level of utility. Rational tax evaders 
3.5 Section 140 of ITA 1967 states that where the DGIR is of the opinion that any transaction has a direct or 
indirect effect of, 
(a) altering the incidence of tax payable or suffered by any person; 
(b) relieving anypersonfrom any liability which would otherwise have arisen to pay or make a return; 
(c) evading or avoiding any duty or liability which is imposed or would have been imposed on any person; 
or 
(d) hindering orpreventing the operation of the Act in any respect. 
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maximise certain things; expected net income after taxes and penalties, or utilities 
thereof. The traditional expected utility approach to tax evasion decisions is based 
on the comparison of these benefits and the costs of the crime for the evader. In 
other words, a rational individual compares the expected utility of the benefits from 
successful tax evasion with the prospect of being detected and having to bear the 
consequences (Alm et al., 1992c). Under this premise, to pass up any gainful 
evasion opportunity would simply violate the axioms of choice, and hence would be 
irrational. The decision to evade taxes is always made under uncertainty. If someone 
decides to evade taxes, there is a risk of being detected and punished. The tendency 
of people to take risks varies between individuals, and therefore people may react 
very differently in similar decision-making situations. People can be categorised 
roughly into three groups according to their attitude towards risk taking: (i) risk 
averse, (ii) risk neutral, and (iii) risk loving. If someone makes his decisions purely 
on the basis of the expected utility of different alternatives, he is risk neutral. 
Usually it is assumed that most people are risk averse in their decisions, and 
therefore they require a higher level of expected utility in order to take risks. 
Because of this, highly risk-averse individuals are not very likely to evade taxes for 
fear of punishment. 
Psychological Elements. There is a feeling in many quarters that taxpayers differ in 
the sense of stigma attached to evasion and follow-up investigation, charges and 
penalties. A survey of the literature on attitudes also reveals that evasion is more 
likely mnong those who feel that they pay an unfairly high level of taxes (Witte and 
Woodbury, 1985). Resistance to paying taxes has been argued to reflect the 
taxpayer's doubt that public revenue has a visible and concrete social or national 
objective (Herschel, 1978). Taxpayers' views on this subject would vary, 
presumably depending on their income and wealth as well as their political 
orientation. 
Administrative and Legal Aspects. Complex tax laws or codes can add to the burden 
of compliance with the law and encourage evasion. Long and Swingen (1988) 
outlined five general propositions for the role of legal complexity in shaping 
taxpayer compliance. First, legal complexity is a causal factor of first rank with a 
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major influence upon the taxpayer. This proposition was tested by using IRS official 
estimates from its TCMP survey against defined complexity measures. It was found 
that legal complexity accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the variation in the 
incidence of reporting errors. Second, legal complexity reduces taxpayers' ability to 
comply by making the task more difficult and expensive, while reducing taxpayers' 
willingness to comply by reducing the moral force of the law. Third, legal 
complexity impacts upon compliance both directly and indirectly by mediating the 
role played by other variables. For example, complexity mediates the impact of 
structural opportunity as well as the role played by tax practitioners in the 
compliance process. Unintentional tax reporting errors arise because legal 
complexity reduces taxpayers' ability to comply by making the task more difficult 
and expensive. Because complexity acts to remove the restraints taxpayers feel 
about obeying the law simply because it is the law, wilful tax cheating can be 
expected to increase where the opportunities to escape detection are the greatest. 
Fourth, complexity is multidimensional, rather than unidimensional; thus, its 
specific effects vary depending upon which of its components dominate. Fifth, legal 
complexity complicates the measurement of non-compliance, helping to determine 
what is defined as non-compliance and by whom. Results have suggested that legal 
complexity is a significant cause of taxpayer non-compliance. It reduces taxpayers' 
ability to comply by making the task more difficult and expensive, while reducing 
taxpayers' willingness to comply by diminishing their understanding of and 
ultimately their respect for legal requirement. 
According to Ahsan (1995), however, this is probably true of marginal cases where 
the amount evaded is small. More significant perhaps is the power of the wealthy to 
block tax measures or to fight administrative procedures in dealing with evasion, 
which would create a moral effect on the general population. Herschel (1978) 
believes that knowledge of widespread corruption and a conspicuous lifestyle of 
senior policyinakers in the country may signal the mismanagement of public funds 
and hence induce resistance to comply with tax laws. 
Role of Specific Taxes. Evidently the scope for evasion depends on the specific tax 
instrument and how the taxable base is defined. The latter may also dictate the 
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collection procedures. In developing countries, which are primarily dominated by 
agriculture and non-formal service sectors, an income tax would be especially 
difficult to enforce. 
In a recent paper, Webley (2004) provided an overview of robust empirical findings 
that recur in relation to both individuals and business. According to him, the main 
reasons for non-compliance behaviour can be categorised as: 
V- 
Equity. The perceived fairness of a taxation system is important, with taxpayers' 
behaviour influenced by two perceptions: that the system treats them unfairly 
compared to others, and that the government is seen as providing too little with the 
revenue it collects. Evidence from a telephone survey carried out with a sample of 
426 Swedish male adults by Warneryd and Walerud (1982) shows that those 
agreeing with the statement 71e Swedish tax system is unjust and disagreeing with 
the statement Taking into consideration what the citizen getsfrom the state, our 
taxes are too high were much more likely to admit evasion than those with opposite 
opinions. 
Opportunityfor tax evasion. Opportunity has been reported as the most significant 
explanatory factor in non-compliance behaviour. However, it is unclear whether 
those who are predisposed to non-compliance seek to work where there are more 
opportunities to evade. According to Webley (2004), for people who pay tax 
through a pay-as-you-eam system (for example in the UK, Malaysia etc. ), where the 
employer withholds the tax due each month and adjusts the amount withheld as 
necessary over the year, there is no opportunity to under-declare income and rather 
limited opportunity to overstate or invent deductions, since there are only a small 
number of allowable deductions for employees. On the other hand, a self-employed 
individual has many more opportunities to conceal income or declare unwarranted 
or inflated deductions. This pattern - where greater opportunities are associated 
with self-employment - is true in most countries, as found out from Vogel's (1974) 
Swedish respondents, where 39 per cent of those who received income not taxable 
at source admitted evasion, compared to only 21 per cent of those where tax was 
withheld. Webley et al. (1991), in a series of experiments where participants had to 
34 
run a shop and take a wide variety of decisions, found that opportunity consistently 
emerged as an important factor. Here greater opportunity consisted simply of being 
able to make more kinds of deductions for expenses. 
Individual differences. Those who do not comply tend to be male, younger, 
egotistical, and have positive attitudes towards tax evasion and negative attitudes 
towards taxation authori 
* 
ties. There is also some evidence to suggest that education 
about the taxation system has a direct impact on reducing the propensity to evade. 
According to Webley (2004), one might predict that non-compliers tending to be 
younger may be a cohort effect or there may be a genuine change in people's 
behaviour as they become older on two grounds: first, people may become more 
integrated into society as they age and therefore be more willing to contribute, and 
second, the consequences of being caught evading taxes may also become severe, 
both in social and economic terms - back auditing is obviously more threatening the 
more years one has been non-compliant. The fact that evaders are more likely to be 
male reflects the generally greater tendency of males across the board to engage in 
criminal acts. In Malaysia, until recently women had very limited interactions with 
the tax authority, as it was the husband's responsibility to complete a joint tax 
return. Weigel et al. (1987) suggest that some individuals may be characterized by 
egoistic tendencies, while others may exhibit strong identification with community 
responsibilities and thus be less motivated to avoid taxes owed. In other words, the 
more egoistic an individual, the less likely they will be as a taxpayer to comply with 
rules and laws when compliance conflicts with their interests. In the context of tax 
education, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Mottiakavandar et al. (2003) (based on 
Norwegian and Malaysian participants, respectively) have shown that increases in 
tax knowledge have a direct impact on people's attitude to their own evasion and on 
the perceived fairness of the tax system, which suggests that there is a role for 
education in reducing the propensity to evade tax. 
Social norms. If a person believes that non-compliance is widespread they are much 
more likely not to comply themselves. Studies indicate that an effective measure in 
reducing non-compliance behaviour is to ensure that taxpayers have an accurate 
understanding of the compliance behaviour of others. Wenzel (2001b) carried out a 
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field experiment on a random sample of 1999 Australian taxpayers. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four groups: injunctive norm feedback, 
descriptive norm feedback, survey only with no feedback, and control condition. All 
respondents other than the control group took part in a survey and three weeks after 
the survey, the first two groups received feedback. The injunctive norm respondents 
were told, 'on average, respondents held the strong personal view that one should be 
honest in one's tax matter ... (though most) ... thought that most people would 
hold 
these views to a lesser degree ... Most people actually agree that 
honesty, 
responsibility and truthfulness are important when paying taxes'. In the descriptive 
norm group, the text concentrated on the difference between average taxpaying 
behaviour and the perceived taxpaying behaviour of the average person. At the end 
of the tax year, it was possible to see if these manipulations had had an impact on 
actual taxpaying behaviour - which they had. There was a significant reduction in 
claims for non-work-related expenses among those in the injunction nonn feedback 
group. This finding suggests that not only do social norms play an important role in 
tax non-compliance, but also that they are amenable to manipulation, and that 
ensuring that taxpayers have an accurate understanding of the behaviour of others is 
important. 
Dissatisfaction with revenue authorities. There is a positive correlation between 
belief by taxpayers that the revenue authority is inefficient or unhelpful and the 
likelihood of their non-compliance (Vogel, 1974; Wallschutzky, 1984; Elffers, 
1991; Webley et aL, 2001). This correlation also applied to small business (Adams 
and Webley, 2001). However, it is unclearjust how potent this is compared to other 
factors. 
3.2.3 Deliberate (intentional) and accidental (unintentional) evasion 
Tax evasion is a form of taxpayer behaviour, as is compliant reporting. The 
psychology literature points out that attitudes and intentions influence behaviour. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977: 889) believe that attitudes are held with respect to some 
aspect of the individual's world, such as another person, a physical object, 
behaviour, or a policy. Behaviour consists of one or more purposes/intentional 
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actions and the prediction of behaviour from attitudes assumes a rational 
consistency between behaviour and attitudes. The attitude - behaviour relationship 
has four elements: action, target, context and time. The behavioural criterion is the 
action that is always performed with respect to a given target, context and point in 
time. 
Bagozzi (1981: 608) introduced a more complete behavioural construct in that 
attitudinal reactions might at times be more complex in nature. Yhis would 
especially be expected as the intricacy andlor ambiguity of an attitudinal act 
increases, as the meaning of the act rises in saliency and in the number of 
consequences for that person and as the cognitive complexity and information 
processing abilities ofa person expand. 
In the Bagozzi model, attitudes influence intentions directly and affect behaviour 
through their influence on intentions. Intentions are defined as the subjective 
probability that an individual will perform a given behaviour. The rationale of the 
intervening variable is that intentions guide goal-directed behaviour and are at an 
intermediate level of abstraction between concrete actions and abstract attitudes. 
In the context of taxation, Kidder and McEwen (1989: 48) believe that the definition 
of non-compliance is far too narrow, which could explain the weak relationships 
found in empirical studies linking non-compliance to various independent variables. 
They presented a typology of non-compliance that highlights the rich complexity of 
tax behaviour. They present six variables or clusters of variables believed to 
influence compliance: these are coercion or the threat thereof, self-interest, habit, 
legitimacy and fairness, informal social pressure, and the level of knowledge about 
rules. The typology assumes that a single variable dominates the compliance 
decision but that it is not necessarily the only variable affecting compliance. 
Taxpaying behaviour is described as follows: 
Procedural non-compliance. This results from failing to comply with the rules 
relating to fon-n and schedule usage and the timing requirements related to filing. 
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Unknowing non-compliance. This results from ignorance regarding the complex, 
changing and sometimes ambiguous rules - for example, not reporting taxable 
benefits from employment. 
Lazy non-compliance. This results from a failure to keep accurate records and 
usually relates to income earned but not recorded. The lack of records is the main 
impetus for underreporting. 
Asocial non-compliance. This fits the classic definition of a 'tax cheater', who 
wilfully underreports taxable income and expends time and effort during the year 
reducing income visibility and hiding an audit trail. 
Symbolic non-compliance. This results from perceived unfairness and inequities in 
the tax law and an unfavourable disposition to the uses to which taxes are put. 
Includes tax protestors and petty evaders. 
Social non-compliance. This develops in the context of a pattern of social or 
economic relationships in which non-compliance is taken for granted or explicitly 
endorsed. 
Brokered non-compliance. This takes place on the advice of a tax consultant who 
assures the taxpayers that a specific form of evasion is highly unlikely to be 
detected. 
Habitual non-compliance. This emerges over time as the taxpayer establishes a 
pattern of reporting income and deductions. Initial instances of brokered or lazy 
non-compliance might evolve into habitual non-compliance. 
Kidder and McEwen (1989: 64) concluded that the state of knowledge in the field 
would be best served by an initial emphasis on taxpaying behaviour and then on 
tax-enforcing behaviour. They argued that by identifying a particular behaviour, it 
might be possible to target enforcement strategies to that particular behaviour, thus 
reducing the likelihood of unintended side effects of the strategies (not just 
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increasing marginal compliance but also preserving and reinforcing current levels of 
compliance). 
Carroll (1989: 254) explicitly recognises that the timing element of the attitude - 
behaviour relationship is important. He combines timing and skill to describe 
evasion as being of either a high level or a low level: 
Even when the taxpayer defines the appropriate behaviour as cheating rather than 
compliance, this cheating can also be done in a planful, high level way or a 
reactive, low-level way. An auto mechanic could have made a 'standing decision'to 
lookfor ways to avoid paying taxes owed ... Given such a decision to avoid paying 
taxes where possible, the more planful, top-down strategies call for assessing 
overall amounts orpercentage to hide, types of transactions to avoid recording and 
other goals and rules. A less planful mode is simply to look out for good 
opportunities, such as customers who pay in cash and havefrequent transactions so 
that they are known to be 'safeand are unlikely to keep track ... An even less planful 
mode is to come to the end of the year with a few shoeboxes full of records and 
some bills to pay. Several 'trial balances' may be attempted and a strategy 
constructed at that time for balancing safety and need orfor meeting a target tax 
amount. 
The Kidder and McEwen typologies appear to relate to the context element of the 
attitude - behaviour relationship. Carroll's focus on the level of planning, however, 
appear to relate to the timing element that seems to be captured by Klepper and 
Nagin (19 89), who developed a theory of line-item compliance behaviour and tested 
their model using Taxpayer Compliance Measuring Program (TCMP)3 -6 data in the 
US. Their premise is that compliance is a line-item decision. The perception of the 
probability that a line item will be audited is assumed to be a function of both the 
3.6 TCPM is a detail studies of the American taxpayer conducted on a roughly three years cycle by the IRS and 
based on a 'line by line' audit of a stratified random sample of 45,000 to 55,000 tax returns since 1965. Ilese 
audits yield an IRS estimate of the taxpayer's true income, which allows IRS to calculate income tax evasion. 
However, TCMP data have some serious and well recognised deficiencies: the audits do not detect all 
underreported income, non-filers of tax return are not often captured, honest errors are not identified, and final 
audit adjustments are not included. 
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dollar amount and percentage of the misstatement. They predict that the dollar value 
of the misstatement will increase as the true dollar value of the line item increases, 
but that the percentage misstatement will decrease. 
Klepper and Nagin (1989) also predict that the risk of detection of a line item is an 
increasing function of non-compliance on that line item and non-compliance on all 
other line items. Their empirical results show that the greater the amount of income 
not subject to information reporting, the smaller the percentage of non-compliance 
on deduction items, Weds paribus. Klepper and Nagin (1989: 18) term the 
gravitation towards an avenue of evasion the 'substitution effect', which refers to 
the interrelationship of non-compliance across the line items. The substitution effect 
causes taxpayers to gravitate away from relatively inferior evasion opportunities. As 
overstatement of deductions is relatively easily detectable during an audit, taxpayers 
with relatively large amounts of unverified income would tend to underreport the 
income rather than overstate deductions. 
The intention element of Bagozzi's model appears to be captured by Carroll 
(1989: 238), who interprets the Contingent Process Model of Payne in a compliance 
decision as follows 3.7 : 
1. Assess money in pocket (if high, no crime; if low, go to step 2) 
2. Assess certainty of success (if low, no crime; if high, go to step 3) 
3. Assess amount of gain (if low, go to step 4; if high go to step 5) 
4. Assess risk (if high, no crime; if low, go to step 5) 
5. Commit crime -a process with sub-steps involving the planning and ex6c'ution of 
the crime. 
3.7 According to Payne (1973), the model was an explanation of the results obtaining in a study of preferences 
among paired duplex gambles. The hypothcsised decision strategy was presented in the form of a process 
model involving two stages: an evaluation stage followed by a choice stage. The model assumed that the 
subject first considers the probability relationship within the gamble in a pair. If Pw < Pi, the gamble with the 
lower Pi is chosen. If Pw > Pi within each gamble in a pair, an attempt is made to maximise the $w. In the 
case where the amounts are equal within a pair, Pw may be used as a secondary criterion, and the gamble with 
the greater Pw chosen. For pairs of gambles whcrePw = Pi, there are alternative paths which can be taken in 
the model, possibly corresponding to two types of subjects. These types of pairs of gambles may be treated as if they were pairs of gambles in which Pw > Pi or as if they were pairs of gambles in whichPw < Pi [where 
Pw = probability of winning, Pi = probability of losing, and Sw = amount to win]. 
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According to Carroll, the above decision process is not optimal because it lacks a 
thorough consideration of alternatives and information in comparison with utility 
theories, and a formal combination of information into an assessment of each 
alternative. He does, however, conclude that the process is responsive to the 
enviromnent and possibly highly effective. 
The attitude - behaviour relationship and behaviour tax literature therefore suggest 
that the following dichotomy of tax evasion is plausible: 
Intentional Evasion. The intention to evade tax exists early in that fiscal year and 
the taxpayer takes pre-planned steps to hide an audit trail and/or obtain fraudulent 
supporting documents. The level of evasion is dependent upon opportunity and 
taxpayer skill and motivation (Carroll 1989: 256). 
Unintentional Evasion. This unintentional evasion corresponds closely to Cowell's 
(1985: 25) description of self-declaration in that the person spends the year 
garnering his income in the usual way and at the end of the year mayplay the game 
of cheat-the tax-man byfalsifying the tax returns on his declared income. 
The essential difference between intentional and unintentional evasion is the timing 
of the evasion actions. Differences in the timing of the evasion actions could be due 
to differences in taxpayer opportunities, skills and motivation, thereby causing a 
taxpayer to be more amenable to one form of evasion behaviour. Unintentional 
evasion encompasses lazy non-compliance, symbolic non-compliance and perhaps 
the habitual non-compliance typologies of Kidder and McEwen (1989). 
Carroll (1989: 256) believes that the level of non-compliance is a function of three 
factors, opportunity, skills and motivation, and that deliberate tax cheating occurs 
when the skill factor is sufficiently high to be able to take advantage of 
opportunities to cheaL Unintentional evasion permits a lower level of skill than does 
intentional evasion and the primary motivation occurs while the tax return is being 
prepared. 
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3.2.4 Cyclical or repetitive process 
The tax literature has not fully explored whether tax evasion constitutes a cyclical or 
repetitive process. Understanding the difference between cycles and repetition is 
essential for understanding the nature of tax evasion, as well as the nature of the 
entire enforcement function of the tax authority, so as to detect or deter tax evasion. 
In general, a cycle pertains to recurrence of similar elements or events. Terms such 
as substitutes, exchangeable, similarities and equivalents apply to cyclical 
processes. On the other hand, repetition refers to constancy of identities or non- 
substitutability and singularities in recurrences. In psyýhological terms, repetition 
and the repeated differ since the former pertains to the process of recurrence and the 
latter refers to the common identified elements in each episode (Deleuze, 1994). 
Without this identity, no repetition exists. Terms such as sameness, non-substitutes, 
identity and non-exchangeable are used quantitatively to describe repetitions. As 
Deleuze (1994: 1) explains: 
To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or 
singular which has no equal or equivalent. This is the apparent paradox of 
festivals: they repeat an unrepeatable. 7hey do not add a second and a third time to 
thefirst, but cany thefirst time to the 'nth'power. 
In the general traditional business cycle, economic crime was more prevalent in 
times of booms or economics growth because it could be 'afforded' and controls 
were perhaps not as tight as they could have been. It is thought that control was then 
tightened in times of bust or recessions as savings had to be made whenever 
possible. However, it is also thought that businesses are more likely to commit 
economic crimes as a recession occurs, to disguise financial problems within a 
company. 
In the context of taxation, the tax evasion decision-making process is very dynamic 
(e. g. Andreoni et al., 1998; Engel and Hines, 1999). Many of the economic models 
of tax evasion examine it as a static decision that is made in one period of time. This 
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is often not the case, because in reality people may continue to evade taxes for many 
years. This means that when the evader continues to evade taxes, he takes the risk 
that the crimes that are committed earlier will also be detected. As the evasion 
continues, the expected level of sanctions keeps increasing. 
The tax enforcement mechanism gains the attributes of a repetition when the same 
personnel, procedures and methods are used from one year to another. Upon 
detecting this pattern, the tax evaders can adjust their tax evasion acts around the 
repetitious enforcement activities to evade detection. 
3.2.5 Probability ofdetection /audit 
According to Jackson and Milliron (1986), the probability of detection is the probability 
that non-compliance will be discovered and that the tax authority will seek to rectify the 
deviance. Most broadly, discovery could be accomplished by all means available to the tax 
authority, for example computerised checks of filed tax returns for obvious errors, 
computer matching of third-party reports and all levels of audits. This is one of the few 
factors that impact compliance which governments have some degree of control over. The 
critical question is the extent to which raising the probability of detection will reduce tax 
evasion. 
In general, the theoretical and empirical perspective assumes that the effects of detection 
probabilities are clear; higher detection probabilities discourage tax evasion, as reviewed by 
Jackson and Milliron (1986), Fischer et A (1992) and Richardson and Sawyer (200 1)3.8, 
which tabulated the results of earlier studies that addressed the effects of the probability of 
detection on compliance. The table is methodology-based in that the results are separated 
for survey studies, experimental studies, analytical studies and regression modelling. 
Generally, the survey, analytical and regression methodologies found that the probability of 
detection positively affects compliance, while the experimental approaches were 
inconclusive as to the effect of the audit probability on compliance. The taxpayer, however, 
3 's Richardson and Sawyer (2001) reviewed findings of the key tax compliance factors, including detection 
probabilities, from the point where Jackson and Milliron's (1986) research ended in 1985; the research 
follows on from that pointý Richard and Sawyer's (2001) research covering the period 1986 to 1997. A 
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cannot perceive the probabilities of detection objectively, and therefore the decision to 
evade taxes is made on the basis of their subjective perception of the detection probability. 
One possible reason for why the majority of people pay their taxes compliantly is that they 
may overestimate the probability of detection. Selected research results concerning the 
probability of detection/audit and taxpayer compliance and the result of its effect are 
discussed below. 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model taxpayer behaviour on the basis that it confirms to 
the Von Neumann-Morghenstcm axioms for behaviour under uncertainty. The decision 
variable is the level of declared income under conditions of a flat tax rate, an audit 
probability, and a penalty function on undeclared income. The taxpayer reports so as to 
maximize expected utility. The mathematical result is that an increase in the probability of 
detection will always lead to a large income being detected. Srinivasan (1973) analysed the 
same reporting decision, and concluded that ceteris paribus, the optimal proportion by 
which income is understated decreases as the probability of detection increases. 
Vogel's (1974) survey of Swedish taxpayers, stratified by source of income, was conducted 
to learn about taxpayers' attitudes and perceptions with respect to income tax evasion. 
Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood that tax authorities would successfully 
detect non-compliance if they chose to evade taxes. Additionally, they were asked whether 
they had a better than average chance to evade taxes without detection. Nearly half of the 
university-educated respondents thought that they would not be detected if they chose to 
evade taxes, while only 22 per cent of blue-collar workers thought that their evasion would 
be detected, and females estimated a higher probability of detection than did males. 
In a US study, Mason and Calvin (1978,1984) conducted two independent surveys in 1975 
and 1980 and examined the relation between perceived detection probability and evasion 
behaviour. In the 1975 survey, the dependent variable, tax evasion, was constructed by 
using a dichotomous measure of three type of evasion; failure to file a tax return, 
overstatement of deductions and underreporting of income. A fourth type of evasion, 
reporting unearned tax credits, was included in the 1984 survey. They concluded that the 
detailed literature review solely on detection probability and taxpayer compliance was undertaken by Fischer 
et al. (1992). 
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belief that non-compliance would not be detected was positively correlated with admitted 
non-compliance in the two surveys. 
In another US study, Scholtz (1989) stated his belief that there is general agreement that an 
increase in the number of IRS examiners will generate increased revenues in excess of the 
direct costs of the increase in manpower. However, he also believes that certain social 
constraints restrain such an approach from being adopted. First, one negative effect of an 
increase in enforcement is the social cost associated with a more visible IRS, and a national 
distaste for increases in the size of government bureaucracy. An increase in examiners 
would also cause increased costs for the taxpaying population as a consequence of 
attending to the requirement of the revenue agents. Second, in a time of spending 
stringency, it would be politically unwise to appropriate more to the IRS for the audit 
process, while at the same time reducing spending on 'socially desirable programmes. 
Scholtz (1989) furthermore believes that the most obvious benefits of increased 
enforcement are that revenue can be raised from evaders, and others deterred from evading, 
due to an increased threat of detection. The revenue argument is most persuasive when 
enforcement is targeted directly at large-scale evaders. It is important to preserve the notion 
of fair enforcement so that the current levels of voluntary compliance can be maintained. 
Scholtz's argument against high levels of enforcement is, in summary, that it is contrary to 
the American belief in individual freedom, and that an aversion to coercive state powers 
pervades the political culture. 
Alm et al. (1992a, 1992b, 1992c), in a series of experimental economics studies, found that 
an increase in the audit rate promoted compliance; however, they noted that the differences 
in compliance rates across sessions with varying enforcement policies were not large. 
Further, when there is uncertainty about the audit rate, the effect on tax compliance depends 
critically on the presence and structure of public goods. In their second study (1992b), an 
experimental approach to estimate taxpayer response to various policy changes, they 
examined the effect of an income endowment, paid from taxes on voluntarily reported 
income, thus dependent upon the tax payments of all taxpayers. The experimental results 
showed a higher compliance rate (ratio of declared income to actual income) with higher 
income endowments, fine rates and audit rates. There was also a higher compliance rate 
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associated with the payoff received from the public goods (paid for by all taxpayers). They 
concluded that government should pursue a range of approaches to promote compliance. 
In a third study, Alm et al. (1992c) employed a similar design to compare actual 
compliance behaviour to predict levels of compliance based on an expected-utility model 
that assumes risk-neutral behaviour. Subjects received an income endowment, paid taxes on 
voluntarily reported income, faced a penalty on taxes evaded and received a public good 
dependent upon the tax payment of all taxpayers. They found that compliance increased (in 
a nonlinear fashion) as detection probability increased. They also noted that the level of 
compliance was higher than predicted by expected-utility theory when audit was low (2 per 
cent). They suggqsted that the result is consistent with the overweighting of low audit 
probabilities or extreme risk aversion. Even when audit probability was zero, there was a 
modest level of compliance. Risk-averse behaviour, however, did not occur in all 
conditions of the experiment; at high levels of audit probability, subjects exhibited risk- 
seeking behaviour. 
In summary, it appears that the literature, in which different methods of research on 
detection probability have been employed, seems to suggest a positive relationship between 
detection probability and taxpayer compliance, and lower taxpayer perceptions of detection 
probability were generally associated with non-compliance behaviour. Government should 
therefore pursue a range of approaches to promote compliance (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; 
Fischer et aL, 1992; Alm et al., 1992c), as its influence has important tax policy 
implications. 
3.3 What does past research reveal about tax evasion by SMEs? 
This section reviews SME literature with a particular emphasis on tax evasion and 
compliance. A summary of relevant studies on tax compliance issues among SME 
taxpayers is presented in Figure 3.1. These studies are discussed in more detail below. 
In a US study, Hite et aL (1992) explored the issue of tax compliance among SMEs. Using 
a nationwide mail questionnaire of 300 sample responses, the findings demonstrated that 
one in every five SMEs was either underreporting income or overreporting deductions. The 
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most commonly addressed factors associated with such non-compliance were an absence of 
third party reporting of their income and a perceived lower probability of detection. They 
also addressed questions of SMEs' motivations for using tax practitioners and final 
reporting decisions about ambiguous tax items. The results suggested that preparing tax 
returns correctly and reducing the likelihood of penalties were the most important reasons 
for using tax practitioners. The study also noted that SMEs were in favour of being in 
control of their own tax situations and making decisions concerning final reporting. 
In another US study, Joulfaian and Rider (1998) used quantitative analysis of IRS data 
(TCMP) from 1985 and 1988 to examine the compliance pattern of small businesses. Their 
research was specifically focused on the effects of differential taxation treatment on 
voluntary compliance by proprietorships, farms and rental real estate activities; for 
example, proprietorship income is subject to self-employment tax whereas rental income is 
not. The average amount by which income was understated was 26.6 per cent for 
proprietorship income, 30.2 per cent for farm income and 11.9 per cent for rental income. 
There was a very clear pattern in the data: the probability of tax evasion is positively 
correlated with tax rate, independent of the level of income. They concluded that the way in 
which tax obligations are framed through law and administrative practices are important in 
explaining the pattern of non-compliance. This finding also supports the notion that 
underreporting of income is positively correlated with tax rates. 
Another researcher, Rice (1992), with the help of the IRS Compliance Analysis Group, 
analysed small corporate tax compliance micro-data in the US. The data set was a stratified 
random sample of approximately 30,000 small corporations. He developed an econometric 
model to test several propositions about the determinants of tax compliance. The study 
concluded that an increase in a small corporation's 'transparency', or public disclosure of 
information about a corporation's operation, tends to encourage better tax compliance. This 
conclusion is based on findings that compliance is positively associated with being publicly 
traded 3 *9 and with belonging to a highly regulated industry, and that corporations whose 
operations are shielded from view through their dealings with a tax haven country 
demonstrate very poor compliance. This result also shows that a firm's profitability exerts 
51 
two opposing compliance effects. Managers of a corporation whose profit performance falls 
short of its industry norm may resort to non-compliance as a means of shaving costs. In 
contrast, high profit corporations may take advantage of their greater ability to underreport 
income without being audited. These related implications are derived from findings that 
deviations from the sample's median industry profit rate correspond positively with tax 
compliance, while deviations from the sample-wide median profit rate correspond 
negatively. Rice also concluded the marginal tax rate is associated negatively with 
compliance, although a reduction in the marginal tax rate would cost the government one 
dollar in revenue for every 5.3 cents it could raise via enhanced compliance. Poor 
compliance is also associated with corporation size and with being located in IRS-identified 
poor compliance regions. Rice,. however, found no clear association between compliance 
and service industries or the use of an outside CPA for tax return preparation. 
In Israel, Dornstein (1976) explored the capacity of the tax authority to check the accuracy 
of SME taxpayers' information. The data were derived from the taxpayers' files in the 
Income Tax division of self-employed taxpayers. Two sets of hypotheses were formulated 
and tested based on the proposition that a person's compliance with norms is a function of 
his/her basic orientations towards these norms, and of the control system related to norm 
compliance 3.10 . In general, the findings revealed that in a situation where non-compliance 
is 
highly detectable and the tax authority has high control in detecting non-compliance, tax 
compliance tends to be higher. This emphasised the importance of the taxation control 
system in detecting non-compliance, specifically when the declared income was lower than 
the actual income. 
3-9 According to Rice (1992), TCMP data broadly divide into small corporations with assets less than US$I 
million and medium-sized corporations with assets between US$I million to $10 nitillion. In the US, a 
corporation having a least US$4 million can be publicly traded on the American Stock Exchange. 
3.10 According to the author, the basic orientation is the degree to which taxpayers identify with the norms and 
consider them legitimate, whether he is favourably or unfavourably disposed toward them. These views are 
shaped by a number of factors, among which are the taxpayers' past and present socio-cultural experiences, 
their ideological predisposition toward the state and their experience in dealing with bureaucratic and 
governmental institutions. The sets of indices chosen for the test were socio-cultural background, length of 
stay in the country and age. As regards the control system, income as the economic factor involved in 
payment of income tax, efficiency of control and official records as the amount and quality of control by the 
tax authority were considered. 
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In Austria, Kirchler (1999) investigated the SME taxpayers' attitudes to paying tax. The 
study highlighted the fact that SMEs were more likely to perceive paying tax as limiting 
their freedom to make financial decisions about their own income. Further, this restriction 
of freedom was positively related to favourable attitudes towards tax evasion, lower tax 
morale and a tendency to act in ways to avoid paying taxes. The.. study concluded that 
reducing and avoiding tax was a way of escaping the perceived loss of freedom. 
Two studies in Canada explored SME taxpayers' perceptions about the cost of complying 
with corporate income and capital taxes (Erard, 1997b; Plamondon & Associates Inc., 
1996). The study by Plamondon & Associates (1996) focuses on the nature and extent of 
incremental compliance cost, sppcific irritants in the system, and revenue-neutral initiatives 
that the government could undertake to improve and simplify the system for Canada's 
entrepreneurs. The data was generated primarily from a discussion panel of six accountants 
who were dealing exclusively with small businesses. The panel observed the following: the 
proper ffinctioning of SMEs deduction; tax planning that focuses on income splitting and 
reorganization of share capital; clearly legitimate claims for research and development 
credits not being made; the use of estimating techniques to comply with non or partial 
deduction of expenditures; the complexity of provisions concerning company vehicles; and 
the high level of professionalism and level of assistance given to'small businesses by 
revenue authority. 
Erard's (1997b) study of Canadian SMEs revealed that the vast majority of them relied on 
outside professional assistance to comply'with their corporate income taxes and capital 
taxes, in contrast to the other taxes they faced. Erard noted that although the availability of 
outside tax assistance undoubtedly reduced the overall income tax compliance burden for 
these firms, the high cost of this assistance was nonetheless the most commonly reported 
source of compliance problems by respondents. Record-keeping requirements, the 
complexity of information requested and the lack of co-ordination among governments 
were also commonly cited sources of concern. 
Sigala et aL (1999) used an in-depth, semi-structured interview to question 23 British 
employed and self-employed taxpayers in various occupations. The study points to factors 
discouraging tax communication and proposes social norms as an alternative way of 
53 
investigating social influence on taxpaying behaviour. According to them, there is an 
foccupational norm' among certain occupational and industrial groups that favours, non- 
compliance by not reporting cash-in-hand payments. 
Two Australian studies explored SMEs' perceptions of the tax authority (Coleman and 
Freeman, 1994; Wallschutzky and Gibson, 1993). Wallschutzky and Gibson (1993) noted 
SMEs' non-compliance was due to the unavailability of the necessary information from the 
tax authorities. Coleman and Freeman's (1994) findings highlight the fact that the 
inaccessibility of the tax authority is at least partly responsible for a failure to instil an 
appropriate business ethic among SMEs despite their willingness to establish a cooperative 
relationship with the tax authority. The tax authority is seen as being neither sympathetic 
nor co-operative in their dealings with SMEs' concerns and problems (Coleman and 
Freeman, 1994). Such a lack of good communication and support by the tax authority is 
likely to lead to bitterness in SMEs that will result in tax evasion. 
In another Australian study, Ahmed and Sakurai (2001) reviewed what we know about 
small business taxpayers. Using a large sample of 2000 respondents, Ahmed and Sakurai 
contrasted a sample of small business taxpayeri (who were self-employed, in partnerships 
or owning a business) with those employed by private companies and those employed by a 
non-profit or government organization. The small business taxpayer placed a greater value 
on achievement and success and opposed government spending on minorities. With regard 
to tax issues, they were more likely to owe money to the tax office, to be incompetent in 
doing tax returns, to acknowledge paying less tax themselves and to believe that others are 
dishonest in paying tax. 
A recent study in Malaysia on SMEs by Mottiakavandar et al. (2003) analysed the 
compliance level of SMEs (sole proprietors and partnerships) and also determined the level 
of taxpayers' knowledge of general tax laws. Survey data was collected from 312 
respondents who participated in an interview and responded to a questionnaire. 
Demographic profiles of the respondents, such as gender, age, race, education and income 
level, were examined to determine the level of compliance among SMEs. The results of this 
study suggested that all variables had a significant relationship with the amount of tax 
knowledge. Taxpayers with a higher income and education level have a higher amount of 
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tax knowledge than those with a lower income and education level. Gender had a 
significant relationship with their attitude towards their own compliance and age had a 
significant relationship with intention to comply. 
In general, the literature discussed suggests that SMEs are likely to have more opportunities 
to participate in tax evasion and some common themes have emerged. Most of the results 
addressed issues such as that SMEs scored quite highly on honesty, had an adversarial 
relation with the tax authority and perceived the tax to be unfair (see Figure 3.1 for a 
tabulated summary of related studies). Further evidence suggests that SMEs not only lack a 
precise understanding of tax matters, but also lack confidence in keeping financial records, 
and importantly, do not view taxation as a priority. In order to overcome such problems, 
there have been suggestions that education and persuasion should be given priority. These 
findings provide an opportunity to further explore a selection of issues covered by these 
studies from a Malaysian perspective. The recent study on Malaysian SME taxpayers 
(Mottiakavandar et aL, 2003) only explored the level of tax knowledge and taxpayers' own 
perceptions of paying income tax. 
3.4 The role of the tax practitioner 
Hasseldine and Bebbington (1991) pointed out that the analysis of the tax evasion problem 
needs to take into account the activity of the tax practitioners. It has been suggested that tax 
practitioners can play a central role in the transmission and translation of legal rules and 
their meaning for the taxpayer. The role of tax practitioners is an ever increasing research 
issue as more and more taxpayers turn to third parties in, order to facilitate their tax 
assessment. Roth et al. (I 989a: 178) observed that tax practitioners play a central role in the 
whole system of tax compliance, both from the point of view of the taxpayer and in respect 
of the definitions of acceptable levels of tax compliance that tax authorities adopt. They 
state greater knowledge about the relationship between tax practitioners and taxpayer 
compliance could offer one of the most promising areas for improving compliance ... to the 
extent that practitioners can be encouraged to foster compliance in their clients, 
enforcement resource could be concentrated on the most problematic areas. Erard 
(1993: 163) pointed out that taxpayers often find it advantageous to seek assistance from 
experts in response to complex social rules and obligations, as experts may facilitate 
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compliance with social rules and obligations by reducing their clients' legal uncertainties 
and by lowering the time and anxiety costs associated with compliance. He argued that tax 
practitioners possess the means to exert an extraordinary influence on the tax compliance 
process since their knowledge of tax law and enforcement procedures far exceeds that of 
the ordinary taxpayer. 
The intermediary place of the tax practitioners between the Government and the taxpayers 
confers an important role on them in the tax collection problem. As a consequence, they are 
well placed to exert a strong and direct influence on the attitudes of taxpayers themselves 
regarding payment of taxes and to tax compliance generally (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; 
Hite et aL. 1992; Erard, 1993; Tan, 1999). This influence is perceived in a tax system in 
which the government audit and collection resources are limited. 
3.4.1 Tax practitioner client relationships 
The absence of regulatory control over who can prepare a tax return in Malaysia allows the 
taxpayers to have the choice of either preparing the tax returns themselves or engaging a 
tax practitioner to assist them. With the increasing complexity of tax law and the 
uncertainty surrounding many tax issues, there is an increasing tendency for more taxpayers 
to seek assistance from tax practitioners. In the United States, approximately 60 per cent of 
all tax returns are professionally prepared (Newberry et aL, 1993; Erard, 1993). Seventy 
two per cent of Australian taxpayers sought professional assistance to prepare tax returns 
(Marshall et aL, 1997). No data is yet available for Malaysia. 
Roth et al. (1989a) identified three principal services provided by tax practitioners in the 
US to their clients. These were (1) return preparation, (2) tax advice, and (3) risk advice. As 
a tax return preparer, the tax practitioners are expected to collect all necessary information 
from taxpayers and to complete returns with all the required forms and schedules. For the 
second function of tax advice, the tax practitioners need to apply their knowledge of tax 
regulations to advise clients on favourable but legal interpretations of the regulations and 
are expected to make use of their extensive knowledge of tax laws, discretion and diligence 
on their clients' behalf. Risk advice, the third function of tax practitioners, emphasises their 
knowledge of tax agency administrative practices, detection probabilities and sanctioning 
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practices, rather than a knowledge of tax regulations. This is merely to advise clients what 
to report with regard to that which is least likely to be challenged and the type of income 
that is likely to be ignored by the tax agency. It was reported that effective advocacy varied 
across each service. The nature of a tax practitioner's client base was an important factor in 
determining the stance that the practitioners were likely to adopt. Generally speaking, client 
expectations provided a strong incentive for practitioners to adopt an aggressive stance. 
Hite and McGill (1992), using an experimental design, examined US taxpayer demand for 
an aggressive tax posture from their tax practitioners. They manipulated three factors: tax 
practitioner's recommendations regarding an ambiguous deduction (deduct or not deduct), 
probability of audit (high or low) and severity of sanction (severe or mild). Taxpayers 
appeared to prefer conservative advice; they displayed a reliance on their tax practitioners, 
particularly on their professional advisors (CPAs and lawyers). They found that the role of 
tax professionals in compliance might be different from previous research, suggesting that 
clients demand aggressive tax advice. Their findings suggest that taxpayers, on average, do 
not have a preference for aggressive tax advice. These findings are strengthened by the 
tendency of the taxpayers to terminate the tax practitioner when they disagreed with the 
advice. The extent of the advice given by the tax practitioner may influence the taxpayer's 
tax compliance behaviour. Hite and McGill (1992: 399) argued that professional experience 
and tax education inculcates potential tax advisors with prevailing professional culture of 
aggressive tax planning. It is possible that taxpayer purchase tax expertise and reporting 
aggressiveness as a package but would purchase just the tax expertise if it were available. 
A tax advisor's aggressive posture may be independent of a client's wishes and based on a 
misinterpretation of the client's demandfor tax minimisation. 
Hite et al. (1992) examined why small business owners in the US use tax practitioners, how 
compliant they are and if they prefer to make reporting decisions about ambiguous tax 
items themselves. The study found that 64 per cent of the sample felt that tax practitioners 
should ask clients to make final reporting decisions about claiming items. They concluded 
that tax practitioners should let taxpayers decide whether to report the ambiguous items, 
given the high percentage of small business owners that want to be involved in making 
reporting decisions about ambiguous items. In other words, the taxpayers were in favour of 
being in control of their own tax situations and making decisions f6r final reporting. 
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Further evidence concerning the relationship between client expectations and the tax 
practitioner's role in tax compliance was provided by the empirical studies of Klepper and 
Nagin (1987). They noted that there were several factors that influence taxpayers into 
engaging tax practitioners to prepare their tax return. These include: (1) to save time, (2) to 
benefit from the expertise on the legal requirements involved, and (3) to identify strategies 
for reducing tax liability within acceptable tolerances for risk. They hypothesised that the 
constraints placed on tax practitioners by tax laws and professional ethics led practitioners 
to play a dual role in the tax compliance process. Specifically, they hypothesised that paid 
tax practitioners were (1) more compliant on return items for which there was little 
ambiguity concerning the legal requirements, and (2) were less compliant on return items 
where there was substantial legal ambiguity about reporting requirements. Results based on 
1979 TCMP data indicate that compliance on paid tax practitioners' returns was relatively 
lower for items that involved ambiguity or were subject to imputation. It was concluded 
that the net influence of tax practitioners on compliance was a declining function of the 
legal ambiguity of return line items but was an increasing function of the incidence of 
unequivocal legal breaches on that line item. 
Schisler (1995) conducted a laboratory experiment to provide exploratory evidence 
regarding the role of the tax practitioner in tax compliance compared to taxpayers, using 
two samples of 125 evening MBA students and 127 'Big 6' CPAs in the US. The samples 
were asked to answer questions concerning the role of tax practitioners as compared to 
taxpayers in compliance. Equity or fairness perceptions, aggressiveness and consensus were 
compared between the samples. The findings indicated that tax practitioners exhibited a 
higher degree of consensus than the taxpayers and the taxpayers had significantly lower 
equity or fairness perceptions of the tax system and were more aggressive (especially in tax 
due/under-withheld situations) than the tax practitioners on the same ambiguous tax issues. 
Another researcher, Tan (1999), used an experimental method similar to Hite and McGill's 
survey on taxpayers' preference for type of tax advice based on New Zealand taxpayers. 
Three independent variables were manipulated in the experimental' design: tax 
practitioner's recommendations (to claim or not to claim) regarding an ambiguous item, 
probability of audit (high or low) and type of sanction (mild or severe). Tan concluded that 
the taxpayers, who were predominantly small business owners, agreed more with the advice 
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given by their tax practitioners. The extent of their reliance on the tax practitioner's advice, 
therefore, indicates that they could be influenced in their tax compliance decisions even 
though there is a greater preference by taxpayers for conservative advice. Though these 
results are in conflict with Schisler (1995), they seem to agree with Hite and McGill (1992) 
using US data. 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) examined Australian taxpayers' perceptions of their ideal 
tax practitioners, using a random sample of 2040 people selected from the Community 
Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey'-". Of three kinds of tax practitioners sought by 
Australian taxpayers, the most popular is the 'low risk', 'no fuss' tax practitioner who is 
honest and risk averse. Second is the creative accountant, the aggressive tax planning type, 
and here the taxpayer is looking for a tax practitioner who is well networked and knows 
what tax offices check for at particular times, and lastly there is the cautious minimisation 
of tax, where tax practitioners identify opportunities to minimise tax. 
3.4.2 Decision processes of tax practitioners 
Given the importance of tax practitioners to the tax system, several studies have analysed 
tax practitioners' willingness to recommend aggressive tax positions to clients in 
hypothetical tax scenarios. Kaplan et aL (1988a) researched the tax reporting decisions Of 
professional tax practitioners in the US. They carried out an empirical examination of the 
decisions of professional tax preparers. -It was hypothesised that for ambiguous tax matters: 
(1) recent outcome information would influence the reporting recommendations of tax 
practitioners, and (2) the amount of tax experience would interact with situational economic 
variables to influence the reporting recommendations of tax practitioners. On non- 
ambiguous tax matters, it was hypothesised that (1) situational economic variables would 
affect recommendations made by tax practitioners, and (2) neither recent outcome 
information nor years of experience would influence the recommendations made by tax 
practitioners. The results obtained generally support the hypotheses. Since the taxpayers 
3.11 Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey is a snapshot of the beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations 
held by Australian citizens in relation to the Australian tax office, the tax system, Australian democracy and 
taxpayers in 2000, which was a national tax survey conducted by the Centre for Tax System Integrity at The 
Australian National University. 
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sought the tax practitioners because of presumed expertise, tax practitioners could 
be 
expected to exert significant influence over taxpayers. Tax practitioners could also have the 
opportunity to enhance or dampen a taxpayer's propensity to be aggressive. 
In another US study, Ayres et al. (1989) found that the regulatory framework in which 
CPAs operate allows them to interpret the tax law more to the taxpayer's benefit than those 
who are not CPAs. The CPAs were observed to help their clients exploit the grey areas of 
the law and thereby reduce compliance. The researchers used a set of five ambiguous tax 
cases to examine the willingness of tax practitioners to offer aggressive tax advice. Two of 
the cases involved a question of deductibility, one involved classification of income and 
two involved recognition of income. They argued that the economic theory of regulation3' 
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would predict a result such as that tax practitioners permitted to offer enhanced services 
through the right to practise before the IRS would have some degree of protection from 
penalties as well as negotiating power not afforded to practitioners not authorised to 
practise before the IRS. That is, if tax practitioners can effectively argue that there was 
reasonable support or substantial authority for a position, penalties will not be assessed. In 
contrast, tax practitioners who are not authorised to practise before the IRS are placed in a 
difficult position if their clients are audited. These clients must either go to the audit 
themselves and justify a position which they may not be prepared to argue or take the tax 
practitioner along as an adviser. This belief has led the IRB to insert an additional clause 
into the new provision in respect of a person who assists in or advises with respect to the 
preparation of any tax return in Malaysia. Under this new provision, a person will be guilty 
of an offence if his/her advice or assistance in preparing the tax return results in an 
understatement of another person's tax liability. This will not apply if the tax practitioners 
exercise reasonable care in the course of providing the advice or assistance. 
LaRue and Reckers (1989) also examined the decision processes of tax practitioners with 
regard to their role as advisors to taxpayers. They hypothesised that several decision factors 
3.12 According to Ayers et aL (1989), the economics theory of regulation asserts that regulation exists to 
benefit the regulated patties. In the area of tax practice, the CPAs fall into the regulated group of tax preparers 
and are able legally to offer clients a broader range of services than can preparers without professional 
certification. Regulation of this service allows these practitioners to interpret the law more to the benefit of 
the taxpayer, further increasing the value of the regulated practitioner's services to the client and, thus, the 
total profitability. 
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would influence professional tax practitioners' decision processes. Factors that were 
manipulated were probability of audit (detection), size of tax saving, the 
overpayment/underpayment year-end tax status of the client and the experience of the tax 
practitioner as a tax advisor. The study examined the influence of the subject's descriptive 
variables such as level of experience, age of the subjects and the subject's perception of the 
fairness of the tax system. They found significant effects between experience, saving and 
fairness but no significant effects between payment status, audit probability and age. They 
argued that their findings attest to the complexity of influences potentially engaged in the 
professional's decision-making process. 
Newberry et aL (1993) examined selected factors influencing the decisions : made by 
professional tax practitioners in the US. Their experiment was conducted using six tax case 
scenarios with 107 experienced tax practitioners who were CPAs. The results reflected that 
there was a significantly greater likelihood that tax practitioners would sign tax returns 
containing a large deduction associated with an ambiguous tax issue (but only in relation to 
existing clients) and a lesser likelihood if tax practitioners' penalties were communicated 
with high enforcement intent. Their study provides evidence that tax sanctions against 
practitioners can significantly influence the decision-making process. 
Schmidt (2001) examined the extent to which taxpayers agree with aggressive tax advice 
under a variety of conditions. This research extends prior taxpayer aggressiveness research 
(Hite and McGill, 1992) by applying prospect theory and the theory of regulation. The 
study reports the results of an experiment that used a nationwide, random sample of US 
taxpayers where the subjects read a scenario that involved an ambiguous tax situation in 
which their professional tax practitioner advises an aggressive advice position. The subjects 
then stated the degree to which they agreed with the aggressive advice. The experiment 
manipulated prepayment positions (refunds versus balance-due) and tax practitioner type 
(CPA versus non-CPA) between subjects. The results showed that taxpayers are more 
likely to agree with aggressive advice when they are in a balance-due prepayment position 
and when they use CPAs as their tax preparers. 
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In considering the ethical behaviour of the tax practitioners, Marshall et aL (1998) 
examined Australian tax practitioners' perceptions of the ethical judgements in which they 
practise, within the context of an income tax system based on the self-assessment principle. 
Using a self-administered mail questionnaire, the research identified and ranked ethical 
issues in terms of perceived frequency of occurrence and importance to tax practitioners. 
The findings indicated that inadequate technical competence, failure to make reasonable 
enquires/conduct research, continuing to act for a client where there is incorrect 
information and conflicts in distinguishing between tax planning and tax avoidance 
emerged as the important issues. Although acknowledging the potential for unethical action 
in tax practice, the tax practitioners considered that they carried out their professional 
activities within an ethical environment. 4' 
Cruz et al. (2000) also investigated professional tax practitioners' ethical judgements and 
behavioural intentions in cases involving client pressure to adopt aggressive reporting 
positions. The multi-dimensional scale (MES)3,13 was used to measure the extent to which a 
hypothetical behaviour was consistent with five ethical philosophies (moral equity, 
contractualism, utilitarianism, relativism and egoism). Samples of 67 tax practitioners' 
responses to three cases involving client pressure to adopt an aggressive tax return position 
were examined in order to evaluate tax practitioners' ethical judgements and behavioural 
intentions. It was found that the respondents supported the existence of all dimensions of 
the MES other than egoism. Regressions of ethical judgements and behavioural intentions 
on the MES dimensions indicated that the moral equity dimension, followed by the 
contractualism dimension, most heavily influenced ethical decision-making. In contrast, the 
utilitarianism and relativism dimensions were only related to ethical judgements and 
behavioural intentions in isolated instances. They also indicated that perceptions of the 
general morality or fairness of an action or the extent to which an action is consistent with 
an individual's duties or contractual obligations are the primary determinants of ethical 
judgements and behavioural intentions. 
3.13 According to Cruz, the MES provides insights into the philosophies or rationales that underlie ethical 
judgement. Use of this scale is based on the premise that individuals use more than one rationale in making 
moral judgements, and that the significance of these rationales differs among problem situations. 
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In summary, the literature has documented that the extent to which tax practitioners meet 
the special needs of taxpayers depends on a number of factors. Cruz et aL (2000) and 
Marshall et aL (1997) argued on the basis that tax practitioners have their own codes of 
practice that may shape their responsiveness to taxpayers' needs. Tax practitioners are also 
operating in a competitive market and their survival may depend on their capacity to do 
what taxpayers ask them, be it legal, illegal, or on the margins of legality (Sakurai and 
Braithwaite, 2001). In general, the literature suggests that tax practitioners play a dual role, 
as clarified by the findings of Kleeper et aL (1991). In ambiguous tax situations, tax 
practitioners tend to recommend aggressive positions; in unambiguous tax situations, they 
tend to enforce tax law. 
3.5 Methodological considerations 
Tax compliance research is subject to certain constraints. Data on the extent of evasion may 
be confidential or nor completely reliable. The confidentiality and disclosure of tax returns 
and information provisions in the tax law (in the case of Malaysia, Section 138 of the 
Malaysian Income Tax Act 1967) expressly prohibits the IRB from making 
personal/business data available to the public. Tax evasion is also seen as socially 
undesirable and a punishable offence and self-reports of evasion are open to question (Hite, 
1988; Elffer, 1991). Access to data is therefore restricted by both parties to the taxation 
process. 
Under these constraints, tax compliance research has evolved into five streams, delineated 
on methodological grounds as noted by Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001): surveys, experiments, analytical models, regression analysis, and process 
tracing. They, however, argued the need for robust research methodology in conducting 
research in tax compliance/evasion actiý, ity: 'too often ... the research plan is inadequate to 
support the research objective' (Jackson and Milliron, 1986: 146), thereby casting doubt on 
the validity of the research findings. 
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3.5.1 Survey research 
Surveys remain a popular research method amongst tax researchers (Jackson and Milliron, 
1986; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). Generally, surveys have studied beliefs, opinions, 
attitudes and behaviour through interviews, questionnaires, panel discussion groups or 
telephone interviews by selecting a sample of people either to find out about the status quo 
or to discover interrelations among available of interest (Jackson and Milliron, 1986: 146). 
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, only a few studies have used self-report survey methodology 
(for example Hite et aL, 1992; Kirchler, 1999; McKerchar, 1995). Most of the studies have 
been limited to interviews and focus groups to gather information about tax matters from 
SMEs. 
A critical aspect of surveys is defining the population of interest and selecting an unbiased 
sample that is representative of the population. After the sample is selected, it is important 
to link them back to known communities or taxpayer characteristics to provide some 
objective measure of the representatives of the respondents. However, where the scope of 
the survey is limited to a few clearly defined variables, especially if these variables can be 
related to a conceptual base and a suitable population is available for testing, the survey can 
appear to represent a viable course for tax compliance research studies. 
Obtaining adequate response rates and samples is also another important aspect of survey 
research. Although some studies have achieved response rates in excess of 50 per cent, the 
average response rate has remained around 30 per cent, with a low of 5.5 per cent 
(Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). Low response rates not only introduce potential non- 
response bias into the survey but also contribute to relatively small sample sizes in the 
studies. Non-response bias and small sample sizes limit the degree of confidence in a 
study's research findings. 
Another critical aspect of surveys concerns the honesty and validity of survey responses. 
The two studies by Elffers (1991) in the Netherlands provide the strongest evidence that 
validity problems may exist with survey measures of taxpayer non-compliance. He tested 
the validity of survey measures of non-compliance by comparing the responses of survey 
participants to actual tax return data held by the revenue authority for those same taxpayers. 
64 
The results showed that the two different measures of non-compliance were almost 
completely unrelated. He suggested that the failure of the survey measure of non- 
compliance to correspond with the return-based measure might have been the result of 
taxpayer self-presentation concerns. 
3.5.2 Experimental research 
These studies are designed to attempt to control and manipulate the influential independent 
variables, though it appears that no past studies have achieved the relatively complete and 
strict control generally associated with laboratory experiments. The strength of this 
approach is the ability to control and manipulate the variables of interest, but the major 
weaknesses are that hypothetical choices may not accurately reflect the choices that would 
be made in actual situations and the instruments may lack construct validity or may fail to 
present critical thresholds. Thus, the findings in experimental studies should be relied on as 
indicators of directionality of choice rather than of absolute choice (Grasmick and Scott, 
1986; Alm, 1991). 
During the experimental procedure, it is important for the experimenter to control subject 
preference; the conditions for this to be achieved are outlined in Alm (1991: 582). If these 
conditions are not met, results should be interpreted with caution. Other methodological 
problems include experimental realism and the concern that hypothetical taxpayer 
behaviour cannot be generalised to actual taxpayer behaviour (Hite 1988: 449). 
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of this approach, external validity can be improved by 
increasing the realism of the experiment, focusing particularly on the use of realistic 
parameter values and representative subjects (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Friedland, 
Maital and Rutenberg (1978) introduced the experimental approach for studying tax 
evasion but their work suffered from a lack of realism, since the subjects were instructed 
always to maximise net income and the probability of detection and the penalty rate were 
given. 
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3.5.3 Analytical research 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) pointed out that part of the tax-oriented research literature 
concerning the probability of detection, sanction and the tax rate involves attempts to model 
these variables analytically. The early analytical models (Allingharn and Sandmo, 1972; 
Kolm, 1973; Srivivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974) generally viewed the taxpayer as being a 
perfectly amoral, utility-maximizing person making the reporting decision solely on their 
risk profile (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Furthermore, the models assumed that the higher 
the level of taxation, the greater the tendency to evade taxes. These models have been 
criticised as being too simplistic to capture the tax evasion decision (Mork, 1975; Pencavel, 
1979; Dean et al., 1980; Lewis, 1982; Schmidt and Witte, 1984). 
Improvements to the earlier models saw economic models adopt relaxed assumptions to 
comprehend the impact of the diminishing marginal utility of money and utilise more 
sophisticated techniques of analysis in an effort to improve the validity of the models 
(Richardson and Sawyer,, 2001). For example, these models considered the labour supply 
under uncertainty (Cowell, 1985), strategic audit selection by the tax authority (Graetz, 
Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Reinganum. and Wilde, 1986; Beck and Jung, 1989; Klepper 
and Nagin 1989; Cronshaw and Alm, 1995), uncertainty regarding the taxpayer's income 
level (Beck and Jung, 1989), different levels of taxpayer risk aversion *(Beck and Jung, 
1989) and non-monetary penalties (Klepper and Nagin, 1989). 
Richardson and Sawyer (2001) commented on the difficulty of finding the right balance 
between simplicity and complexity within the economic models, as the models generally 
failed to find an equilibrium. Bardsley (1994) argued that a good economics model is one 
which is complex enough to be relevant, yet simple enough to be understood. 
3.5.4 Regression modelling 
Regression modelling uses actual audit data. The most detailed data are based on the 
American Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). TCMP is conducted 
regularly by the IRS and is based on a 'line by line' audit of a sample of 45,000 to 55,000 
tax returns. Generally, these studies seek to detect relationships between demographic 
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variables and tax return characteristics and the extent of evasion (Clotfelter, 1983). From a 
practical perspective, access to this data is limited, and from a theoretical perspective the 
true correlation is between the detected level of evasion and the variable studies. 
Weaknesses with the data. are that detected evasion is less than actual non-compliance, and 
may be accidental and not deliberate. Furthermore, the TCMP database excludes non-filers 
(Alm, 1991: 581). When empirical data is used to test theories, Kinsey (1986: 406) 
concluded that when the empirical data does not support a model, it is not clear whether the 
failure to confirm these theories is due to faulty theory, faulty measurement or both. 
Other data used in the regression analysis is amnesty data, originally used by Crane and 
Nourzad (1990). The main advantage of this data source is that it contains information on 
taxpayers who evade tax through the non-filing of tax returns. Amnesty data, however, is 
not a perfect source of information on non-filers, as those taxpayers who do not participate 
in the amnesty are excluded. 
3.5.5 Process tracing 
Process tracing has been developed and tested by Carroll (1989,1992). The method is 
founded on the principle that taxpayer compliance is a process rather than a one-off action. 
The method involves observing taxpayers while they carry out their tax activities so that 
insights into the compliance process can be obtained. The method was trialled by Carroll 
(1992), where a group of 100 volunteers were asked to keep a tax diary over the course of a 
year, recording any tax-related thoughts or activities. At the conclusion of the trial, Carroll 
(1992) concluded that the process was time consuming and the resulting diaries inconsistent 
in quality and difficult to code. 
In summary, given the range of methodologies available, it would seem that significant 
results should have been achieved to date. Roth et al. (1989a: 247) concluded otherwise; ... 
Yhere is little scientific evidence on which to base policies to encourage compliance, and 
there are few mechanisms in place for systematically accumulating more. Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001) believe the state of tax compliance research to be one of development or 
transition as it strives to move towards maturity rather primitive as described by Jackson 
and Milliron (1986). Therefore, progress in tax compliance research has depended upon 
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refining current methodological approaches for conducting research. Chapter 5 discusses 
the research methodology used in this study so as to increase the level of understanding of 
SME taxpayer behaviour through focusing on perceptions of taxpaying (SMEs and tax 
practitioners) using survey instruments, analysis of actual cases and opinion from the tax 
authority. Combining these methods may lead to a richer understanding of the phenomenon 
under investigation. By incorporating multiple modes of analysis into the design, additional 
insights may be revealed that would otherwise remain undiscovered via a single 
methodological approach. 
3.6 Summary 
Clearly, there is considerable diversity in the behaviour of SNE taxpayers motivated by a 
myriad factors with regard to tax evasion. This ambiguity could possibly be due to the 
methodological approaches that have been adopted in the particular research studies. All 
social science methodologies have their strengths and weaknesses and it is important to be 
sensitive to their limitations and thus select the methodology that is appropriate for the 
research goals. 
Previous research also indicates that there is a role for tax practitioners in tax compliance 
activities and the extent to which tax practitioners meet the special needs of the taxpayers 
depends on a number of factors. The question as to whether they side with the revenue 
authority or their client is much less well documented. 
The following chapter will review the issue of forensic accounting. Unfortunately, evidence 
concerning forensic accounting from academic research is still scant, yet it has been 
addressed within endless series of professional articles, texts and websites, all of which 
have provided a technically competent account of the profession as a particular mode of 
expertise boasting specific characteristics and producing identifiable effects. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 
All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered, the point is to discover them 
Galileo Galilei 
4.1 Introduction 
This is the second of the two literature chapters and it highlights recent literature pertaining 
to the prominence of forensic accounting through tracing its origins, definition and 
significance in the taxation world. Unfortunately, evidence concerning forensic accounting 
collected by academics is still scane*'. Its has, however, been addressed within numerous 
series of professional articles, texts and websites, all which have provided a technically 
competent account of the profession as a particular mode of expertise boasting specific 
characteristics and producing identifiable effects (for example, Dykeman, 1982; Bologna 
and Lindquist, 1995; Rosen et al., 1999; Brennan et al., 2001). 
4.2 An Overview of Malaysian Financial Accounting and Reporting Practices 
4.2.1 A Historical Perspective 
The origin of financial reporting in Malaysia cannot be traced precisely but it must have 
existed at the time when businesses were first established as a separate legal entities. The 
first documented financial reporting regulations, however, were those of the Companies 
Ordinances (and amendments) of 1940,1946 and 1956, before Malaysia (then Malaya) 
achieved her independence on 31 August 1957. These Ordinances played an important role 
in statutory regulations on financial accounting and reporting, until they were repealed by 
the establishment of the Malaysian Companies Act in 1965. The Act formally established 
the reporting requirements, rules and regulations on accounting in Malaysia. 
4.1 Academic literature emphasizes the examination of current coverage and the future direction and role of forensic accounting education [see e. g. Rezace et aL, 1996,1997; Carnes et aL, 2001 ] 
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Under the Companies Act, 1965, the Ninth Schedule, specifies the disclosure requirements 
in the financial statements of Malaysian companies. The Act remained relatively unchanged 
until in 1985 when it was amended to incorporate a revised Ninth Schedule which contains 
a more -comprehensive disclosure requirements and specifically requires that a statement of 
source and application of funds be an integral part of the financial statements in addition to 
a profit and loss account, a balance sheet, and the accompanying notes to the accounts. The 
Companies Act's main concern is that the accounts should be true and fair. It does not, 
however, state explicitly how this true and fair view should be judged and neither does the 
Act make reference to the accounting standards issued by professional bodies. Thus, in 
practice and in the absence of an accepted accounting framework for financial reporting in 
Malaysia, companies tend to use the Act as the absolute disclosure requirements rather than 
as minimum requirements. Empirical studies by Tan et. al. (1990) and Tan and Chew 
(1996) have shown that the extent of voluntary disclosure practices among Malaysian 
companies is very low, even among listed companies. It is not surprising that there were 
many accounts preparers in Malaysia who believed that disclosures should be strictly in 
accordance with those by the Act ( and approved accounting standards) and nothing more 
(cited in Tan, 2000). 
The development and advancement of financial accounting and reporting was also overseer 
by the accounting profession. The Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(MACPA) a private sector accounting body was established in 1958 as a company limited 
by guarantee that regulates the practices of its members who carry the title of certified 
public accountant (CPA). The first accounting guidance issued by the MACPA was in 1968 
and it dealt with a specimen company accounts. Items in that Specimen Company accounts 
(apart from being drawn up so as to comply with the requirements of Ninth Schedule of the 
Companies Act 1965), were also largely influenced by the practices then in United 
Kingdom and Australia. This mainly because most of its members were either trained in the 
United Kingdom or Australia, or had professional qualifications from accounting bodies in 
those two countries. After been admitted as a member of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) in 1978, the MACPA began to adopting International 
Accounting Standards. In 1984, the first Malaysian Accounting Standards (MAS) was 
issued. The process of adoption of IASs and development of MASs continued until 1997 
when the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) was established. 
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Another accounting body known as the Malaysian Institute of Accountant (MIA) was 
established in 1967 under the Accountants Act, 1967. Although established under the 
statute, the MIA operates largely as a private sector accounting, and its regulations cover 
the practices of the whole accounting profession in Malaysia. After its establishment, it 
remained inactive and only concentrated mainly on registration of accountants in Malaysian 
until 1987, its operations were activated to that of a national accounting body. 
4. Z2 Reporting Requirements by Type ofEnterprise 
The reporting requirements of an enterprise depend on the form of business organization it 
takes. A business enterprise in Malaysia may take the form of. 
eA sole proprietorship 
*A partnership; or 
*A company incorporated under the companies Act, which can be - 
-a private company (Sdn Bhd) 
- an unlisted public company (unlisted Bhd) 
-a listed public company (listed Bhd) 
For a non-incorporated enterprise (for example sole proprietorship or partnership), its 
reporting requirements are: 
9 To comply with the Approved Accounting Standards in the preparation and 
presentation of its financial statements; and 
* To submits its fmancial statements to the Director General of Inland Revenue for 
the purpose of determining assessable income under the Income Tax Act 
No other external reporting or submissions are required. The financial statements also do 
not need to be audited, unless its own constitution requires that the financial statement to be 
audited. 
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For a private company, its reporting requirements are: 
9 To comply with the Approved Accounting Standards in the preparation and 
presentation of its financial statements; 
To comply with the Companies Act - financial statements must be audited, should 
reflect a true and fair view and should be submitted to the Registrar of Companies 
within 6 months of its financial year-end; and 
* To submits its financial statements to the Director General of Wand Revenue for 
the purpose of determining assessable income under the Income Tax Act 
For an unlisted public company, all the reporting requirements of a private company stated 
above are applicable. In addition it has to comply with: 
9 the securities commission's corporate disclosure policy concerning high standards 
of disclosure and dissemination of information. It does not, however have to comply 
with the SC's guidelines which relate to listed public companies; 
9 If it is a bank or financial institution licensed under Banks and Financial Institutions 
Act (BAFIA), it must comply with the Central Bank's guidelines. 
For a listed public company, its reporting requirements are more extensive as it has to 
comply with: 
" The Approved Accounting Standards 
" The Companies Act 
" The SC's guidelines 
" The USE Listing Requirements 
" The Income Tax Act 
" The Central Bank's guidelines if it is a bank or financial institution 
A listed public company should submit: 
9 Quarterly financial statements to the SC and the KLSE 
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9 Other interim and periodic financial reports to the SC 
* the final audited financial statements to the SC, the USE, the ROC and the 
Director General of Inland Revenue; and 
* Financial statements that have been drawn up to show a true and fair view and are in 
compliance with Approve Accounting Standards. 
4.3 The question of origins: Tracing the history of the forensic accounting 
Nurse (2002) claimed that the current prominence of forensic accounting masks the fact 
that the discipline's roots can be traced back more than 5,000 years. According to Nurse, 
archaeological findings, dating between 3300 and 3500 BC, have revealed the habit of the 
world's first accountants or scribes in Mesopotamia and Egypt, who recorded commercial 
transactions onto damp clay tablets or papyrus. A scribe would then enfold the original 
document in a thin clay envelope. If the outer tablet was tampered with later, it would 
trigger an investigation. Egyptian bookkeepers were careful to prepare meticulous records 
since any irregularities founds by the royal auditors were punishable by fine, mutilation or 
even death. 
Nurse (2002) also pointed out that during India's Mauray period (321-184 BC), records 
indicate the inclination to go beyond accuracy and accountability, addressing issues of 
criminality. Kautilya's Arthasastra (science of material wealth), the earliest known treatise 
on accounting concepts, had already given detailed instructions on check and balance 
accounting and auditing and lists at least 40 different types of embezzlement. Kautilya also 
considered the punishment for accountants failing in their duties, be it by deliberate fraud, 
incompetence or negligence (Bhattacharya, 2002). 
In Scotland, the chartered accounting profession was only established in the nineteenth 
century and at this time a close relationship existed between lawyers and accountants. The 
two professions frequently belonged to the same associations and most lawyers offered 
clients accounting services. Accountants, in turn, incorporated the duties of expert 
witnesses into their general services rendered. An 1824 circular, announcing the accounting 
practice of one James McClelland of Glasgow, states that he will make 'statement for 
laying before arbiters, courts or council' (Nurse, 2002). 
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During these early years, legal work comprised a substantial portion of the accountant's 
services. When in 1854 the Edinburgh Society of Accountants petitioned Queen Victoria 
for a royal charter, it argued over the relationship between accounting and law. It stated that 
'the business of the accountant is not confined to the Department ofActuary, it also ranges 
over a much widerfield in which considerable acquaintance with the general principles of 
law is quite indispensable' By the early twentieth century, chartered accountants had 
increased their accounting services and court appearances reduced to a fraction of their 
overall business. It could therefore be argued that rather than a new speciality within 
accounting, modern day forensic accounting represents a return to accounting roots 
(Nurse, 2002). 
The discipline of forensic accounting also gained prominence during the trial of the 
notorious gangster, Al Capone. Eliot Ness, an agent with the Prohibition Bureau during the 
1930s, has earned a permanent place in the annals of American crime fighting for his 
efforts to convict Al Capone, yet Ness was only one of a team responsible for terminating 
Capone's career. In fact, it was an accountant with the Internal Revenue Service, Elmer 
Irey, who played the key role in pursuing Capone for tax evasion. Irey was, in effect, 
America's first high-profile forensic accountant. The team of investigators, dubbed 'the 
silent investigators', used their superior investigative and analytical skills to piece together 
an irrefutable chronicle of Capone's financial malfeasance (Nurse, 2002). 
The first person to use the phrase 'forensic accounting' in print was probably Maurice E. 
Peloubet in 1946 (Crumbley and Apostolou, 2002). At that time, Peloubet was a partner in 
the public accounting firm of Pogson, Peloubet & Co. in New York. Peloubet (1946: 459) 
stated that 'during the war both public accountant and industrial accountant have been and 
are now engaged in the practice offorensic accounting'. 
Peloubet (1946: 460) noted that forensic accounting was only practised in the courtroom, 
and that the preparation of financial statements has some but not all of the characteristics of 
forensic accounting. As the number and power of administrative and regulatory agencies 
increase, the accountant finds himself 'more involved in what is essentially a type of 
forensic practice'. The preparation of data for and the appearance before such agencies "as 
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a witness tofacts, to accounting principles or to the application of accounting principles is 
essentiallyforensic accounting practice rather than advocacy. 
4.4 What is forensic accounting? 
Thornhill (1995) pointed out that the discipline of forensic accounting is relatively so new 
that, up to now, there has been no formal definition accepted as the standard. Random 
House College Dictionary defines the term 'forensic' as 'ýpertaining to, connected with, or 
used in the courts of law or public discussion and debate". Accounting is "the system of 
recording and summarising business andfinancial transaction and analysing, verifying and 
reporting the results ". Thus, it can be emphasised that forensic accounting is closely 
connected to the legal process and has the potential to be involved in proceedings in the 
civil and criminal courts. 
According to the myriad of professional texts, manuals and publications that have emerged 
in recent years, forensic accounting refers to the application of accounting methodologies, 
techniques and expertise, and to the analysis and representation of issues, facts, and 
circumstances of consequence to various legal matters and proceedings. In other words, it is 
accounting work executed according to a particular standard of law and with the intention 
of supporting specific legal claims. The significance of this intersection of accounting and 
law as a defining feature of forensic accounting is argued by Rosen et aL (1999: 92): 
Forensic accounting and forensic accounting investigation involve the investigation of 
financial transactions and the accountingfor such transactions so that the results can be of 
used in a civil or criminal litigation proceeding ... Theforensic accountant is usually needed 
to clarify, uncover and verify the facts in a case and may also be required to quantify 
disputedfinancial issues based on the facts of various circumstances by using a variety of 
methods of interpretation. 
Along the same lines, Bologna and Lindquist (1995: 42) also argue that forensic accounting 
involves: 
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... the relation and application offinancial 
facts to legal problems. Forensic accounting 
evidence is oriented to a court of law, whether that court is civil or criminal. Furthermore, 
with its orientation to courts of law, the quality of the work forensic accountants must 
attain is subject to public scrutiny if the matter goes to trial. 
The management of the intersections between business, accounting and law encompasses 
three specific forms of forensic accounting work. They may be broadly classified in a 
combination of (1) investigative, (2) analytical, and (3) adjudicative (Crumbley, 1990; 
Zysman, 2000; Rezaee et A, 1992; Williams, 2002) aspects. The investigative dimension 
involves the collection and preliminary analysis of both financial and non-financial forms 
of information pertaining to a particular case. The analytical dimension involves the 
conversion of these informational inputs into more formal analyses and conclusions with 
respect to issues of responsibility, cost and potential avenues of legal resource through a 
forensic accounting report. The first two dimensions are primarily oriented to the question 
of what is happening within the particular case, the adjudicative dimension involves the 
participation of forensic accounting experts (forensic accountants) in the actual facilitation 
or delivery of particular adjudicative outcomes or solutions. This may take a variety of 
different forms ranging from the provision of advice to legal counsel in support of formal 
civil litigation and/or criminal prosecution, to the actual delivery of testimony as an expert 
witness. The critical dimension of the expert witness role is the investigation, analyses and 
conclusions in a format that is both suitable to the desired legal framing and which may be 
readily understood and digested by the various participants in the legal process, including 
judges, juries and other lawyers - who are often unfamiliar with complex accounting and 
financial matters (Dykeman, 1982). In visualising these legal issues, forensic accounting 
experts rely not only on their original reports but also on a variety of court schedules, 
exhibits and visual aids, which they are responsible for producing and communicating 
within the context of judicial proceedings. In summary, the involvement of forensic 
accounting experts in the legal process is extremely broad and encompasses a number of 
distinct professional functions. 
Williams (2002) summarised forensic accounting as a unique and highly specialised form 
of professional expertise founded upon well developed and technically sophisticated 
accounting logics, methodologies, and competencies. It is also supported by the qualities of 
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independence, objectivity and neutrality. It is through these attributes that forensic 
accounting experts are able to transverse the categories and frameworks of business, 
accounting, economics and laws, while rendering judgements which are interpreted and 
institutionalised as legitimate, authorised and ultimately authoritative in nature. All of this 
is of course fmmed in terms of an investigative mentality, integrity and sense of ethical 
commitments, which stand in stark contrast to the structural conformity attributed to the 
traditional accounting function. 
4.5 Role of forensic accounting in establishing tax evasion 
One of the measures taken by tax authorities in developed countries (for example, the 
United States and the United Kingdom) for combating tax evasion practice is to make tax 
evasion a crime. The framework of forensic accounting fitted neatly into reforming the 
procedure of deterring tax evasion for the Malaysian tax office with the introduction of 
criminal tax investigation as opposed to the existing system of civil penalties. 
In the Malaysian context, wilful evasion of tax is an offence under section 114 of the 
Income Tax Act 1967. This section prescribes the particular elements and acts that 
constitute the offence. For proceedings against a person under section 114, being criminal 
in nature, criminal law applies. As this is a statutory offence, the enforcement authorities 
must therefore examine what the "mens rea " (the guilty mind) and what the "actus reus " 
(the acts) are when constituting the offence prescribed by the law (IRD, 1989; Wise, 2000). 
The actus reus must be tied to mens rea and the enforcement authorities must prove the 
existence of mens rea in court. Obviously, each case will be decided on its own facts. To 
prove or disprove the mens rea, counsel will generally rely upon the work of the 
enforcement authorities, mostly based on the forensic accounting methods, who will testify 
as to whether the taxpayer established a scheme to evade tax. 
4.5.1 Section 114 Income Tax Act 1967 
Section 114 of the Income Tax Act, 1967 states the following: 
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"I 14(l) Any person who wilfully and with intent to evade or assist any other person to 
evade tax: 
(a) Omits from a return made under this act any income which should be included; 
(b) Makes a false statement or entry in a return made under this Act; 
(c) Gives a false answer (orally or in writing) to a question asked or request for 
information made in pursuance of this Act; 
(d) Prepares or maintains or authorises the preparation or maintenance of false books of 
account or other false records; 
(e) Falsifies or authorises the falsification of books of accounts or other false records; 
or 
(0 Makes use or authorises the use of any fraud, art or contrivance, 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding ten 
thousand Malaysian Ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to 
both, and shall pay a special penalty of treble the amount of tax which has been 
undercharged in consequence of the offence or which would have been undercharged if the 
offence had not been detected. " 
114(2) Where in any proceedings under this section it is proved that a false statement or 
false entry (whether by omission or otherwise) has been made in a return furnished under 
this Act by or on behalf of 'any person or in any books of account or other records 
maintained by or on behalf of any person, that person shall be presumed until the contrary 
is proved to have made that false statement or entry with intent to evade tax. " 
4.5.2 Mens rea ofsection 114 ofIncome Tax Act 1967 
The expression mens rea refers to the state of mind of the individual (IRD, 1989; Wise, 
2000). In section 114, the mens rea is one of the prescribed acts that must have been carried 
out with the intention to "witfully and with intent to evade or assist any other person to 
evade tax". 
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In tax evasion conviction, the prosecution must therefore prove beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused taxpayers "wilfully" committed one of the acts prescribed in the section 
114 (paragraph (a) to (f) above) and that it was committed with the particular intention of 
wanting to evade tax. 
4.5.2.1 "Wlyiully" 
The term "wilfully" has been considered and defined in several decided cases. In the case 
of Senior (1899) 1 Q. B. 283 at 290, Lord Russel of Killowen described the tenn as: 
y, not by accident or ..., Wiylully' means that the act is done deliberately and intentionall 
inadvertence but that the mind of the person who does the act goes with it 
In the case of lanella vs. French (1967-1968) 41, ALJR 389 at 393, Barwick J. stated: 
Wiy'ul connotes intention and knowledge ... the word contains in its connotations elements of 
purpose 
Windeyer J. (41 ALJR 389: 399) in the same case expanded Us interpretation as follows: 
If the word 'wiy'ully' be given the meaning and effect that it thinks it has in this context, 
then an honest mistake as to the existence ofany element to the offence is a defence' 
Napier CI, in the case of Davies vs. 0. Sullivan (No. 2) 1049 S. A. A. R 208, stated: 
the nature meaning (of the term wilrully) is that the act was done intentionally, not by 
accident or inadvertence but so that the mind or will of the actor goes with the act 
The interpretations seem to suggest that where, for example, a false statement was made 
through careless or inadvertent omission, that act is not 'wilful'. The particular acts, 
however, must be committed deliberately rather than by accident. The taxpayer concerned 
must have intended, seen from the natural consequences of his acts or omission, to evade 
tax. 
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Yet it is difficult to prove the state of an individual's mind at a given time. In relation to 
this, Bowen L. J., in Edington vs. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch. D 459, stated: 
the state ofa man's mind is as much afact as the state ofhis digestion. It is true that it is 
very dijficult to prove what the state ofa man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be 
ascertained, it is as much afact as anything is 
The state of a man's mind is to be gathered from the acts and conduct of the person 
concerned and can be proved by circumstantial rather than direct evidence. A person may 
of course testify as to his intent, but if his acts and conduct are shown to be at variance and 
are inconsistent with the intent he swears to, his own testimony in his own favour would 
ordinarily obtain very little credit. 
4.5.2.2 Intention 
Tax authorities must prove that the taxpayers have intended the effect mentioned in section 
114 before a conviction of tax evasion. Intention has been defined in RN. Mohan (1975) 2 
AII. E. R 93 at 200 as: 
A decision to bring about, in so fa'r as it lies within the accused power, a particular 
consequence, no matter whether the accused designed that consequences were of his act or 
not 
Intention is not the same as motive. What is important is the purpose of the act or ornission. 
The effect is also relevant. Motive is the reason why-, purpose is the aim or objects or end 
view. Under section 114, the motive of the taxpayer in omitting to include income which 
ought to be included is therefore irrelevant. 
4.5.2.3 fViy'ully with intent 
Wilfully with intent means the doing of an act with the knowledge that certain 
consequences will follow. It does not mean recklessly or negligently, which mean the doing 
of an act thoughtlessly without regard to consequences. It is the foreknowledge of the act 
coupled with the desire for it and that it exists in idea before it happens in fact. 
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Two situations must be understood, i. e. the state of mind of one who commits an act 
because he/she desires it to produce a particular result and one who, when he/she commits 
an act, is aware what it is likely to produce but is prepared to take the risk that it may do so 
in order to achieve some other purpose. 
Viscount Dilhorne, in Hyam vs. DPP (1974) 1 AII. E. R. 4 1, stated: 
A man does an act with a number of intentions. If he does it deliberately and intentionally 
knowing that when he does it, it is highly probable that (the consequence) follow, I think 
most people would say and bejustified in saying that whether other intentions he may have 
had as well he at least intended that (particular consequence) 
Lord Diplock in the same case added: 
Rat is common... is willingness to produce a particular evil consequence ... in my view 
this is the mens rea needed to satisfy a requirement whether imposed by statute or existing 
common law that in order to constitute the offence with which the accused is charged he 
must have acted with intent to produce a particular evil consequence... 
Therefore, intention need not be one's specific aim or targei. So long as it is highly 
probable that a tax can be undercharged by reason of any devise used by the taxpayer, it 
may amount to evasion. The court will in each particular case have to take the whole 
circumstances of the case. 
4.5.3 Actus reus 
With respect to the actus reus, the tax authority will need to provide the necessary tools to 
demonstrate whether or not there was tax evasion or at least an aftcmpt thereof. In this 
respect, the tax authority will examine primary evidence, including books of accounts and 
other accounting records of the taxpayer, third party documents and statements or 
representations obtained from potential witnesses. 
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Documentary forensic accounting evidence is presented in court in two forms: 
I. Primary, which includes individual accounting documents in original form, obtained 
directly from the taxpayer or other parties; and 
2. Secondary, which includes schedules, exhibits, summaries, graphs and charts, 
which are based on the original source documents. While this evidence may not in and of 
itself be evidence, it has been admitted to assist the trier of fact in understanding the 
primary evidence. 
Section 114(l) identifies six categories of acts, which if committed would constitute the 
offence of tax evasion. Assisting a person to commit any of the acts is itself an offence. 
Professionals who prepare tax returns or tax computations based on data supplied by their 
clients can also be charged under section 114, In such a situation, however, by virtue of 
section 114(2), there is a presumption that the taxpayer is to be held equally liable. 
The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1999, however, introduced a specific provision in 
respect of a person who assists in, or advises with respect to the preparation of any return 
with the introduction of SAS. Under this provision, a person will be guilty of an offence if 
his/her advice or assistance in preparing the tax return results in an understatement of 
another person's tax liability. This will not apply if the tax practitioner exercises reasonable 
care in the course of providing the advice or assistance. 
4.5.3.1 Non-reporting ofincome [section 114(1)aj 
The paragraph of this section reads; 'Omitsfrom a return made under this act any income 
which should be included. 
The elements that constitute an offence under this section are; (1) there must be an 
omission from a return; and (2) the omission was 'income' which should have been 
included. 
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Whether there is 'omission' or not is a question of fact and that omission must relate to 
'income which should be included'. Income is not defined in the Act. Section 4 of the Act, 
however, sets out the classes of income on which tax is chargeable and any concealment of 
income from any of the sources mentioned in section 4(a) to (f) can be legally constructed 
as omission to include income which should have been included in the return. 
4.5.3.2 False statement [section 114(1)bj 
The paragraph of this section reads; 'Makes a false statement or entry in a return made 
under this Act. 
The provision deals with fraudulent misrepresentation in a return made under the Act. A 
return is not defined in the Act, but it is submitted that a return made under the Act means a 
return in the prescribed form as detailed in section 77(l). The Director General is also 
empowered to compel a taxpayer to provide complete information by giving him a notice 
and that notice may specify the kind of return that is sought (section 78(a)). 
To sustain a charge, firstly the taxpayer must wilfully with intent make an untrue statement. 
It may be made (1) knowingly, (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly or 
indifferently or carelessly as to whether the statement is true or false. It is submitted that if 
either of the above is proved, the taxpayer must be held to have made the statement or entry 
falsely. 
4.5.3.3 False answers [section 114(l)(c)] 
The paragraph of this section reads; 'Gives a false answer (orally or in writing) to a 
question asked or requestfor information made in pursuance of this Act. 
The paragraph covers a situation where misleading, deceptive, inaccurate or untrue replies 
are given by the taxpayer when responding to queries and requests for information by the 
IRB. It may relate to oral responses as well as to those made in writing. Where a response is 
in oral form, such responses should be supported by some other form of evidence, for 
example in writing, or taped recordings, so as to avoid unnecessary problems in court. 
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4.5.3.4 False accounts and records [section 114(l)(d) and (e)] 
The paragraphs of this section read; 'Prepares or maintains or authorises the preparation 
or maintenance of false books of account or other false records' and Talsi(les or 
authorises thefalsification of books ofaccount or otherfalse records'respectively. 
There is a statutory duty for every trader to keep such books and records as may be 
necessary to enable an adequate return to be made (Section 82 of the Act). Any person 
preparing or maintaining or authorising such preparation or maintenance having false books 
or records of account are liable to be charged under this section. Tax evasion by this 
category of people is that there is an understatement of income supported by incorrect 
accounts or an understatement of income supported by false accounts. 
The only difficulty here is what happens if the taxpayer confesses that he did maintain two 
sets of books, as claimed by Tighe (1985) (cited in Rice, 1992) in the United States, that 
many businesses maintain two sets of accounts in order to evade taxes. By this practice, the 
firm keeps two sets of accounting books, one that records all the real values of revenue and 
cost that are used for management and another that has the false accounting information 
which is used for tax purposes. This is a question of evidence and intention must therefore 
be proven. 
4.5.3.5 Fraud, art or contrivance [section 114(l)(1)] 
The paragraph of this section reads; 'Makes use or authorises the use of any fraud, art or 
contrivance'. 
This is a sweeping provision and covers situations envisaged by earlier paragraphs. It is an 
all-embracing provision, which sums up the underlying basis of tax evasion. 
Fraud is a human phenomenon, which can take many forms and may be the basis for either 
a civil action or a criminal charge (Comer, 1985). According to the Auditing Practising 
Board (1995), fraud comprises both the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal 
financial advantage and intentional misrepresentations affecting the financial statements by 
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one or more individuals among management, employees or third parties. It is the obtaining 
of pecuniary advantage by deceitful means and an act of deliberate cheating which involves 
trickery and cunning methods to fool the tax authority. This includes, among others: 
(a) Manipulation of figures, falsification or alteration of records or documents. Forgery or 
sham transactions to evade tax. 
(b) Suppression or omission of the actual substance of a particular transaction. The twisting 
of facts and concealment of material information from tax authorities. 
(c) Recording of transactions which in fact are in substance non existent. 
(d) Exaggeration of outgoings, disbursements, expenditures or other payments howsoever 
described. 
(e) Distorting facts about assets and liabilities. 
(f) Malicious cover-up action of any sort with intent to evade tax. 
4.6 Forensic accounting techniques in proving undeclared income 
The criminal tax investigators must gather evidentiary documents, interview potential 
witnesses and piece together the elements that are necessary to prove that a crime was 
committed by tying the actus reus to the mens rea. Because mens rea relates to fraudulent 
intent, it must be demonstrated that there was a pattern of evasion sufficient to establish that 
it was an oversight by the taxpayer. 
In order to prove that there is a substantial amount of additional tax due and that there was a 
wilful attempt to evade it, the correct taxable income in excess of that reported must be 
established. This is done by the direct approach, which involves proof of specific items 
relating to sales, expenses etc., or the indirect approach, which is based upon circumstantial 
evidence relating to the taxpayer's income. 
With respect to the direct method, the tax authority attempts to establish that the taxpayer's 
transactions during the taxation year are not accurately reflected in the income tax returns, 
and the taxpayer is thereby wilfully understating income tax liability. This involves probing 
missing income by pointing to specific items of income that do not appear on the tax return. 
The evidence may include admissions of the defendant, the defendant's books and records, 
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bank records, the testimony of inside witnesses (e. g. the defendant's employees and ex- 
spouse), the testimony and documentation of witnesses engaged in the transactions which 
have been reported inaccurately and the testimony of the defendant's accountant. 
When direct methods prove unproductive and the tax authority has a reasonable indication 
that there is a likelihood of unreported income, indirect methods may be employed. The 
indirect methods use economic reality and financial status techniques in which the 
taxpayer's finances are reconstructed through circumstantial evidence. The methods 
commonly usedi-2 by tax authorities for proving unreported income are as follows: (1) net 
worth method; (2) expenditure; (3) bank deposits; (4) percentage mark-up; (5) units and 
volumes; and (6) Benford's law. 
.3 In Malaysia4 , there 
is no statutory provision expressly authorising the IRB to use whatever 
method necessary in determining unreported income in cases where the taxpayer maintains 
no records or the financial records are inadequate and unreliable. It is the responsibility of 
the IRB to seek out and counter evasion where it is known or thought to exist. 
4.61 Net worth method 
The net worth method was first used in the US in 193 1. It was developed by the Internal 
Revenue Service of the United States (IRS) to prove the income tax evasion of Al Capone. 
The method involves the collection and examination of the taxpayer's personal and 
business records to obtain particulars of assets and liabilities for establishing lifestyle, a 
long process which entails a study and verification of the detailed movement of the 
taxpayer's assets. The tax authority will compare increments in wealth with known income 
on a calendar year basis to determine whether there has been any omission or 
understatement of income, which is shown by discrepancies in the comparisons. 
41 Commonly used by developed countries, for example the US, the UK, Canada and Australia. The Malaysia tax authority has also used indirect methods, especially the net worth method, since 1947 with the introduction of investigation activities. 
4.3 In the United States, Treasury Regulation 1.446 authorises the IRS to use whatever method necessary in determining unreported income. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of the calculation of the net worth method. 
Figure 4.1: The Net Worth Method 
Year One Year Two 
Assets Assets 
Less: Liabilities Less: Liabilities 
Equal: Net Worth Equal: Net Worth 
Less: Net worth In year one 
Equal: Net worth increase 
Add: Non deductible expenditure 
Less: Non taxable income 
Equal: Corrected taxable income 
Less: Reported taxable Income 
Equal: Unreported taxable income 
The determination of non-deductible expenditure may not be easy. Barson (1986: 98) made 
the following suggestions for detennining expenses: 
For that you need to go into the checking and savings accounts of individuals and 
depending on the extent of the accuracy of the records involved, you may have to make 
certain assumptions. Interview the parties involved and reconstruct their standard of living, 
making some educated guesses as to what they spend on such mundane expenses as food, 
clothing and various other elements of living that often leave little or no residue financial 
trail. Be as thorough as possible in as much as you are on less stable ground (even though 
the ultimate result may be very supportable ones) than ifyou had come up with proof in the 
form ofactual cash deposits that were not reconcilable to reported income. 
According to Wise (2000) and Cnunbley et al. (2003), the net worth method is useful 
where; (1) the taxpayer keeps no books or records; (2) the taxpayer does keep books and 
records, but (a) they are not available, (b) they are incomplete, (c) refuses to produce them; 
(3) another indirect method of proving income was applied, and the net worth method is 
used to corroborate it. 
The typical defences to the net worth method may include: (1) the calculation of the 
opening net worth and the closing net worth merely includes the discovery of assets already 
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owned; (2) increases in net worth are from non-taxable sources, such as gifts, loans and 
inheritances; (3) the use of erroneous accounting procedures to calculate net worth; (4) the 
holding of assets or funds as a nominee; or (5) an opening net worth of substantial cash on 
hand which failed to be considered. 
4.62 Expenditures method 
The expenditure method (also referred to as source and application of funds method) is 
similar to the net worth method in that the relationships among income, personal 
expenditures and increases/decreases in the taxpayer's assets are the same under both 
methods. The method is based on the theory that if the taxpayer's expenditures during a 
given period exceed reported income and the source of such expenditure is unexplained, it 
may be inferred that such expenditures represent unreported income. 
The defence against this method is similar to that argued in the net worth case'outline 
above. 
Figure 4.2 gives an example of the calculation of undeclared income using the expenditures 
method. 
Figure 4.2: The Expenditure Method 
Year 
Total Expenditure 
Less: Total non taxable source 
Equal: Adjusted gross Income 
Less: Allowable deduction 
Less: Exemption 
Equal: Corrected taxable Income 
Less: Reported taxable income 
Equal: Unreported taxable Income 
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4.63 Bank deposit method 
The bank deposit method looks at the funds deposited during the years. This method 
attempts to reconstruct gross taxable receipts rather than adjusted receipts. Figure 4.3 shows 
the general formula for determining taxable income using the bank deposit method. 
Figure 4.3: Bank Deposit Method 
Total Deposit 
Add: payment made in cash 
Subtotal 
Less: Non Income deposits and Items (loan, gifts, etc) 
Total receipts 
Less: Business expenses and cost 
Net income from the business 
Less: Deductions and exemptions 
Taxable Income 
The main defence in bank deposit cases is that the amount of the deposits indicates prior 
accumulated funds and that no current receipts are involved; that the deposits reflect, in 
whole or in substantial part, non-income items, income items attributable to other years or 
duplicates of current income already accounted for by the taxpayer. 
4.64 Percentage mark-up method 
The percentage mark-up method is used mainly in connection with retail operations. The 
income statement is restructured using such mark-ups, mark-downs or gross percentages 
based on the industry averages. This is done using the taxpayer's own records such as price 
list, sales invoices, purchases invoices, freight in and custom duties and so forth, which are 
reviewed and the percentage mark-up is calculated where such documents provide a 
reasonable basis. 
Due to the subjectivity involved with respect to factors considered in the calculation, f6r 
example type of merchandise, the geographical location, the size of the taxpayer's business 
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operation, the relevant period, and so forth, it may be difficult to prove what the real 
income of the operation is. 
4.6.5 Unit and volume method 
This method involves multiplying the number of units sold by the selling price per unit, 
which determines or verifies the gross receipts. The gross profit margin can then be applied 
to determine the gross profit of the business before overhead expenses. 
4.5.6 Benford's law 
Benford's law has been promoted as providing the tax authority with a tool that is simple 
and effective for the detection and proving of tax evasion. The law is based on a peculiar 
observation that certain digits appear more frequently than others in data sets, as noted by 
Simon Newcomb (Nigrini, 2000)4 *4. Newcomb calculated that the probability that a 
number has any particular non-zero first digits (zero is not a valid first number, but it is a 
valid second or later digit) is: 
P(d)=Loglo(l+lld) 
Where: d is a number 1,2 ... 9, and 
P is the probability 
4.4 Newcomb observed that library copies of books of logarithms were considerably more worn out in the 
early pages, which dealt with low digits, and progressively less wom on the pages dealing with higher digits. 
He inferred from this pattern that fellow scientists used those tables to look up numbers which started with the 
numeral one more often than those starting with two, three and so on. He concluded that more numbers exist 
which begin with the numeral one than with larger numbers. He however provided no theoretical explanation 
for the phenomena that he described. Then, almost 50 years later, Frank Benford, a physicist, also noticed that 
the first few pages of his logarithm books were more worn than the last few. He came to the same conclusion 
that Newcomb had arrived at years prior, that people more often looked up numbers that began with low 
digits rather than high ones. Benford also posited that there were more numbers that began with the lower 
digits. He tested his hypothesis by collecting and analysing the data from 20,000 observations from data sets 
such as rivers, atomic weight of elements and numbers appearing in Reader's Digest articles (cited in 
Durtschi et aL, 2004). He found that numbers consistently fell into a pattern with low digits occurring more 
frequently in the first position than larger digits, which later became known as Benford's law. 
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Using the formula, the probability that the first digit of a number is one is about 30 per cent 
while the probability the first digit a nine is only 4.6 per cent. Table 4.4 shows the expected 
frequencies for all digits 0 through 9 in each of the first places in any number. 
Table 4.4 
Expected frequencies based on Benford's Law 
Digit I st place 2nd place 3rd place 4th place 
0 0.11968 0.10178 0.10018 
1 0.30103 0.11389 0.10138 0.10014 
2 0.17609 0.19882 0.10097 0.10010 
3 0.12494 0.10433 0.10057 0.10006 
4 0.09691 0.10031 0.10018 0.10002 
5 0.07918 0.09668 0.09979 0.09998 
6 0.06695 0.09337 0.09940 0.09994 
7 0.05799 0.09035 0.09902 0.09990 
8 0.05115 0.08757 0.09864 0.09986 
9 0.04576 0.08500 0.09827 0.09982 
Source: Nigrini, 1996 
Formulas for expected digital frequencies: 
For first digit of the number: 
Probability (DI = dj) = log(I + (I / dj); d, = (1,2,3 9) 
For second digit combinations: 
9 
Probability ( D2= d2) = 1, log(l+(I/dld2)); d2= (1,2,3... 0) 
d 1-1 
For two digit combinations: 
Probability (DID2= dld2)= log(I + djd2) 
Probability (D2= d2 11 D, = dj) = log(l + dld2)1109(1+(lldl) 
Where: 
D, represents the first digit of a number 
D2represents the second digit of a number, etc. 
Nigrini (2000) illustrated a simple scenario so as to understand the law. Consider a city 
with a po pulation of 1,000,000. It will have to double in size before the first digit is a '2', in 
other words it needs to grow 100 per cent. For the first digit to be '3', it only needs to grow 
50 per cent. To be aW the population must only grow 33 per cent and so forth. This 
explains why '1' will consistently be a first digit that is much further from other digits. 
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Thus, the observed finding is that smaller values of the first significant digits are much 
more likely than larger values. 
According to Durtshi et aL (2004), most accounting-related data can be expected to 
conform to a Benford distribution, as shown in the proof by Hill (1995)4.5. Such is the case 
because the typical accounts consist of transactions that result from combining numbers 
(for example accounts receivable, which is the number of items sold [which comes from 
one distribution], multiplied by the price per item [coming from another distribution]). 
Benford analysis will reveal various underlying peculiarities in an account but not all 
accounts shown not to conform to the law will be fraudulent. Not conforming, however, 
should raise some level of suspicion. Figure 4.4 summarises when it is appropriate to use 
Benford's Law, and when to use caution. 
5 Hill's proof relies on the fact that the numbers in sets that conform to the Benford distribution are second- 
generation distributions, that is, combinations of other distributions. If distributions are selected at random 
and random samples are taken from each of these distributions, then the significant digit frequencies of the 
combined sampling will converge to Benford's distribution, even though the individual distributions may not 
closely follow the law. In other words, combining unrelated numbers gives a distribution, a law of true 
randomness that is universal. 
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Figure 4.5 
When Benford's Law Is or Is not likely useful 
When Benford's Law Is likely Useful Example 
Sets of numbers that result from mathematical Accounts recelvable (no. sold price) 
combination of numbers - Result comes from Accounts payable (no. bought price) 
two distributions 
Transacdon-level data- No need to sample 
on large data sets - the more observations. the 
better 
Accounts that appear to conform to Benford Law - 
When the mean of a set of numbers is greater 
than the median and the skewness Is positive 
Disbursements, sales, expenses 
Full yeaes transadons 
Most sets of accounting numbers 
When Bentbrd's Law Is not likely to be useful Example 
Data set is comprised of assigned numbers Cheque numbers, Invoice numbers, zip codes 
Numbers that are influenced by human thought 
Accounts Wth a large number of firm-specific 
numbers 
Accounts vvith a built in minimum or mayjmum 
Where no transaction Is recorded 
Prices set at psychological thresholds ($1.99), 
ATM withdrawals 
An account specically set up to record $100 
refunds 
Set of assets that must meet a threshold to be 
recorded 
Thefts, kickbacks, contarct rigging 
Source: Durtschi et al. (2004) 
According to Nigrini (1996), in general, when the actual proportion of low digits exceeds 
the expected frequencies under Benford's law, this indicates that the numbers have been 
manipulated downwards. Conversely, when the actual proportion of high digits exceeds the 
expected frequencies, this indicates that the numbers have on average been manipulated 
UpWardS4.6. 
4 -6 Nigrini developed a Distortion Factor (DF) Model that quantified the extent of unintentional tax evasion. 
Tax returns on the U. S. IRS Individual Tax Model Files were analysed. The analysis based on the digital 
frequencies indicated that low-income taxpayers practise unintentional tax evasion to a greater extent than 
high-income taxpayers. 
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4.7 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the origins, definition and the significance of forensic 
accounting in taxation with some illustrations of the different methods commonly used by 
tax authorities in proving income tax evasion. 
Forensic accounting represents a return to accounting roots rather than a new speciality 
within accounting. It is seen as a field that encapsulates all the other areas in the use of the 
accounting framework for investigation purposes. The use of forensic accounting 
techniques, together with knowledge and skills in other investigation methods, will enhance 
the investigation and the enforcement officers' ability to investigate and prosecute those 
involved in tax evasion and criminal acts. 
The following chapter introduces methodological considerations with respect to this study. 
The chapter also highlights the importance of certain statistical techniques relevant to this 
study, as well as a number of tests to signify the validity and reliability of the adopted 
research process. 
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CILAYTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
... if the research is worth doing, then one is likely to be dealing with aproblem which is notfully 
understood, andfor which the ideal course ofinvestigation cannot be charted in advance with any 
certainty. 
Easterby-Smith et aL (2002: 13) 
5.1 Introduction 
There appear to be a number of methodologies for conducting tax evasion research, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.5). Hasseldine and Zhuhong (1999: 98) noted that the 
research method employed and the inherent trade-offs in the research would have 
consequences for the validity and robustness of the results. Jackson and Milliron 
(1986: 146) identified the need for this as they commented that too often answers to 
interesting questions are indeterminate because the research plan is inadequate to support 
the research objective, thereby casting doubt on the validity of the research findings. The 
quest for valid research methodology remains a vital aspect of tax compliance research and 
the aim of this chapter is to outline and justify the research method employed in this study. 
This chapter presents an overview of the methodological perspective of the research and 
statistical issues with a view to selecting and formulating an appropriate research 
framework for this study into tax evasion. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
philosophy of research and research methods in general. This is followed with the choice of 
and justifications for the research method in the current study. Then a comprehensive 
description is provided for each of the research strategies adopted by outlining the research 
fi-amework for data collection: reliability and validity issues are also discussed. Next is a 
brief orientation to the statistical procedures used to analyse the data. Finally, a summary 
section concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Research and research methods 
There is no consensus in the literature on how research should be defined. One reason for 
this is that research means different things to different people. From the many different 
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definitions offered, however, there appears to be agreement that: (1) research is a process of 
enquiry and investigation; (2) it is systematic and methodical; and (3) research increases 
knowledge (Remenyi et aL, 1998). 
Buckley et aL (1975: 28) suggested that the definition of research requires the satisfaction of 
the conditions that: (1) it be an orderly investigation of a defined problem; (2) appropriate 
scientific methods be used; (3) adequate and representative evidence be gathered; (4) 
logical reasoning be employed in drawing conclusions on the basis of the evidence; (5) the 
research be able to demonstrate or prove the validity or reasonableness of the conclusions; 
(6) the cumulative results of research in a given area yield general principles or laws that 
may be applied with confidence under similar conditions in the future. 
Research is conducted in the spirit of inquiry, which relies on facts, experience and data, 
concepts and constructs, hypotheses and conjectures, and principles and laws, all of which 
are commonly used but easily confused concepts in science. Figure 5.1 (abstracted from 
Buckley et aL, 1975: 29) illustrates how these concepts of research together form a 
symbolic and rational system of inquiry. Additionally, they constitute the language of 
research, enabling precision in the use of words and communication among those 
concerned. 
Figure 5.1 
Basic elements of scientific research methodology 
Laws Verifed hypotheses; used to assert a predictable association 
among va dable: can be empirical or theoretical 
Principles A principle is a law or general truth which provides a guide to thought or action 
Hypotheses Formal propositions which, through untested, are amenable to testing; usually 
express In casual terms 
Conjectures Informal propositions which are not stated in a testable form, nor is a casual 
relationship known or even necessarily Implied 
Concepts and Concepts are Inventions of the human mind to provide a means for organising 
Constructs and understanding observations; they perform a number of functions, all 
of which are designed to form logical and systematic relationship among data 
Facts Something that exists, a phenomenon that Is true or generally held to be true 
Data The collection of facts, achieved either through direct observations or through 
gamering from records; observation Is the process by which facts become 
data 
Source: Buckley et at. (1975: 28-29) 
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Remenyi et aL (1998) defined research methodology as the procedural framework within 
which the research is conducted. They further argued that there are many factors to be 
considered when choosing an appropriate research methodology, with the topic to be 
researched and the specific research questions being the primary drivers. The important 
thing is that the form of inquiry adopted in any investigation should not be shaped simply 
by a commitment to particular research methods for their own sake, but should be logically 
consistent and appropriate given the aims of the research and the values and assumptions 
that lie behind it (Hooper and Powell, 1985). 
53 Schools of thought 
Research falls into two main areas, namely qualitative research and quantitative research. 
Patton (1990) views the former as concentrating on words and observations to express 
reality and attempts to describe people in natural situations. In contrast, the quantitative 
approach grows out of a strong academic tradition that places considerable trust in numbers 
that represent opinions or concepts. 
Patton (1990) also noted that philosophers of science and methodologists have been 
engaged in a long-standing epistemological debate about how best to conduct research. The 
debate centres on the two fundamentally different and competing schools of thought or 
inquiry paradigms: (1) positivism; (2) phenomenology. Positivism uses quantitative and 
experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalisations. Among the major 
implications of this approach are the need for independence of the observer from the 
subject being observed and the need to formulate the subject hypotheses for subsequent 
verification. Positivism searches for causal explanations and reduces the whole to the 
simplest possible elements in order to facilitate analysis (Remenyi et at, 1998; Easterby- 
Smith et aL, 2002). Phenomenological inquiry, however, uses qualitative and naturalistic 
approaches to inductively and holistically understand human experience in a context- 
specific setting. This latter approach tries to understand and explain the phenomenon, rather 
than search for external causes or fundamental laws (Remenyi et aL, 1998; Easterby-Smith 
et aL, 2002). This picture is set out in Figure 5.2 (Silverman, 1998). 
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Figure 5.2 
Two school of science 
Approach Concepts Methods 
Positivism Social structure Quantitative 
Social facts Hypothesis testing 
Phenomenological Social contruction Qualitative 
Meanings Hypothesis generation 
Source: Silveffnan (1998) 
Although the distinction between the two paradigms may be very clear at the philosophical 
level, as Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue, when it comes to the use of quantitative or 
qualitative methods and to the issues of research design the distinction breaks down 
(Bulmer, 1988). This is due to different researchers exhibiting different preferences and 
leaning toward one direction or style of research. Moreover, the range of methods of data 
collection represented does not divide easily into quantitative and qualitative. Filstead 
(1979) views quantitative and qualitative methods as being more than just differences 
between research strategies and data collection procedures. These approaches represent 
fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for conceptualising the nature of 
knowledge, social reality and procedures for comprehending those phenomena. 
In research design, therefore, it is crucial to be cognisant of the methodological paradigm 
debate in order to appreciate why decisions regarding methods can be controversial. Guba 
and Lincoln (1994: 116) stated that "Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer, we maintain, 
ought to go about the business of inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm 
informs and guides his or her approach". 
Patton (1990: 39) advocates "a paradigm of choicee' as a way out of the dilemma. "A 
paradigm of choices rejects methodological orthodoxy in favour of methodological 
appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging methodological quality. " The paradigm 
of choices recognises that different methods are appropriate for different situations. This 
issue then becomes not whether one has uniformly adhered to prescribed canons of either 
positivism or phenomenology but whether one has made sensible method decisions given 
the purpose of the study, the questions being investigated and the resources available 
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(Bulmer, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Remenyi et aL (1998) summarised the main 
differences between the positivist and the phenomenological viewpoints based on the work 
of Easterby-Smith et aL (199 1), as shown in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3 
Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigm 
Theme Positivist Paradigm 
Basic beliefs The world is external and objecUve 
Observer is independent 
Science is value free 
Phenomenological Paradigm 
The world Is socially constructed and 
subjective, 
Observer is part of what is observed 
Science Is driven by human interest 
Researcher should Focus on facts Focus on meaning 
Look for causality and fundamental law Try to understanding what Is happening 
Reduce phenomena to simplest elements Look at the totality of each situation 
Formulate hypotheses and test them Develop ideas through Induction from 
data 
Preferred method in Operationalising concepts so that they 
the research can be measured 
Taking large sample 
Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of the phenomena 
Small samples Investigated in depth or 
over time 
Source: Easterby-Smith (1991) 
Patton (1990: 69) further points out that a main concern confronting researchers is the 
polarisation of views held by each paradigm, "... it is this aspect of paradigms that 
constitutes both their strength and their weakness - their strength in that it makes action 
possible, their weakness in that the very reason for action is hidden in the unquestioned 
assumptions of the paradigrW'. Figure 5.4 provides a view of a summary of some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two research paradigms. 
Thus no one research method is superior to another and each research method has its own 
unique ways to collect and analyse data, and each strategy has its own particular strengths 
and weaknesses. It is the appropriateness of the method of investigation to the specific 
study being undertaken that is the main concým in a particular research study. Therefore, 
construction of a logical research process is of paramount importance in order to lend 
credence to the research findings (Wallance, 197 1). 
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Figure 5.4 
Comparison of strengths and weaknessess 
Approach 
Positivist 
(Quantitative paradigm) 
Strengths 
they can provide wide coverage of 
the range of situations 
they can be fast and economical 
where statistics are aggregated from 
large samples, they may be of 
considerable relevance to policy 
decisions 
Weaknesses 
the methods used tend to be rather 
infle)dble and artificial 
they are not very effective In under 
standing processes or the significance 
that people attach to actions 
they are not very helpful in generating 
theories 
because they focus on what Is, or 
what has been recently, they make it 
hard for policy makers to Infer Mat 
changes and actions should take place 
In the future 
Phenomenological 
(Qualitative paradigm) 
data gathering methods seen as more 
natural rather than artificial 
ability to look at change processes 
over time 
ability to understand people's 
meaning 
ability to adjust to new Issues and 
ideas as they emerge 
contribute to theory generation 
data collection can be tedious and 
require more resources 
analysis and interpretation of data may 
be more difficult 
harder to control the pace, progress 
and end points of research process 
policy makers may give low credibility 
to results from qualitative approach 
Source: Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 33) 
5.4 Choice of research strategy 
From the discussion of these schools of thought, it is apparent that both the qualitative and 
quantitative methods have differing strengths and weaknesses. McGrath (1982), in his 
study of research choices, makes it clear that there are no ideal solutions, only a series of 
compromises. Cronbach (1982: 239) has observed that, "designing a study is as much art as 
science ... it is an exercise of the dramatic imagination. " Patton (1990: 13) also expressed the 
same view: "research, like diplomacy, is the art of the possible". Tbus, a mixed approach of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods would be the most appropriate in order to 
avoid their respective weaknesses. This may provide complementary data sets, which 
together give a more complete picture than can be obtained using either method singly, as 
justified below. 
100 
As suggested by Jackson and Milliron (1986), Hasseldine and Zhuhong (1999), and 
Richardson and Sawyer (2001), mixed approaches hold promise to improving tax 
compliancelevasion research. Jackson and Milliron (1986: 146) commented that with 
research in tax compliance, too often the research plan is inadequate to support the research 
objective. Richardson and Sawyer (2001: 200) observed that research studies in tax 
compliance have been criticised for their conflicting research results obtained when 
different research methods are used in the same study. It is possible that these discrepancies 
are the result of different research methods measuring different types of non-compliance; 
however, this is merely speculation at this point in time. They further argued that the 
finding that different research methods yield different results underlies the need for 
triangulation. Without such an approach, results will always be method dependent and any 
conclusions reached can be no more than provisional. 
Moreover, combining these methods may lead to a richer understanding of the phenomenon 
being studied, especially when investigating human behaviour and attitudes (Patton, 1990; 
Easterby-Smith et aL, 2002), and thus improve the validity of the data. By incorporating 
multiple modes of analysis into the design, additional insights may be revealed that would 
otherwise remain undiscovered via a single method approach. 
The advocates for mixed approaches (for example, see Jick, 1979; Das, 1983; Denzin, 
1989; Tashakkori et al., 1998; Creswell, 2003) argue that neither paradigm alone 
(quantitative only or qualitative only) will provide a deep understanding of the subject 
being studied, but together, the two offer the potential to inform and complement each 
other. Using different sources and methods strengthens each type of data collection and 
minimises the weaknesses of any single method. This helps in producing a more 
authoritative piece of research by increasing the strength of the research design. Das 
(1983: 311) stated that "... qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not antithetic or 
divergent; rather they focus on the different dimensions of the same phenomenon. 
Sometimes, these dimensions may appear to be confluent: but even in these instances, 
where they apparently diverge, the underlying unity may become visible on deeper 
penetration ... The situation contingencies and objectives of the research would seem to play 
a deceive role in the design and execution of the study". 
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Denzin (1989: 307) also noted that "by combining multiple observers, theories, methods 
and data sources, (researchers) can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from 
single methods, single observers and single theory studies ". 
In the context of developing countries, Bulmer and Warwick (1993) argued that multi- 
method approaches are important, especially for social science research; one reason being 
that it can be very hard to locate and find research data in a specific field due to 
bureaucracy. A second reason is that in a developing country, due to cultural orientation, 
people are not used to expressing their opinions frankly; they have a tendency to say what 
the other person wants to hear. 
A number of research strategies are available for conducting research. According to Yin 
(1994), a research strategy should be chosen as a function of the research situation. Each 
research strategy has its own specific approach to collecting data and analysing empirical 
data and therefore each strategy has its own advantages and disadvantages. Although each 
strategy has its own characteristics, there are overlapping areas which bring complexity to 
the process of strategy selection. In order to avoid gross mismatches between the desired 
outcome and the chosen strategy, Yin (1994: 4) put forward three criteria for choosing a 
certain type of research strategy. These are (1) the type of question posed, (2) the control 
over actual behaviour elements; and (3) the degree offocus on historical or contemporary 
events. 
Figure 5.5 shows the outcome of the intersection between most common research strategies 
and the three conditions identified by Yin (1994). However, in this thesis, the choice of 
strategy as a principle research technique is based on the contention that it was the most 
appropriate and efficient means available for addressing the research questions 
Based on the research questions proposed in this study (see Chapter 1, section 1.3), the 
research strategies of a questionnaire survey, analysis of file data/actual cases and group 
interviews were to be used to obtain information on the areas identified for the research 
(see section 5.5 and 5.6 for a detailed discussion). A group interview, however, was not 
conducted due to unforeseen circumstances. As a fallback method, the semi-structure 
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questions intended for the group interview were later distributed as an open-ended 
questionnaire. 
Figure 5.5 
Research strategies versus characteristics 
Strategy 
F-Veriment 
Survey 
Archival analysis 
History 
Case studies 
Fom of research 
question 
How, Why 
Who, WhaV, Where, 
how many, how much 
Who, what*, where, how 
many, how much 
How, Why 
How, Why 
Requires control over Focuses on 
behaviour events? contemporary events? 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes/No 
No 
Yes 
Source: Yin (1994: 17) 
* 'what! questions, when asked as part of an exploratory, pertain to all five strategies 
The questionnaire was designed to gain a general insight into how the different SME 
taxpayers and tax practitioners in Malaysia perceived the situation in relation to tax evasion 
and forensic accounting. The results from the questionnaire survey would further provide a 
contemporary opinion on top of the case file analysis and opinions from IRB personnel. 
Whatever the case, the author believed that they would provide a justification and 
explanation of the tax evasion by SMEs and forensic accounting in Malaysia. 
Having identified the choice of strategy to be taken, the discussion from here on will 
therefore focus primarily on methodological issues relating to the chosen strategies for data 
collection, data analysis and validation. 
5.5 Quantitative component 
5.5.1 Introduction 
According to McKerchar (2001), a common weakness of quantitative studies on tax 
evasion/compliance has been the inability to generalise the findings to the broader 
population, because the researchers have had to work independently of the tax authority and 
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thus have been unable to study random samples of taxpayers. This present study, however, 
was given permission to use the tax authority's (Inland Revenue Board, Malaysia) database 
to address this weakness, but within a limited coverage so as to ensure taxpayer privacy and 
not to contravene the tax law (Section 138, Income Tax Act 19675"). Given this 
opportunity, the desire to reduce bias in as many forms as possible, and the nature of 
information to be collected, a mail survey questionnaire was determined to be the most 
practical and reliable method of data collection. 
By definition, a questionnaire is a set of questions as an instrument of research for data 
collection (Oppenheim, 2000). In this study, the questionnaire was the main instrument 
through which data was accumulated. A mailed questionnaire survey was adopted, as the 
approach is judged a suitable, economical, effective and a reliable means of obtaining the 
primary data and also desirable for investigating sensitive attitudes or behavioural patterns. 
Questionnaires can also obtain quantitative and qualitative data. Mailed questionnaires also 
allow researchers to obtain a larger sample with wide coverage and allow the respondents 
to complete the questionnaire in their own time. However, it is recognised that mailed 
questionnaires are subject to response bias. 
5.5.2 Questionnaire design 
In order to gain complete coverage of the research questions, two sets of questionnaires 
(see Appendix I and 11) were designed to collect data from SME taxpayers and tax 
practitioners. By addressing the related questions to these two groups, it was possible to 
draw on each subject's opinions, experience and specialist knowledge of tax laws, tax 
evasion and the impact on both of the technical aspects of the legislation, and the impact 
that the administration of the tax system has on tax evasion by SMEs. 
5" Section 138 of the Act provides that every classified person shall deal with classified material as 
confidential. Therefore, there is a duty of confidentiality with regard to the information obtained about the 
affairs of taxpayers. A classified person is defined to include not only IRB officials, the Auditor General and 
his officers, but also any person advising or acting for a person who is or may be chargeable to tax, and any 
employee of a person so acting or advising who had access to classified material. Therefore, a duty of 
confidentiality is imposed on professional advisers such as accountants and lawyers. Classified material 
means any return or other document made for the purposes of the Act and relating to the income of any 
person or partnership and any information which comes to the notice of a classified person in his/her capacity 
as such. 
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Considerable attention was given to developing clear, unambiguous and useful questions 
aimed at answering the research questions; this included conducting two pilot studies. The 
fmt was with fellow doctoral students within the university, colleagues from Edinburgh 
University and selected academic staff of the Accounting and Finance Division of Heriot- 
Watt University. The second piloting stage was done using a non-random representative 
sample of the tax practitioners and SME taxpayers at the researcher's hometown in 
Malaysia. 
The development of the questionnaire was carried out in four phases: 
Phase 1: Literature review: To determine the appropriate concepts to be included, the 
design of the research framework, which served to guide the desired information and 
specify the relationships to be investigated 
Phase 11: Question Development: Questions were developed both from previous studies and 
original ideas, and were modified to suit the conditions and background of the largely 
different Malaysian respondents so as to ensure that responses were not so much a 
reflection of their business acumen as of their cultural background. The purpose of this 
stage was to evaluate whether respondents understood and correctly interpreted the 
meaning of the questions and whether the range of response alternatives was sufficient. 
Sentence structure for the questions was short and simple in order to avoid ambiguity. 
As the area of taxation, and especially tax evasion, is sensitive in nature, most of the 
questions in the questionnaire were generally indirect, such as: 
(Question 2.3, Appendix 1): 
Image yourself in this situation: One ofyour clients has been paid RM100,000 in cash for 
work that was done outside the regularjob. As a tax practitioner which action would you 
take in reporting that income to IRB? - this will indirectly answer the research question 
concerning the characteristics of, tax evasion and whether it is deliberate or accidental in 
nature. 
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(Question 2.7, Appendix 11) 
Do you have any other interest in other SME businesses (associate, subsidiary or wholly- 
owned company, including sole proprietorship etc. ) - indirectly translated the likelihood 
that inter-company transactions exist in the approach and method used in the tax evasion. 
The answers tended to be more honest than from direct questions. There were also some 
questions, however, that did adopt the direct approach as to whether the respondent had 
evaded taxes and, if so, to what degree: as argued by Lewis (1982: 140), "why notjust ask 
respondents whether they evade tax or not? If they admit it, ask them how much this 
amounts to andperhaps even why they do it? fflat could be simpler? " 
Phase III: Questionnaire development: Piloting and administering a complete questionnaire 
at this stage allowed further evaluation of individual items as well as of the questionnaires 
as a whole. 
Phase IV: Questionnaire revision: This phase incorporated the responses from phase III in 
order to revise particular questions. 
The questionnaire not only had to cater for educated individuals, but also for those who 
have a low level of literacy. Where possible, questions were shortened in order to reduce 
confusion and ambiguity. Questions were also worded so as not to be misleading about the 
purpose of the question. The aim was to try and ensure that respondents could respond 
without feeling that they were giving wrong answers. This included translation of the 
questions into the local language (Bahasa Malaysia) for the benefit of respondents not 
English educated. 
To ease and save respondents' time in completing the questionnaires, as well as achieving 
uniformity among respondents' answers, most of the questions adopted a closed format. 
Even though closed format questions are difficult to design, they simplify the collection and 
analysis of data and make the task easier for the researcher (Remenyi et al., 1998). Further 
advantages of well-developed closed questions are evident when the questionnaire is long 
or people's motivation to answer is not high, as the questions are easy and quick to answer. 
Closed questions are also easy to code and classify by respondents, thus avoiding 
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misclassification. Open-ended questions, however, were also included in asking fin-ther 
opinions of the choices made by the respondents. Open-ended questions are important in 
allowing the respondents to say what they think (Oppenheim, 2000). 
A category termed 'other (please specify)' was also adopted to allow for unanticipated 
responses, so that if the available categories were not the chosen answer, then the 
respondents would be in a position to make their own choice of answer to the question. The 
type of closed format questions used included: (i) Likert-style formats, with rating scales of 
I to 5 for respondents to indicate their responses to the question; (ii) semantic differential 
formats, where the format consists of choosing adjectives to present the two extremes of a 
continuum and asking the respondents to tick between the two extremes; (iii) Yes and No 
format to obtain the respondents' general opinions about the main subject matter. 
So as to maximise the response rate, each mailed questionnaire was accompanied by a 
covering letter (attached inside the questionnaire) stating the survey objectives, assuring the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the responses, giving the approximate deadline for 
respondents to complete the questionnaire and providing a stamped, addressed reply 
envelope. In addition, a support letter from the author's supervisor was also included to 
introduce the researcher and stating the importance of the research. 
5.5.3 Sample construction 
The sample was restricted to SME taxpayers and tax practitioners, as mentioned in the 
questionnaire design (paragraph 5.5.2). SME taxpayer and tax practitioner databases were 
provided by the IRB. The SME taxpayer population comprised two databases of non-tax 
evaders (general database) and SME tax evaders (from the Investigation and Intelligence 
Division database for the year 2000). The population differed in at least two important 
respects; first, the population of 'tax evaders' consisted of those who had evaded tax and 
who had been caught and penalised- for doing so. Secondly, the population of the 'non-tax 
evaders' group was based on those whose names appeared on the main IRB database. This 
group was likely to include both evaders and non-evaders, though the number of evaders in 
this group was unknown. 
107 
The database was provided with limited content - only data with the full names and 
addresses of the taxpayers was provided. This has generally been the case to ensure 
taxpayer privacy and to prevent contravention of the tax law (section 138, Income Tax Act, 
1967). However, the general database may not represent the true population since the actual 
number of the population supposed to be registered as taxpayers is unknown. The IRB 
database, however, provides substantial evidence as a representative of the population for 
the research. Furthermore, most of the literature argues that an accessible population is one 
that meets the established criteria and is easily accessible, considering the constraints of 
time, money and research availability. Babbie (2001: 195) argued that a '! Properly drawn 
sample provides information appropriate for describing the population of element that 
compose the samplingframe - nothing more ". 
The general database provided by the IRB was already stratified according to the file 
categories of 'P' for partnership, 'OG' for businesses which include sole proprietors and 
SNE entrepreneurs (owner, director and management), and 'C' for SMEs registered under 
the Company Act 1965. So as to minimise cost and time, a probability sample was used, 
namely, a stratified random sample. A probability sample is one in which each person in 
the population has an equal, or a least a known probability of being selected. Stratified 
sampling is a modification of simple random sampling which is able to produce a more 
representative and accurate sample. The main reason for using probability-sampling 
methods is to permit the use of a variety of statistical tools to estimate the precision of the 
samples. The sampling technique used is termed stratified disproportionate sampling. Once 
the strata are determined, the selection of a sample from each stratum is dictated by 
analytical considerations. 
The tax practitioner database consisted of tax practitioners practising according to the 
provisions of Section 153(3) of the Income Tax Act 1967 - (i) Section 153(3)a: a 
professional accountant authorized by or under any written law to be an auditor of 
companies; ii Section 153(3)b: any other professional accountant approved by the 
Minister-, (iii) Section 153(3)c: any other person approved by the Minister on the 
recommendation of the Director General. 
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The IRB database formed the sampling frame except for the sample of tax practitioners 
practising under Section 153(3)a, which was drawn from the database of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA - an association of professional accounting 
bodies in 
Malaysia), since the MIA is the controlling body of professional accountants in Malaysia. 
A nationwide sample of 7505*2 was selected, consisting of 400 SME taxpayers (250 non-tax 
evaders and 150 tax evaders) and 350 tax practitioners (200,100 and 50 in each category of 
tax practitioner under sections 153(3)a, 153(3)b and 153(3)c respectively). Each of the 
categories was distinguished by using different coloured questionnaire covers - blue for 
non-tax evaders, orange for tax evaders, white for tax practitioners practising under section 
153 (3)(a), red for those practising under section 153(3)(b) and yellow for those practising 
under section 153(3)(c). 
The sample size obtained is likely to have an effect on the degree of accuracy of the sample 
and the extent to which there is variation in the population with regard to the key 
characteristics of the study. What must be remembered is that the size of the population 
from which the sample is drawn is largely irrelevant for the accuracy of the sample 
(Oppenheim, 2000). In this study, the final sample size was a compromise between cost, 
accuracy and the ensuring of sufficient numbers for meaningful analysis and results. 
5.6 Qualitative Component 
5.6.1 Introduction 
To identify and understand better the actual factors underlying the research agenda (in this 
study, tax evasion by SMIEs and the role of forensic accounting), one of the major 
3-2 Determination of sample size for the survey was based on the sample size calculator created by Creative 
Research Systems (retrieved at hM: //www. survMystem. com/sscalc. htm with the confidence level of 95% 
and confidence interval of 5%. The formula used in the sample size calculator was: 
Sample size =Z* (p) *Q- p) 
C 
Where: Z=Z value (e. g. 1.96 for 95% confidence level) 
P= percentage picking a choice expressed as decimal (0.5 used for sample size needed) 
C= confidence interval, expressed as decimal (e. g. 0.04 = ±-41 
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determinants was the need to be able to study actual data/cases rather than rely upon data 
from taxpayers' memories (Hite, 1988; Elffers 1991 a; McKerchar 2001). The critical factor 
here was that reliance on recall was considered unsuitable, as taxpayers that had been 
evading tax would not honestly report whether they had reneged on their taxes. Further, the 
analysis of actual data/cases would facilitate the evaluation of the appropriateness of certain 
aspects of the quantitative design. 
The file data/actual cases analysis and opinions from the IRB personnel involved in the 
deterring of tax evasion (Investigation and Intelligence Division/Centre personnel) 
appeared to be the most appropriate qualitative design. 
5.6.2 File datalActual cases 
The file data/actual cases analysis is the collection of data undertaken by reviewing the 
settled convicted tax evaders' files from the Investigation and Intelligence Division, which 
is entrusted to investigate suspected cases of tax evasion. The purpose of file data/actual 
cases analysis is to draw analytical generalisations about the practices within the IRB and 
SMEs with regard to tax evasion. Again, given the confidentiality requirement of the data 
due to the secrecy provision of tax law (Section 138, Income Tax Act 1967), only certain 
data were made available for the analysis. A systematic approach in drawing the data from 
the file was adopted so as to ensure that the appropriate and correct information would be 
extracted by using a pre-designed, tabulated format sheet (see Appendix 111). The area of 
interest was the characteristics and methods employed by SME taxpayers in their tax 
evasion schemes, methods used by the IRB in detection and settling of the cases, and the 
degree of culpability. 
From a total population of 609 and 649 for the years 1997 and 2001 respectively, samples 
of 200 files based on IRB records were reviewed between April and June 2003 (100 files 
for each year, i. e. 1997 and 2001) by using systematic random sampling. The sample size 
here did not play an important role as the analysis was able to show the pattern or trend 
within tax evasion by SMEs. The data was then linked with further findings from the 
quantitative method. The selected years were chosen because they represented the latest 
financial crisis in the Asian region in the second half of 1997 and when the economy of the 
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country started to recover in 2001. This period significantly reflects business cycles, which 
consist of phases of peak, subsequent recession, trough and finally recovery, which repeat 
ad infiniturn. Table 5.1 represents the percentage changes in GDP in Malaysia from 1996 to 
2002. 
Table 5.1 
Percentage changes in GDP In Malaysia, 1996 - 2002 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP 10 7.5 -7.5 6.1 8.3 0.4 
4.2 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (2002) 
5.63 Opinionfrom IRB personnel 
The initial survey instrument for the collection of this data was supposed to be a group 
interview with IRB officers using semi-structured questions. However, due to unforeseen 
circumstances, the group interview could not be conducted. The semi-structured questions 
(with a slightly revised format, see Appendix IV) were later distributed to all fifteen heads 
of the Investigation and Intelligence Centre of the IRB of Malaysia as an open-ended 
questionnaire. This fallback method to collect data from the IRB personnel received an 
encouraging response, with 8 replies. 
Through this fallback method, it was possible to draw upon the subjects' specialist 
knowledge of tax laws, tax evasion and the impact that the technical aspects of both the 
legislation and the current administration of the tax system have on tax evasion. This 
method also allowed an exploration of the degree to which forensic accounting and its 
underlying assumptions were gaining acceptance and use within the organisation. The 
method is justified because, as argued by Marsh (1982: 66), "... 77iere is no obvious 
alternative to survey research in most situations. Ifyou cannot intervene in the social world 
yoursetf, and you are chary of drawing very strong or general conclusionsfrom those quasi 
experimental situations where others have, you areforced back to considered variations as 
it occurs 
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5.7 Triangulation 
Denzin (1978: 29 1) broadly defines triangulation as the combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon and the process is important in ensuring the validity of the 
research work. Triangulation thus denotes the use of different techniques of collecting data 
for a single research project. 
According to Croll (1986: 176), "triangulation is a data conformation technique in which 
data are strengthened where the same results are produced by different procedures... it also 
served to give greater depth to the data and gives the researcher a greater understanding" 
Bennett and Thaiss (1967: 307) supported the argument that "human reality must be 
apprehended by a variety of viewpoints, not by one alone because this very reality is always 
in part a construct, always in part an image and only by encouraging difference in 
perspective and approach can one obtain the needed richness of imagery and consequently 
theory". Jick (1979: 602) described the advantages of such techniques in that they "improve 
the accuracy of the researcher judgements by collecting different kinds of data bearing on 
the same phenomenon". 
Jick (1979: 603) sees blending and integrating a variety of data and methods, as 
triangulation demands, as a continuum, ranging from simple to complex designs. 'Scaling' 
or 'quantification of qualitative measures' is at the simple end, and the complete, 'holistic' 
and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) is at the complex end (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 
A continuum of triangulation design 
Convergent Holistic (or Contexual) 
Scaling.... Reliability... Validation... Description 
Simple Design Complex Design 
Source: Jick (1979: 603) 
Testing 'reliability' and 'convergent validation' (or the use of complementary methods) 
occupies the second and third place on his continuum. In the sense of 'holistic' design, 
triangulation may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple 
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perspectives, but also to enrich our understanding by allowing new or deeper dimensions to 
emerge. Jick went on to illustrate the advantages and effectiveness of triangulation as 117be 
effectiveness of triangulation rests on the premises that the weaknesses in each single 
method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another. Although each 
method has assets and liabilities, triangulation purports to exploit the assets and 
neutralize, rather than compound, the liabilities ". 
Jick (1979: 608) also stated that "Piangulation provides researchers with several important 
opportunities, it allows researchers to be more confident of the results, ... it can stimulate 
the creation of inventive methods; new ways of capturing a problem to balance with 
conventional data collection methods... the triangulation may also help to uncover the 
deviant or offquadrant dimension ofa phenomenon ". 
In line with the above arguments, the findings from the questionnaire survey, file 
data/actual cases and opinion from IRB personnel are corroborated to give a comprehensive 
understanding of the issue. This helps in producing a more authoritative piece of research 
by increasing the strength of the research design. Figure 5.7 shows a diagrammatic 
representation of the triangulation of information. 
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Figure 5.7 
Diagrammatic representation of the triangulation of Information 
5.8 Reliability and validity issues 
The questions of reliability and validity have to be addressed before a piece of research can 
be accepted. In this study, measures were taken to ensure that the study was both reliable 
and valid by employing a number of different research methods. 
5.8.1 Reliability 
Reliability is the extent to which a test or procedure produces similar results under constant 
conditions on all occasions (Yin, 1994). Another definition, by Simon and Burstein (1985), 
states "... reliability is essentially repeatability - if it comes up with the same result in the 
same circumstances time after time, even employed by different people". In other words, if 
another researcher uses the same method on the same group, the same result will be 
obtained. 
To look at the reliability of the data collected and consistency of the item, the Cronbach 
reliability estimate was used (see Chapter 6 for the result). The coefficient alpha is suitable 
for items that are not scored as right or wrong: the response simply indicates where one 
stands on the continuum of the given scale. If all the variation in observed scores is due to 
errors of measurement, the reliability coefficient will be zero. If there is no error of 
measurement, the reliability coefficient will be one. With regard to its use, Nunnally 
(1967: 2 10) stated, "coefflicient alpha is the basic formula for determining the reliability 
based on internal consistency ... even if other estimates of reliability should be made for 
particular instruments, coefflicient alpha should be obtainedfirst ... the coefficient alpha 
sets an upper limit to the reliability test. " 
Cronbach's alpha varies between 0 and I inclusive, with the higher numbers indicating 
greater reliability. According to Bagozzi (1994), for exploratory research, a score of 0.6 is 
desirable, although values greater than 0.70 are preferred. 
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5.8.2 Validity 
De Vaus (1991) asserted that validity means in essence that a theory, model, concept or 
category describes reality with good fit: "A valid measure is one which measures what it is 
intended to measure. In fact, it is not the measure that is valid or invalid but the use to 
which the measure is put ... the validity of a measure then depends on how we have defined 
the concept it is designed to measure ". 
The measure of validity is often considered under either internal or external validity (Yin, 
1994; Gill and Johnson, 1991). Internal validity refers to whether or not what are identified 
as the causes actually produce what has been interpreted as the effect or response, and 
checks whether the right cause and effect relationships have been established. Thus, 
internal validity is the issue of establishing theoretical territory that goes with the defined 
construct and ensuring consistency between it and other recognised constructs. External 
validity, on the other hand, refers to the extent to which any research findings can be 
generalised beyond the immediate research sample or setting in which the research took 
place. External validity is often subdivided into two: (1) population validity, which 
concerns the extent to which it is possible to generalise from the sample involved in the 
research to a wider population; and (2) ecological validity, which concerns the extent to 
which it is possible'to generalise from the actual social context in which the research has 
taken place and the data has been collected to other contexts and settings. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the basic difference between reliability and 
validity (internal) is that reliability deals with the data collection process to ensure the 
consistency of the results, while validity focuses more on the way such results support the 
conclusions. The above deliberation, however, refers to the traditional evaluation criteria of 
validity and reliability that are governed by the convention of the quantitative research 
paradigm. Although early qualitative researchers felt compelled to relate traditional notions 
of validity and reliability to procedures in qualitative research, later researchers (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Yin 1994; Easterby-Smith, 2000) developed their own criteria in the 
qualitative research paradigm. Miles and Huberman (1994) concentrated on improved and 
rigorous techniques for data gathering and analysing as the best way to enhance credibility 
and acceptance. Yin (1994) identified the following as essential to establishing validity and 
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reliability in qualitative research: (1) establish a chain of evidence; (2) have the draft study 
report reviewed by the key informants; (3) the use of a single research exploratory design 
by establishing a causal relationship, using a single case explanatory design, and specifying 
the unit of analysis; (4) develop a formal research study framework, which typically has the 
following sections - an overview of the study project (objectives, issues, topic being 
investigated), field procedures (credentials and access to sites, sources of information), 
research study questions (specific questions that the investigator must keep in mind during 
data collection, and a guide for the research report (outline, format of the narrative). 
Reliability and validity issues can be interrelated. A study can be merely reliable but cannot 
be valid without first being reliable. Kirk and Miller (1986: 20) asserted that, "it is easy to 
obtain perfect reliability with no validity at all ... perfect validity, on the other hand, would 
assure perfiect reliability, for every observation would yield the complete and exact truth ". 
Therefore, the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in this study may help 
towards developing a more reliable and valid generalisation, as discussed earlier. 
5.9 Statistical techniques 
There are a number of statistical techniques that can be used to explain research data (from 
the questionnaires). The following section highlights those statistical techniques that have 
been used in this study. The statistical package adopted in this case is the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for Windows version 11. 
5.9.1 Descriptive statistics 
Statistics such as frequency, percentage, mean, median and standard deviation were used to 
describe and summarise sets of the data received from the respondents. The uses of these 
statistics include describing the characteristics of the sample and checking variables for any 
violation of the assumptions underlying the statistical techniques that address specific 
research questions. These give the readers 'a picture' of the data collected and used in the 
research. 
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5.9.2 Bivatiant analysis 
This analysis concentrates on explaining the variance that the researcher observes in single 
variables in the descriptive statistics. The usual way to examine a relationship between one 
variable and another is in the context of a table, known as cross tabulation or sometimes a 
contingency table, which includes both variables. 
5.9.3 Mann-Nitney Utest 
The Mann-Whiney U test is a non-parametric test that is used to test the difference between 
two independent groups of sample data. This test is the non-parametric alternative to the t- 
test for independent samples. Instead of comparing the means of the two groups, as in the 
case of the mest, the Mann-Whitney U test actually compares medians. It converts the 
scores of the continuous variable to ranks across the two groups. It then evaluates whether 
the ranks for the two groups significantly differ. As the scores are converted to ranks, the 
actual distribution of the scores does not matter. 
This statistical technique is used to test for non-response bias within the questionnaire 
survey in this study. Wallace and Mellor (1988: 136) pointed out that this non-parametric 
test might be more efficient and more appropriate. The parametric Q or F) tests require a 
variety of strong assumptions, the main ones being that (i) the samples are drawn from 
independent normal populations with equal variances, and (ii) the scores under analysis 
result from measurement in the strength of at least an interval scale (Siegel, 1956: 3 1). 
5.9.4 One-way analysis ofvariance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA involves one independent variable, which has a number of different levels. These 
levels correspond to the different groups or conditions. Analysis of variance is so called 
because it compares the variance between the different groups with the variability within 
each of the groups. An F ratio is calculated, which represents the variance between the 
groups divided by the variance within the groups. A large F ratio indicates that there is 
more variability between the groups than there is within each group. This analysis is used to 
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assess the degree of agreement within the scale questions (Likert scale) in the 
questionnaire. 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter has provided a detailed account of the methodological issues that have been 
considered and implemented with regard to this study. The research methodology can be 
characterised as a combination of quantitative and qualitative strategies via the 
triangulation technique so as to gain insights and results and to assist in making inferences 
and in drawing conclusions. Detailed processes and methods for utilising the questionnaire 
survey, analysis of file data/actual cases from the IRB and opinions from IRB personnel 
were also described. Finally, the chapter detailed reliability and validity issues and data 
analysis techniques utilised in the study. 
The following three chapters will discuss the results obtained from the collected data. The 
questionnaire results are detailed in the next chapter, followed by a discussion on the 
analysis of file data/actual cases from the IRB files in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 examines the 
perceptions, drawn from open-ended questions, of IRB personnel of the IRB's stance on 
and practical overview of tax evasion by SMEs. These results will then be linked together 
and discussed in the context of the research questions in Chapter 9. 
118 
CHAPTER 6 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESULT 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 reports the results obtained from the surveys of tax practitioners and SME 
taxpayers (see Appendix I for the tax practitioner questionnaire and Appendix 11 for the 
SME taxpayer questionnaire). The first section encompasses the administrative aspect of 
the surveys with the analysis of response rates, non-response bias and reliability testing. 
The next section of the chapter analyses, interprets and surnmarises the tax practitioner 
survey results and the following section presents the SME survey result. Each section 
analyses the data obtained from corresponding sections of the questionnaire and is 
delineated as such. A summary at the end of each of the sections outlines the main points of 
that section. 
6.2 Response rates and non-response bias 
Meams and Braithwaite (2001) noted that any response rate is typically related to the size 
of the questionnaire and the mode of delivery (in this study normal mail [equivalent to the 
2nd class mail in the UK] was used). Following two mailings" and after the deadline for 
responding to the questionnaire had passed, the response achieved an unadjusted response 
rate of 21.75 per cent for SME taxpayers and 17.14 per cent for tax practitioners (Table 
6.1). When adjusted using the formula described by de Vaus 6.2 (1992), a response rate of 
24.9 per cent for the SME taxpayers and 19.7 per cent for tax practitioners were obtained. 
Such response rates are typical for mail surveys (Kanuk and Berenson, 1975; Oppenhcim, 
2000) and not unusual in taxation studies, where it has been argued that tax surveys cannot 
be expected to achieve more than a 30 to 40 per cent response rate (Wallschutzky, 1984). 
61 Following an interval of 14 days from the initial posting, a short rerrýinder letter was sent to all respondents 
to encourage them to respond as soon as possible. 
6.2 Response Rate = -- 
Number returned * 100 
N in the sample - (Ineligible + Undelivered) 
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Another interesting feature of the data in Table 6.1 is that approximately 13 per cent (95 
samples) of the samples were not delivered to the address the questionnaire was sent to. 
This finding is somewhat surprising given that the sample was drawn from an active IRB 
and MIA database, which, it was assumed, would be up-to-date. 
Table 6.1 
Response rate of the surve 
Taxpayer Tax Practitioners 
Non Evader Evader OveraIll Sec153(3)a Sec'153(3)b Sec153(3)c Overall 
Population 11.6m 631 2.2m 17,300 364 666 18,300 
Questionnaires mailed 250 150 400 200 100 50 350 
Usable response 62 25 87 35 17 8 60 
Undelivered 30 20 so 20 15 10 45 
Unadjusted Rate 24.80% 16.70% 21-75% 17.50% 17% 16% 17.14% 
Adjusted Rate 28% 19% 24.90% 19% 20% 20% 19.70% 
Questionnaires sent to a random sample of a population will typically yield biased results 
arising from the fact that not all will return the questionnaire. This will create two main 
problems; a reduction in the sample and bias in the study. In order to attain a reasonable 
sample size, a large initial sample could be created. However, this serves only to produce 
the designed sample size, it does not address the problem of non-response bias. Increasing 
the sample size does not ensure a representative sample of various groups if some groups 
systematically do not respond. 
The main concern about non-response is the risk that it will differ between respondents 
with regard to the survey variables, in which case the survey estimate based on the 
respondents alone will be a biased estimate of the overall population. The concern is not so 
much the bias itself, but the difficulty in understanding what the bias is and to what extent it 
occurs. However, there are a wide variety of practices and methods for dealing with the 
non-response problem through various statistical techniques for minimising its influence in 
the analysis. As the survey in this study is confidential and anonymous, the possibility of 
obtaining information to enable adjustments for bias is ruled out. 
Wallace and Mellor (1988) outlined three types of test that can be carried out on 
questionnaire non-responses. The surrogate method involves a comparative analysis of 
responses by date of receipt. This method requires that returned questionnaires bear the 
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dates of completion or, in the absence of this, questionnaires are coded as they are received. 
The second method involves comparing the profile of respondents with known 
characteristics of a sampled population. The third method also involves the comparison of 
the characteristics of respondents with the non-respondents from the sample (in terms of 
geographical location, date of birth, sex, type of qualification). 
The difficulty of gaining independent records of the population or the sample fmme that 
can provide a more definite picture of the characteristics of the non-respondents means that 
the latter two methods are not so regularly used by researchers as the surrogate method. It 
would be impossible to carry out either of these latter two methods with respect to this 
study, as there is no way of knowing who responded and who did not due to enforced 
confidentially and anonymity. This study will use the surrogate method to test the non- 
response bias. The surrogate method attempts to construct a measure of non-response bias 
that will be based on the presumption that late responders are reasonable surrogates of non- 
respondents. 
Wallace and Mellor (1988) also suggested a non-parametric test (Mann-Whitney) as an 
appropriate test to this set of investigation. They argued that parametric tests require a 
variety of strong assumptions, the main one being that (1) the samples are drawn from 
independent normal populations with equal variances, and (2) the scores under analysis 
result from measurement in the strength of at least an interval scale. 
Using the surrogate method, Table 6.2 shows the result of the non-parametric test (Mann 
Whitney) using specified variables for SME taxpayers (non-tax evaders) for the first and 
the last 10 respondent questionnaires. Significant differences are only noted in Q 1.4g with a 
significance level of p=0.008 (z value is -2.645). In general, it can be inferred that there 
appears to be no statistically significant difference between early and late respondents for 
this group. 
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Table 6.2 
Result of the non response bias test SME taxpayers (non tax evader) 
Variable z value Sig (2 tailed)_ 
Q1.1a -1.630 0.103 
01.1b -0.187 0.851 
01.1c -0.312 0.755 
QI. Id -0.041 0.967 
Q1.1 e -0.764 0.445 
01.4a -0.659 0.510 
01.4b -1.501 0.133 
QI. 4c -1.501 0.133 
01.4d -1.364 0.172 
Q1.4e -1.629 0.103 
01.4f -1.198 0.231 
QlAg -2.645 0.008 
01.5a -1.153 0.249 
QI. 5b -1.009 0.313 
01.5c -1.744 0.081 
01.5d -0.736 0.461 
01.5e -0.648 0.517 
Q1.5f -0.622 0.534 
QI. 5g -0.965 0.335 
For the tax evader responders (Table 6.3), the same procedure as for non-tax evaders was 
used. The results of the Mann Whitney test also show that no significant difference exists 
between early and late respondents. Significant differences were only noted in QlAe (z 
value = -2.134, sig. level = 0.033) and QI. 5c (z value = -2.285, sig. level = 0.022). 
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Table 6.3 
Results of non response bias test SME taxpayer (tax evader) 
Variable z value sig (2 iled) 
Q1.1a -1.378 0.168 
Q1.1b -1.453 0.146 
QI. 1c -1.000 0.317 
Q1.1d -1.395 0.163 
QI. 1e -0.350 0.726 
01.4a -1.071 0.284 
QI. 4b -0.530 0.596 
01.4c -0.944 0.345 
QI. 4d -0.559 0.576 
01.4e -2.134 0.033 
QI. 4f -0.587 0.557 
01.49 -0.042 0.967 
01.5a 0.000 1.000 
QI. 5b -0.376 0.707 
Q1.5c -2.285 0.022 
QI. 5d -1.902 0.057 
Q1.5e -1.023 0.306 
Q1.5f -0.640 0.522 
Q1.5g 0.000 1.000 
With regard to the tax practitioner survey, a similar method and Mann Whitney test 
procedure was also carried out. All of the results for tax practitioners show no significant 
difference between early and late respondents. Table 6.4, Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show the 
results for tax practitioners practising under section 153(3)(a), section 153(3)(b) and section 
153(3)(c) respectively. 
Table 6.4 
Result of the non response bias test 
Tax Practitioner (section 153(3)(a) 
Variable z value Sig (2 tailed) 
01.9a -1.826 0.068 
01.9b -1.400 0.161 
Q1.9c -0.175 0.861 
QI. 9d -0.640 0.522 
123 
Table 6.5 
Result of the non response bias test 
Tax Practitioners section 153(3)(b) 
Vadable z value Sig (2 tailed)_ 
Q1.9a -1.000 0.317 
QI. 9b -1.000 0.317 
01.9c -1.000 0.317 
01.9d -1.181 0.238 
Table 6.6 
Result of non response bias test 
Tax Practitioners section 153(3)c 
Varlable z value Sig (2 tailed) 
Q1.9a -1.423 0.155 
QI. 9b -2.013 0.044 
Q1.9c -1.512 0.131 
QI. 9d -1.323 0.186 
It can be concluded that there appear to be no significant differences between early and late 
responders for the SME taxpayers and the tax practitioners. Bearing in mind the assumption 
when using the surrogate method, that the late responders are representative of non- 
responders, the test concluded that non-response bias is not significant. Therefore, it was 
not necessary to carry out any adjustment to the responses received. 
6.3 Reliability test 
In this research, most of the questionnaire questions have been treated as a measure in 
assessing the attitude of the respondents. Each question is a measurement of a particular 
variable. Thus the concept of reliability and validity has been applied in order to assess the 
performance of the measure. 
There are two aspects to consider when testing scaled responses; unidimensionality and 
reliability. This is known as item analysis. A unidimensionality scale is one in which each 
item measures the same underlying concept. The way to work out whether the responses for 
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a particular item reflect the response for other items is to calculate a correlation coefficient 
between the respondents' scores for the item with the score for the rest of the scale. The 
coefficient is termed the item-to-item scale coefficient. If the coefficient is less than 0.3, 
then the item is dropped from the scale. 
To assess the reliability for each item on a scale, it is possible to calculate item-to-item 
correlations. This compares the consistency of a response for an item to each other scale 
item. The index is given by the alpha statistic. If the alpha statistic is at least 0.7, the scale 
is deemed reliable. 
Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show the results of the scaled items in response to questions 
relating to the moral acceptability of tax evasion in business practices for the non-tax 
evaders and convicted evaders respectively. The items are signified as QIAA to QIAG. 
The alpha for the scale justifies the reliability (0.7), as do the unidimensionality coefficients 
for individual items. 
Table 6.7 
Reliability test for SME taxpayers (non tax evaders) responses to questions relating to 
moral acceptability of involving tax evasion. 
Item-total Statistics 
Scale mean Scale Corrected Alpha if Item 
if item variance Item total deleted 
deleted if item correlation 
deleted 
Q1.4A 12.1290 24.3437 0.7531 0.9535 
Q1.413 11.9355 23.1761 0.8158 0.9484 
Q1.4C 11-9194 22.623 0.9179 0.9402 
Q1.4D 12.0645 23.5695 0.8701 0.9445 
Q1.4E 11-9516 22.8665 0.9285 0.9395 
Q1.4F 11.9516 23.8829 0.8344 0.9473 
Q1.4G 11.9516 22.8993 0.7891 0.9519 
Reliability Coefficients 
N= 62 Reliability coefficient =7 
Alpha = 0.9539 
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Table 6.8 
Reliability test for SME taxpayers (tax evaders) question relating to business practices 
Item total statistics 
Scale mean Scale Corrected Alpha 
if item variance item total if item 
deleted if item correlation deleted 
deleted 
Q1.4A 15.4000 9.8333 0.7307 0.862 
Q1.413 15.4400 10.3400 0.6168 0.8774 
QIAC 15.0800 10.9433 0.6031 0.8787 
QIAD 15.3600 10.49 0.8172 0.8553 
Q1.4E 15.1600 9.8067 0.7458 0.8598 
QI. 4F 15.1600 10.89 0.7203 0.8661 
QMG 15.2000 11.0833 0.5623 0.882 
Reliability Coefficients 
N= 25 Reliability Coefficient =7 
Alpha = 0.8855 
The scaled responses for the questions relating to the proportion of SMEs practising such 
business practices was also deemed reliable with alpha above 0.7 for the SME taxpayers, as 
shown in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 
Reliability test for SME taxpayers questions relating to proportion of SMEs practising such 
buiness practices 
Taxpayer No. of ' Cronbactfs 
responses Alpha 
Non tax evader 62 0.8573 
Tax evader 25 0.9126 
A similar test was also conducted with the tax practitioner questionnaire for the scaled 
responses. The items are signified as Q1.9A to QI. 91), relating to the effectiveness of the 
method used in detecting tax evasion. Alpha is calculated as being above 0.7 for each of the 
three groups, which is deemed reliable (Table 6.10). 
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Table 6.10 
Reliability test for the tax practitioners questions realting to the effectiveness of the 
methods used in detecting tax evasion 
Tax Practitioners No. of Cronbach's 
responses Alpha 
Sec 153(3)a 35 0.7628 
Secl53(3)b 17 0.8609 
Sed 53(3)c 8 0.8889 
The difficulty in assessing the validity of attitude questions is the lack of criteria. A group 
of people with known attitude characteristics are required (criterion group) so that it is 
possible to see whether or not the chosen question can discriminate between them. In order 
to assess the validity of this research, careful attention must be given to studying 
conceptualisation and the way in which data are collected, analysed and interpreted, as this 
will help to generalise the findings. 
6.4 Tax practitioners survey result 
6.4.1 Respondents' background 
Respondents were asked to provide personal details in Part III of the questionnaire 
(Appendix 1). With respect to some of these items, response categories have been 
combined in order to facilitate statistical analysis. The results are shown in Table 
6.11. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents were below 50 years old and 
almost 94 per cent were male practitioners. Over 60 per cent of the respondents 
were Chinese, followed by Malays (38 per cent) and Indians (2 per cent). More than 
51 per cent were members of local professional bodies, less than 7 per cent have 
overseas professional qualifications and the rest hold themselves to be tax 
practitioners under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act 1967. The sample is thus a 
fair composition of tax practitioners concurrently registered with the Ministry of 
Finance to act as tax practitioners. Two-thirds of the respondents have more than 10 
years' experience in taxation, while another 30 per cent have between 5 and 10 
127 
Table 6.11 
Demographic characteristics of the tax practitioner 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec'153(3)b Sec'153(3)c Overall 
(a) Age 
<50 62.9 47.1 100 63.3 
>50 am 52.9 Q 36.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
(b) Gender 
Male 94.3 94.1 87.5 93.3 
Female §. 7 12.5 fil. 
Total 100 100 100 100 
(c) Ethnicity 
Malay 22.9 41.2 100 38.3 
Chinese 74.3 58.8 0 60.0 
Indian a 2 2 ill 
Total 100 192 100 100 
(d) Member of Professional Bodies 
MIAIMACPA 88.6 0 0 51.7 
ACCA/CA 11.4 0 0 6.6 
Sec; 153 of ITA 1967 100 100 411 
Total 100 100 100 100 
(e)Expedence 
<5 years 0 0 12.5 1.7 
Between 5 to 10 years 22.9 29.4 62.5 30.0 
> 10 years HA 70.6 25 68.3 
Total 100 im 100 100 
(f) No of SMEs Client 
< 100 clients 17.1 35.3 62.5 28.3 
100 to 500 clients 45.8 64.7 37.5 50.0 
> 500 clients 37.1 2 Q W 
Total 100 100 100 100 
(g)Locabon 
Westem 57.1 58.8 so 56.6 
Eastem 8.6 17.6 0 10.0 
Northem 14.3 5.9 12.5 11.7 
Southem 11.4 11.8 37.5 15.0 
East Malaysia B 
-. 
6 u Q 6.7 
Total im 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
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years and less than 2 per cent have 5 years or less experience in tax matters. The 
mean length of tax experience is approximately 10 years. The data implies that 
respondents are fairly familiar with the tax law and its administrative system. 
The size of practices can be regarded as medium compared to the number of SME 
clients the tax practitioners serve, with 50 per cent of them having 100 to 500 
clients. The geographical breakdown is appropriate, based on the business/economic 
setting of the country. Most of the practices are located in the western region (56 per 
cent), followed by the southern (15 per cent), northern (I I per cent), and eastern 
regions (10 per cent) and East Malaysia (7 per cent). 
64.2 Existence and extent of tax evasion in SMEs 
Responses indicated that SMEs do evade tax (Table 6.12). Question 1.1 related to 
the respondent's opinion toward the existence of tax evasion in SMEs. Only a small 
proportion of the respondents (15 per cent) did not perceive the existence of tax 
evasion within SMEs. To quantify these responses, the respondents were asked to 
estimate the extent of the involvement of SMEs in tax evasion in Question 1-2. 
Overall, the results suggest that the problem of tax evasion among SMEs is serious 
in Malaysia: approximately 52 per cent of the respondents believed that more than 
50 per cent of SMEs evade tax. 
These responses, however, must be viewed in the context of the fact that one-third 
of the respondents are former IRB staff (tax practitioners practising under Section 
153(3)b) and may have a biased view of tax evasion by SMEs based on their 
previous exposure and experience within the IRB handling SME cases. 
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Table 6.12 
Tax practitioners! perceive the existence and extent of SMEs Involvement In tax evasion 
QI. I: In your opinion, do most of SMEs evade tax? 
Percentages 
SecI53(3)a SecIS3(3)b SecI53(3)c Overall 
Yes 88.6 94.1 50.0 85.0 
No JJA U 50.0 15.0 
Total 100 100 IQQ 100 
N 35 17 60 
Q1 -2: To the best of your ability, please estimate the percentages of SMEs that evade tax in 
Malaysia 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec153(3)b Sec153(3)c Overall 
< 25% of SMEs 5.7 17.6 37.5 13.3 
25%-50% of SMEs 31.5 5.9 0 20.0 
50%-75% of SMEs 45.7 64.7 12.5 46.7 
>75% of SMEs 5.7 5.9 0 5.0 
Not applicable* 11.4 u 50.0 15.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
* Responses perceived SMEs do not evade tax. 
64.3 Characteristics of tax evasion in SMEs 
Questions 1.5,1.6 and 1.7 identified the characteristics of tax evasion by SMEs. The 
results are presented in Table 6.13. Over 48 per cent of respondents indicated that 
tax evasion is not cyclical in nature within SMEs. By contrast, only 5 per cent 
perceived otherwise and approximately one-third of them responded 'do not know' 
(QI. 5). 
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Table 6.13 
Tax practitioners' perceived the charateristics of tax evasion by SMEs 
Q1.5: Is tax evasion cyclical in SMEs? Cyclical means it happens Ywithin a specific period or 
circumstances for example once in ten years. 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec153(3)b Sec153(3)c Overall 
Yes 8.6 0 0 5.0 
No 42.9 76.5 12.5 48.3 
Do not know 37.1 17.6 37.5 31.7 
Not applicable* 11.4 U 50.0 15-0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 17 60 
C11.6: Is tax evasion a repetitive action by some SMEs? Repetitive means a yearly affair done by SMEs. 
Percentages 
Seel 53(3)a Seel 53(3)b Seel 53(3)c Overall 
Yes 40.1 70.6 0 43.3 
No 11.4 5.9 0 8.3 
Do not know 37.1 17.6 50.0 33.3 
Not applicable* 11.4 u 50.0 M 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
QI. 7: Which is the most likely period that SMEs will evade taxes. 
Percentages 
Sec'153(3)a SecI53(3)b Secl53(3)c Overall 
Early stage 8.6 0 0 5.0 
High inflation 0 0 0 0 
Economic boom 5.7 11.7 0 6.6 
Economic downturn 2.9 0 0 1.7 
AM the time 71.4 76.5 50.0 70.0 
Other 0 5.9 0 1.7 
Not applicable* 11.4 Eg 50.0 15.0 
Total jo 100 IM 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
On the other hand, tax evasion was perceived to be repetitive in nature by more than 
40 per cent of the respondents. Another 8 per cent believed it not to be repetitive 
and one-third indicated 'do not know' (Q 1.6). 
To understand these responses further, respondents were asked to identify the likely 
period over which SMEs would evade tax (QI. 7). Almost 70 per cent of the 
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respondents were of the opinion that SMEs evaded taxes all the time, an interesting 
finding given that if they are caught, they are at greater risk of incurring substantial 
penalties for past evasions: the IRB is empowered under section 91 of ITA, 1967 to 
raise assessment beyond the prescribed time limit (6 years) where tax has been lost 
due to fraud, wilful default or negligence on the part of the taxpayer. Alternatively, 
this result indicates that the characteristic of SME tax evasion is that it is repetitive 
in nature. 
6.4.4 Factors influencing tax evasion by SMEs 
Question 1.4 asked tax practitioners to identify the most common factor from a list 
of factors that may lead to tax evasion and related manipulation in SMEs in 
Malaysia. An overall average of 57 per cent of the respondents viewed an 
incompetent, corrupt and inadequately staffed tax administration as the most 
common factor that may lead to tax evasion and related manipulation in SMEs 
(Table 6.14). 
Table 6.14 
Tax practitioners' view on the most common factor Influencing tax evasion In SMEs 
Q1.4: The following are the factors which may lead to tax evasion and related manipulation In SMEs. 
Please Indicates one factor which you think Is the common factor that may lead to tax evasion and 
related manipulation In SMEs In Malaysia. 
Loopholes in tax system 
Wrong accounting concept/principle 
Incompetent, corrupt and Inadequately 
staffed tax administration 
Unable to enforce prevailing tax code 
Unwilling to enforce prevailing tax code 
Other 
Not applicable* 
Total 
Percentages 
Seel 53(3)a' Seel 53(3)b 
8.6 5.9 
8.6 5.9 
Sed 53(3)c Overall 
0 6.7 
0 6.7 
N 
60.0 58.8 37.5 56.7 
2.9 0 12.5 3.3 
2.9 0 0 1.7 
5.7 23.5 0 10 
IJA m 0 15 
100 100 100 100 
35 17 8 60 
* Responses perceived SMEs do not evade tax 
The dimensions associated with the provision of law (loopholes in the tax system, 
unable and unwilling to enforce prevailing tax code and the professional standard) 
were regarded by tax practitioners as the least influential on tax evasion by SMEs. 
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In practice, these categories are not mutually exclusive because tax practitioners' 
training and experience allows them to take and justify the position. 
64.5 Role of tax practitioners 
Tax practitioners acting on behalf of the taxpayers are involved in certain decision- 
making processes. The decision is governed by whether the practitioner takes an 
independent, pro-taxpayer or pro-tax authority stance with regard to their 
professional decision process. Questions 2.3 and 2.5 identified stances that 
influenced tax practitioners in terms of siding with their client or the tax authority. 
Responses indicated that tax practitioners do show commitment towards the tax 
authority. Question 2.3 looked at the possible responses concerning tax 
practitioners' appropriate action in reporting the income received from outside of 
the regular job of a client. Over 98 per cent of the respondents preferred to declare it 
in the most advantageous manner within the law (Table 6.15). This acknowledges 
that the tax practitioners have a duty to perform for their client within the 
boundaries of tax laws. It is in the interest of the taxpayers to comply. It can also be 
seen as being in the interest of the tax practitioners (self-interest) to ensure that 
clients do comply and this interpretation can be perceived as a pro-tax authority 
stance. 
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Table 6.15 
Tax practitioners' response to the action that will be taken In reporting Income 
02.3: Imagine Yourself In this situabon: One of your client has been paid RM1 00,000 in cash for 
work done outside the regular job. As tax practitioner which action would you take in reporting 
that income to IRB 
Not declare it 
Declare only a portion of it 
Declare it in the most 
advantageous manner 
within the law 
Declare as advised by client 
Others 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Seci 53(3) Sed 53(3)b Sed 53(3)c Overall 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
100 94.1 100 98.3 
0 0 0 0 
2 m 2 1.7 
100 100 100 100 
35 17 8 60 
Question 2.5 raised the issue of clients not accepting advice on an issue of 
disclosure. Approximately 88 per cent of respondents would refilse to continue to 
act on behalf of such a client (Table 6.16). Again, this suggested a positive attitude 
of tax practitioners towards the IRB in assisting the board to enforce tax laws. 
Table 6.16 
Tax practitioners' response to non acceptance of advice on an Issue of disclosure 
Q2.5: What action do you think tax practitioner should take, if client does not accept advice 
on an Issues of disclosure. 
Percentages 
Sec153(3) Sec153(3)b Sec153(3)c Overall 
Inform IRB 0 0 12.5 1.7 
Refuse to complete the tax return 2.8 0 0 1.6 
Refuse to act as an agent 88.6 88.2 87.5 88.3 
Fill in incorrect return but inform 
IRB 0 5.9 0 1.7 
Other 
_U 
5.9 9 6.7 
Total 1 DO 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
The large numbers of respondents saying that they would declare cash earnings in 
the most advantageous manner within the law and would refuse to act as an agent 
seemed contrary to view of the fact that tax practitioners may play a negative role in 
the tax compliance process as there is evidence that tax practitioners appear to be 
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exploiters of the law (e. g. Kaplan et aL, 1988a; Ayers et al., 1989; Erard, 1990). 
This may also be true with regard to the cultural orientation of developing countries; 
people are not used to expressing their opinions frankly and they have a tendency to 
say what other people want to hear (Bulmer and Warwick, 1993). If these responses 
are a true indication, tax practitioners are not prepared to go out of their way to aid 
taxpayers, but are happy to help within the boundaries of tax law. 
64.6 Tax practitioners professional ethics and integrity 
Two questions (Q2.1 and Q2.2) addressed tax practitioners' professional ethics and 
integrity. Question 2.1 looked at the possibility of tax practitioners accidentally or 
deliberately understating SMEs' profit so that their clients would pay less tax (Table 
6.17). Over 80 per cent of respondents perceived that they were involved in such 
activities, about 12 per cent felt that no such involvement existed and approximately 
7 per cent stated 'prefer not to reply'. 
135 
Table 6.17 
Tax practitioners' perceptions of the accidental or deliberate understatement of SMEs profit 
02.1: Do you think tax practitioners, whether due to client pressure or for what ever reasons, 
accidentally or deliberately understate their client profit so that they have had to pay less income 
tax 
Yes 
No 
Prefer not to reply 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Seel 53(3) Seel 53(3)b Seel 53(3)c Overall 
80.0 88.2 75.0 81.7 
8.6 11.8 25.0 11.6 
11.4 2 9 6.7 
100 100 100 100 
35 17 8 60 
02.1(b): To what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax pracutioners accidentally 
understate SMEs profits. 
< 10% of tax practitioners 
10% - 25% of tax practitioners 
25% - 50% of tax practitioners 
50% - 75% of tax practitioners 
>75% of tax practitioners 
Not applicablen 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec153(3)b SecI53(3)c) Overall 
77.1 64.6 62.5 71.7 
2.9 11.8 0 5.0 
0 5.9 12.5 3.3 
0 5.9 0 1.7 
0 0 0 0 
20.0 11.8 2u iu 
100 100 100 im 
35 17 8 60 
Q2.1 (c) To what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax practitioners deliberately 
understate SMEs profit. 
< 10% of tax practitioners 
10% - 25% of tax practitioners 
25% - 50% of tax practitioners 
50% - 75% of tax practitioners 
> 75% of tax practitioners 
Not applicableil 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Sed 53(3)a Sed 53(3)b Sed 53(3)c Overall 
8.5 11.8 12.5 10.0 
14.3 5.9 37.5 15.0 
28.6 64.6 25.0 38.3 
25.7 5.9 0 16.7 
2.9 0 0 1.7 
20.0 ILA M. lu 
JDQ 100 100 100 
35 17 8 60 
*Responses with answers'noand 'prefer not to repIV 
The majority of the respondents (72 per cent), however, believed that the 
involvement of tax practitioners in accidentally understating SMEs' income/profit 
was less than 10 per cent. By contrast, between 25 and 50 per cent of tax 
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practitioners were perceived to be deliberately involved in understating SMEs' 
income/profit. One possible explanation is that tax practitioners are trying to keep 
their clients happy in order to keep their business. 
Question 2.2 looked at the possible involvement of tax practitioners' perceptions of 
accidental or deliberate overstatement of SMEs' income/profit (Table 6.18). Over 
78 per cent of the respondents were of the opinion that tax practitioners were 
involved in such activities. Tax practitioner involvement, however, was perceived to 
be less than 10 per cent. One possible explanation for overstatement is that most 
SMEs with low paid-up capital and resources need financing. In order to obtain 
funding, their financial statement needs to show them to be a creative altered to 
show a going concern, with good income and profit and paying a fair share of tax. 
This approach is possible because currently the tax law in Malaysia does not require 
the accounts of the smaller SMEs (for example self-employed, sole proprietorship 
and partnership) registered with Registrar of Business to be audited except those 
which are incorporated under the Companies Act 1967. 
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Table 6.18 
Tax practitioners' perception of the accidental or deliberate overstatement of SMEs profit 
Q2.2: Do you think tax practitioners, whether due to client pressure or for whatever reason. 
accidentally or deliberately overstate their client's profit so they have to pay more tax. 
Percentages 
Secl 53(3) Secl 53(3)b Secl 53(3)c Overall 
Yes 68.6 88.2 100 78.3 
No 28.6 11.8 0 20.0 
Prefer not to reply 2.8 02 11 
Total I AO 100 100 100 
N 35 17 a 60 
Q2.2(b) To what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax practitioners accidentally 
overstate SMEs profit? 
< 10% of tax practitioners 
10% - 25% of tax practitioners 
25% - 50% of tax practitioners 
50% - 75% of tax practitioners 
> 75% of tax practiboneri 
Not applicable* 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Sed 53(3)a Sed 53(3)b Sed 53(3)c Overall 
65.7 76.4 87.5 71.6 
2.9 11.8 0 5.0 
0 0 12.5 1.7 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
31.4 11.8 9 211 
100 100 NQ 100 
35 17 8 60 
Q2.2(c) To what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax practitioners deliberately 
overstate SMEs profit? 
< 10% of tax practitioners 
10% - 25% of tax practitioners 
25% - 50% of tax practitioners 
50% - 75% of tax practitioners 
> 75% of tax practitioners 
Not applicable* 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec153(3)b Sec153(3)c Overall 
57.2 23.5 50.0 46.7 
0 17.6 37.5 10 
11.4 41.2 0 18.3 
0 5.9 12.5 3.3 
0 0 0 0 
21 A 11.8 2 2JI 
100 100 100 100 
35 17 8 60 
* Responses with answer 'no' and 'prefer not to reply' 
6.4.7 Approaches used by SMEs in evading tax 
The related prior research indicated that there are various ways for SMEs to evade 
tax. Question 1.6 detailed four methods understood to be the most common in 
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generating tax-evaded income in SMEs, as listed in Table 6.19. The survey 
respondents believed (45 per cent) overstatement of expenses (other than cost of 
goods sold) to be the most common method used for SMEs' tax evasion schemes. 
This was followed by understatement of gross profit (30 per cent) and complete 
suppression of gross profit (8 per cent). The possible explanation as to why the 
overstatement of expenses is common in generating tax-evaded income in SMEs 
could be because it is the easiest and simplest method to use. 
Table 6.19 
Tax practitioners' response to the approaches used to evade tax 
01.3: The following are understood to be common methods for generating tax evaded 
income in SMEs. Which do you think Is the most frequently used In generating tax evaded 
Income in SMEs in Malaysia. 
Complete Suppression of GP 
Understatement of GP 
Overstatement of expenses 
(other than cost of goods sold) 
Understatement of asset 
(including property and inventories) 
Others 
Not applicable* 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Sec153(3)a Sec153(3)b Secl53(3)c Overall 
8.6 11.8 0 8.3 
22.9 52.9 12.5 30.0 
57.1 23.5 37.5 45.0 
0 0 0 0 
0 5.9 0 1.7 
u 50.0 m 
100 100 im 
35 17 8 60 
* Responses perceived SIVIEs do not evade tax. 
6.4.8 Probability ofdetection by IRB 
Question 2.4 asked the respondents' views towards the chances of being caught by 
the IRB. Over two thirds of the respondents believed that there was less than a 50 
per cent chance that tax evasion activities would be detected by the IRB (Table 
6.20). In other words, respondents believed the chances of being caught by the IRB 
are 50/50. 
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Table 6.20 
Tax practioners'view on the chances of being caught by IRB 
Q2.4: What do you think the chances are that your client will be caught by IRB if they/ 
tax practitioner reported less/none of the income in Q2.3. 
Percentages 
Secl 53(3)a Secl 53(3)b Secl 53(3)c Overall 
None 5.7 0 0 3.3 
Less than 25 % 14.3 17.6 25.0 16.7 
Between 25% to 50% 57.1 70.6 75.0 63.3 
Between 50% to 75% 20.0 0 0 11.7 
More than 75% a Im 
-Q 
1-0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 18 7 60 
The number of SMEs' clients being investigatedlaudited by the IRB may further 
explain this view. The majority indicated that less than 10 clients on average had 
been investigated/audited per year over the last five years (Table 6.21). As such, a 
small percentage of the SMEs were investigated/audited by the IRB each year and 
this could be less than I per cent. This view further suggests an incompetent, 
corrupt and inadequately staffed tax administration to be one of the main factors 
influencing tax evasion by SMEs. 
Table 6.21 
Tax practitioners' response on the number of clients investigatedlaudited on average per 
vear over the last five vear. 
02.6: How many of your SME clients have been Investigated/audited by IRB on average 
per year over the last five years. 
Pecentages 
Sec153(3)a Secl53(3)b Secl53(3)c Overall 
None 37.1 23.5 12.5 30.0 
Less than 10 60.0 76.5 75.0 66.7 
10 - 50 clients 2.9 0 12.5 3.3 
More than 50 clients 2 9 2 Q 
Total '100 100 M 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
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64.9 Methods used byIRB in detecting tax evasion by SMEs 
Respondents were presented with a set of four methods that had been identified as 
the common methods for detecting tax evasion (QI. 9). Respondents were asked to 
rate the effectiveness of the methods using a Likert scale of "I" (very poor) to "Y' 
(very good). Table 6.22 compares the means of the responses concerning four 
common methods used by the revenue authority. The respondents were of the 
opinion that all the methods were good with all of the means nearing 4. However, 
capital statement/net worth analysis (overall mean response of 3.80) was viewed by 
the respondents overall as the most effective way to detect tax evasion. 
Table 6.22 
Tax practitioners' view on the common methods for detecting tax evasion used Revenue 
Authority 
01.9: The following are the common methods for detecting tax evasion used by the 
Revenue Authority. How would you rate the effectiveness of the method in detecUng tax 
evasion. 
Mean response 
Sec153(3)a Secl53(3)b Secl53(3)c Overall 
Analytical Review/Ratio analysis 3.89 3.71 3.38 3.77 
Capital StatementtNetworth Analysis 3.80 3.88 3.63 3.80 
Income Reconstruction 3.66 4.00 3.63 3.75 
Digital analysis using Benford's Law 3.51 M 3.50 
Total im 10 jo JA 
N 35 17 8 60 
The mean response of individual response on the scale of 1= very poor to 5= very good. 
64.10 Tax practitionersperception offorensic accounting 
Questions 1.10 and 1.11 addressed the issue of forensic accounting, and respondents 
were asked to assess their understanding and opinions of the techniques involved in 
detecting tax evasion by SIýEs. More than 78 per cent of the respondents claimed to 
have either a 'fairly good' and 'good' understanding of forensic accounting. It is of 
note that approximately 20 per cent stated that they had a poor or non-existent 
understanding of what forensic accounting was all about (Table 6.23). At the other 
end of the scale, about 2 per cent identified themselves as being very well equipped 
with knowledge of forensic accounting. 
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Table 6.23 
Tax practitioners' response to the understanding of forensic accounting techniques 
01.10: What Is your understanding of forensic accounting? 
Pecentages 
Sec153(3)a SecIS3(3)b Secl53(3)c Overall 
None 0 5.9 0 1.7 
Poor 17.1 17.6 25.0 18.3 
Average 54.3 64.7 62.5 58.3 
Good 28.6 5.9 12.5 20.0 
Very good Q U 2 JJ7 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
Despite the relatively high percentage of respondents who claimed themselves to 
have a 'fairly good' or 'good' understanding of forensic accounting, most 
respondents (95 per cent) were not aware or perhaps not knowledgeable at all about 
other methods 6.3 of detecting tax evasion more successful than forensic accounting 
techniques (Table 6.24). The remaining 5 per cent claimed that there was a better 
way to detect tax evasion by SMEs; unfortunately, none of them made any 
comments or suggestions about this method. The possible explanation is that 
forensic accounting is either still new to them or not widely available in Malaysia 
or, if it is available, the tax practitioners may not have undergone formal training to 
enable them to fully understand the concept of forensic accounting. 
Table 6.24 
Tax practitioners' response to the other mean of detection better than forensic accounting 
technioue? 
01.11: In your opinion is there a better way to detect tax evasion by SMEs other than 
forensic accounting techniques. 
Percentages 
Sed 53(3)a Sed 53(3)b Sed 53(3)c Overall 
Yes 2.9 5.9 12.5 5.0 
No 31.4 11.8 25.0 25.0 
Do not know 65.7 82.4 62.5 zu 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 35 17 8 60 
63 Most tax practitioners were quite familiar with the indirect methods of proving unreported income used by 
the tax authority, for example net worth/capital statement, expenditure, bank deposits or percentage mark-up. 
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6 4.11 Focus group outcomes 
The tax practitioners and SMEs focus group 
The primary purpose of the tax practitioners and SMEs focus groups were to assist 
in identifying issues in the SMEs and tax practitioners questitionaires (see Chapter 
5, section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 for further details). The principal outcomes of the analysis 
of the data are summarised in Figure 6.1. 
Summarising, the tax practitioner survey suggested that SMEs did evade tax and it 
is estimated that more than 50 per cent of SMEs are involved. Analysis also 
revealed that tax evasion by SMEs is repetitive in nature and takes place mostly 
through overstatement of expenses (other than cost of goods sold), which was the 
most common method used in tax evasion schemes. 
The results further revealed an incompetent, corrupt and inadequately staffed tax 
administration to be the major factor influencing tax evasion by SMEs, which is 
supported by the probability of detection by the IRB, which is less than I per cent 
annually. Tax practitioners, however, believed that all of the methods and 
approaches used by the IRB are good with capital statement/net worth analysis 
being viewed as overall the most effective method of detecting tax evasion. 
Tax practitioners also perceived themselves as pro-tax authority, acting within the 
law and without any factors influencing ýheir decision-making. They, however, 
admitted that some of them do accidentally or deliberately understate or overstate 
profit for their clients so that they will pay more or less tax. 
The conception and knowledge of forensic accounting among the tax practitioners is 
perceived to be 'average' by the majority. The current techniques of forensic 
accounting used by the IRB are considered to be the most effective way to detect tax 
evasion by SMEs. 
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6.5 SME taxpayer survey result 
65.1 Respondents'background 
Some of the personal details provided in Part III of the questionnaire (see Appendix 
11) have been combined in order to facilitate statistical analysis. Table 6.25 provides 
a profile of the respondents. The respondents represent a total of 87 SME taxpayers, 
62 from the general population, i. e. the group presumed to be SME non-tax evaders, 
and 25 convicted SME tax evaders. The classification of compliance behaviour, that 
is, whether the respondent is deemed a non-tax evader or convicted evader, was 
indicated by the colour of the questionnaire, which was set at the design stage: blue 
for non evaders and orange for tax evaders. 
Two-thirds of the respondents were below 50 years old with over 90 per cent being 
male proprietors. They represented a fairly evenly spread ratio of ethnic groups, 
comprising Malays (43 per cent), Chinese (50 per cent) and Indians (7 per cent). 
Fifty four per cent of them have had a tertiary education and 46 per cent compulsory 
schooling/college education. 
The majority of the respondents are in a position of control in the SMEs. 
Approximately 45 per cent are company directors and more than 39 per cent are 
self-employed. The average turnover for the respondents was less than RMIO 
million per year. Over 80 per cent of the sample employed fewer than 50 
employees. The geographical breakdown of the respondents is appropriate 
according to the economic setting of the country with most of the economic 
activities being located in the western region (48 per cent), followed by the southern 
(17 per cent), northern (14 per cent), and eastern regions (I I per cent) and East 
Malaysia (8 per cent). 
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Table 6.25 
Demographic characteristics of the SMES taxpaye 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
(a) Age 
* 50 83.8 76.0 81.6 
* 50 16.2 24.0 18.4 
Total 100 100 100 
(b) Gender 
Male 90.3 92.0 90.8 
Female 11 U 2.2 
Total 100 100 100 
(c) Ethnicity 
Malay 46.8 32.0 42.5 
Chinese 43.5 68.0 50.6 
Indian 9.7 
-Q 
H 
Total 100 100 10-Q 
(d) Education 
Compulsory schooling/college 48.4 40.0 46.0 
First degree and above U& 60.0 54.0 
Total im 100 100 
(e) Profession 
Professional 43.5 28.0 39.1 
Partner In a partnership 9.7 12.0 10.3 
Company director 38.7 60.0 44.9 
Employee DA 2 U 
Total 100 100 100 
(f) Average turnover per year 
< 10 millions 85.4 72.0 81.6 
10 - 25 million 14.6 28.0 18.4 
Total 100 100 1QQ 
(g) No. of employee 
* 50 82.2 76.0 80.5 
* 50 17.8 24,0 1U 
Total 100 100 
(h) Business category 
Self employed 45.2 32.0 41.4 
Non self employed 54.8 68.0 58.6 
Total 10 100 
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Table 6.25 (continued) 
Demographic characteristics of the SME taxpayers 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
(i) Locabon 
Westem 51.6 40.0 48.3 
Eastem 9.7 16.0 11.5 
Northem 14.5 16.0 14.9 
Southem 19.4 12.0 17.2 
East Malaysia 4.8 16.0 8.0 
Total 100 ng 100 
N 62 25 87 
The sample provided a relatively representative cross section of the population. The 
only bias that was observed was an under-representation of female entrepreneurs, 
where married female entrepreneur taxpayers currently are filed under the 
.4 husband's tax file6 . 
65.2 General views and extent oftax evasion in SMEs 
The SME taxpayers were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement, on a 
five-point Likert scale of "I" (strongly disagree) to 'T' (strongly agree), with each 
of five statements regarding tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia, as listed in Table 
6.26. This table also sets out the means and significance level for the responses of 
the non-tax evaders and convicted evaders who supported the statements. The mean 
responses to these statements were greater than 3.5 for both groups of respondents 
with no significant differences, indicating strong agreement in the views on tax 
evasion by SMEs in Malaysia6-5. 
The strong agreement with such statements as "Tax evasion is common in 
Malaysia", "Aere is nothing morally wrong with paying less tax" and "Tax 
6.4 Under the Malaysian tax system, only one file is opened for a married couple, even though a married 
woman is assessed separately on her income from all sources. The wife has to file the income under the husband's tax return. However, a married woman may elect for aggregation of her income with that of her husband if she finds it beneficial in terms of a lower tax liability. 
6,5 ANOVA , was used to test for differences in responses between non evaders and evaders. 
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evasion is a form of gambling" is evidence to suggest that the existence and 
problem of tax evasion is serious in Malaysia (at least in the perceptions of the 
respondents). 
Table 6.26 
Taxpayers'vlew on tax evasion by SMEs 
01.1: To what extent do you agree With the following statement about tax evasion? 
Mean response 
Non evaders Evaders Overall F value Sig 
Tax evasion is common in Malaysia 3.92 3.96 3.93 0.057 0.811 
Tax evasion is a fraud committed 
against the government 3.90 4.08 3.95 1.342 0.250 
Tax evasion is Justified if the tax 
system is unfair 3.85 3.92 3.87 0.163 0.688 
There Is nothing morally wrong 
with paying less tax than the proper 
amount 3.56 3.68 3.60 0.415 0.521 
Tax evasion is a special form of 
gambling: gambling for extra income 
in light of the likelihood of detection 
and the imposition of penalities 3.82 3.76 3.80 0.136 0.731 
N 62 25 87 
The mean response is the Individual response on a five point scale of I= strongly disagree to 
5= strongly agree 
It is also worth highlighting the strong agreement (overall mean response of 3.95) 
with the statement of "Tax evasion is a fraud committed against the government. " 
On the basis of this view, both groups of respondents perceived some positive 
attitude towards tax ethics and a perception of fairness in taxation. It is quite 
surprising to observe the positive attitude among tax evaders. Presumably they want 
to present an image of themselves as honest and also want to regard themselves as 
honest, perhaps resulting from their experience with the IRB after being found out 
and penalised for income tax evasion. 
In order to quantify the seriousness of the perceptions, the respondents were asked 
to estimate the extent of SME involvement in tax evasion (see QI. 6, Table 6.27). 
About two third of the respondents in both groups believed that 'between 25 to 50 
per cent' of SMEs do evade tax. In contrast, only 2 per cent are of the view 'less 
than 25 per cent' and approximately 36 per cent believed 'more than 50 per cent' of 
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SMEs are evading tax. There was a split opinion in the overall perception by the 
SME taxpayers and tax practitioners (Table 6.12, Q 1.2) with regard to this 
estimate; however, the extent of the perceived involvement of SMEs indicates that 
the problem of tax evasion among SMEs is serious. 
Table 6.27 
Taxpavers' estimation of SMEs Involvement In evadinci tax 
Q1.6: In your opinion, to what e)dent (in percentage), if any, do you think that SMEs are evading tax. 
Percentages S 
Non evaders Evader overall 
Less than 25% 1.6 4.0 2.3 
Between 25% to 50% 53.2 76.0 59.8 
Between 50% to 75% 41.. 9 20.0 35.6 
More than 75% 2.2 2 a 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
65.3 Characteristics of tax evasion in SMEs 
One question (Q1.8) was posed to identify the likely period over which SMEs 
would evade taxes. As can be seen from Table 6.28, both groups of respondents 
believed that tax evasion by SMEs will take place all the time. This view is 
consistent with the results obtained from the tax practitioners (Table 6.13. ). It 
indicates that tax evasion by SMEs id repetitive in nature. 
Table 6.28 
Taxpayers' response to the likely Period SMEswill evade taxes 
Q1 -8: In your opinion, which Is the likely period In wbich SMEs will evade taxes? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evader Overall 
Early stage 4.8 8.0 5.7 
High Inflation 3.2 0 2.3 
Economic boom 9.7 0 6.9 
Economic downturn 6.5 12.0 8.0 
AM the time 75.8 80.0 77.1 
Other 0 2 2 
Total 100 UQ jo 
N 62 25 87 
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6 5.4 Relationship with tax practitioners 
The relationship with tax practitioners was addressed through three questions (Q2.1, 
Q2.2 and Q2.3). The respondents were asked who kept their accounting 
records/books, who dealt with tax matters and whether they had ever switched 
accountants/tax practitioners in dealing with tax matters. 
Questions 2.1 and 2.2 asked SME taxpayers whether or not they relied on each of 
the following in keeping their accounting documents and dealing with tax matters 
for their business: (a) Self-, (b) Spouse/partner; (c) Friends; (d) Employee; (e) 
Accountant/Tax practitioners. The frequency of use of each possible source is 
summarised in Table 6.29. 
A majority of evaders (64 per cent) whereas about half (50 per cent) of non evaders 
relied on their accountants/tax practitioners to keep their accounting documentation; 
about one third of respondents kept their own. Notably less involved in the keeping 
of accounting documentation were the employees (12.6 per cent) and 
spouses/partners (1.1 per cent). Both group tended to be more heavily relied on their 
accountants/tax practitioners in keeping their accounting records. The extent of their 
reliance on their accountants/tax practitioners, therefore, indicates that they can be 
influence in their tax compliance decision. These results are consistent with research 
undertaken in the Australia context (Marshall et aL, 1997) showing that taxpayers 
place a heavy reliance upon tax practitioners. 
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Table 6.29 
Taxpayers' response on tax administration 
02.1: Who keeps the accounting records/books of your business? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evader Overall 
Self 37.1 20.0 32.2 
Spouselpartner 1.6 0 1.2 
Friends 0 0 0 
Employee 11.3 16.0 12.6 
Accountant/tax practitioners 50.0 64.0 54.0 
Not applicable 9 9 2 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
Q2.2: Who deals with tax matters for your business? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Self 25.8 8.0 20.8 
Spouselpartner 1.6 0 1.1 
Friends 0 0 0 
Employee 1.6 0 1.1 
Accountant/Tax practitioner 71.0 92.0 77.0 
Not applicable Q Q 2 
Total IQQ im im 
N 62 25 87 
02.3: Have you ever switched accountant/tax practitioners In dealing with tax matter. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Yes 12.9 56.0 25.3 
No 62.9 32.0 54.0 
Prefer not to reply 4.8 12.0 6.9 
Not applicable 19.4 m 
Total im Im 
N 62 25 87 
Both groups (92 per cent of evaders and 71 per cent of non evaders) also used 
accountants/tax practitioners in helping them to deal with tax matters with the IRB, 
(see Q2.2, Table 6.29). This finding implies a complexity in the tax law and, as a 
result, the tendency of SME taxpayers to seek assistance and advice from 
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accountants/tax practitioners. This view also implies that tax practitioners play dual 
roles; giving advice to their clients and helping to enforce tax laws. Ydepper et aL 
(1991), however, established that tax practitioners do assist the government to 
enforce tax laws when it is unambiguous but at the same time assist taxpayers to 
exploit the tax law when it is ambiguous. The extent of SMEs' reliance on the tax 
practitioners as their advisors, therefore, indicates that they can be influenced in 
their tax compliance decisions (Tan, 1999). 
In analysing the results for switching accountants/tax practitioners, both groups 
expressed that they had never switched accountants/tax practitioners in dealing with 
tax matters (Table 6.29; Q2.3). There is, however, a tendency to switch accountants, 
for some reason that has not been raised by this research, as perceived by the 
convicted tax evaders. This implies that both groups willing to ter7ninate their tax 
practitioner's services. Evaders, in particular, justified their actions although there is 
no clear evidence to indicate that this occurs when their desire for advice is not met. 
Prior research (Hite, 1992; Tan, 1999; Sakurai and Braithwaite, 2001) has shown 
that taxpayers would switch or terminate their tax practitioners if they disagreed 
with the advice given or if they had been investigated for tax evasion: it was even 
likely the that tax practitioner would stop dealing with them if he/she thought they 
fitted the profile of a tax evader. 
6.5.5 Taxpayers' integrity 
Three questions were asked to assess the integrity of SME taxpayers. The first 
question presented respondents with a scenario of a case (Q 2.4). The scenario 
asked the respondent for the appropriate action to be taken if they were being paid 
RM 100,000.00 in cash for work done outside their regular job. By far the greatest 
number of respondents indicated that they would declare the income in the most 
advantageous manner within the law (Table 6.30). This response suggests that both 
groups of SME taxpayers have a positive perception towards the tax law; however, 
it may be difficult to prove whether truthful answers were given, as discussed earlier 
in the context of the tax practitioners' views on the same issue (paragraph 6.4.5). 
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Table 6.30 
Taxpayers' response on the action that will be taken in reporting the Income to IRS 
02A Imagine yourself in this situation: You have been paid RM100,000 In cash for 
work that you have done outside your regular job. Which appropriate action would 
you take to report it 
Not declare It 
Declare only a portion of it 
Declare it in the most 
advantageous manner 
Declare it but off set 
by GP or expenses 
Total 
N 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evader Overall 
8.1 4 6.9 
1.6 8 3.4 
87.1 88 87.4 
1.2 9 2.3 
100 100 100 
62 25 87 
Tables 6.31 and 6.32 show respondents' perceptions of whether SMEs are involved 
in tax evasion and whether their involvement was either accidentally or deliberately 
understating or overstating their income/profit so as to pay less or more tax than 
they should. These were assessed by two questions - Q2.5 and Q2.6. 
When examining the responses to part I of Q2.5 (Table 6.3 1) and Q2.6 (Table 
6.32), it is clear that there was a perception that SMEs do accidentally or 
deliberately understate or overstate their income/profits. The respondents generally 
tend to agree that SMEs accidentally or deliberately understated their 
income/profits. One implication of this response is that both groups believed SMEs 
had more opportunity to evade tax. 
Both groups believed the actual percentage of SMEs involved in such activities to 
be less than 10 per cent. Further findings showed that almost half of respondents 
indicated that between 25 and 50 per cent of SMEs deliberately understated their 
profits and two third of the respondents perceived that less than 10 per cent of 
SMEs deliberately overstated their profit. 
These results provide some evidence that SMEs do accidentally or deliberately 
understate or overstate profits; however, overall SMEs tend to deliberately 
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understate profits. Understanding this phenomenon could help the IRB to shape and 
manage its compliance programme in a strategic way. Kidder and McEwen 
(1989: 64) concluded that the state of knowledge in the field of tax evasion would be 
best served by an initial emphasis on taxpaying behaviour and then on tax enforcing 
behaviour. It may be possible to target enforcement strategies to the particular 
behaviour, thus reducing the likelihood of unintended side effects of the strategies. 
Table 6.31 
Taxpayers' perceptions of the accidental or deliberate understatement of SMES profit 
02.5: Do you think SMEsItaxpayers for what ever reasons. ever accidentally or deliberately 
understate their profit a nd pay less tax than they should. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Yes 87.1 100 90.8 
No 8.1 0 5.7 
Prefer no to reply 4.8 Q 3.5 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
Q2.5(b): To what extent(in percentage) do you think, SMEs accidentally understate the profit? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
< 10% 62.9 68 64.4 
10%-25% 16.1 20 17.2 
25%-50% 8.1 12 9.2 
50%-75% 0 0 0 
>75% 0 0 0 
Not applicable[l] la 2.2 
Total 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
02.5(c): To what extengin percentage) do you think, SMEs deliberately understate the profit? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
< 10% 6.5 4 5.7 
10%-25% 6.5 8 6.9 
25%-50% 43.5 48 44.8 
50%-75% 27.4 40 31 
>75% 3.2 0 2.3 
Not applicablell] 12.9 9 2.2 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
11] Responses vAth answer'no' and 'prefer not to replY 
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Table 6.32 
Taxpayers' perceptions on the accidental or deliberate overstatement of SMEs profit 
02.6: Do you think SMEs/taxpayers for what ever reasons, ever accidentally or deliberately 
overstate their profit and pay more tax than they should. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Yes 82.3 88 83.9 
No 17.7 12 16.1 
Prefer no to reply 9 Q 9 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
Q2.6(b): To what extent(in percentage) do you think, SMEs accidentally overstate the profit? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
< 10% 77.4 88 80.5 
10%-25% 3.2 0 2.3 
25%-50% 1.6 0 0 
50%-75% 0 0 0 
>75% 0 0 0 
Not applicable[21 17.7 J2 IU 
Total 100 100 IM 
N 62 25 87 
Q2.6(c): To what extent(in percentage) do you think, SMEs deliberately overstate the profit? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
< 10% 72.6 64 70.1 
10%-25% 6.5 16 9.2 
25%-50% 43.2 8 4.6 
50%-75% 0 0 0 
>75% 0 0 0 
Not applicable[2] lu 12 
Total 100 100 im 
N 62 25 87 
121 Responses Wth answerno' and 'prefer not to reply' 
6.5.6 Approaches used by SMEs in evading tax 
Question 1.9 details four approaches that are understood to be the most frequently 
used in generating tax evasion by SMEs (Table 6.33). Both groups perceived the 
understatement of gross profit to be the most frequently used method, followed by 
an overstatement of expenses other than the cost of goods sold, in contrast with the 
view of the tax practitioners (Table 6.15). 
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Table 6.33 
Taxpayers'view on the most frequently used method in generating tax evaded 
Income In SMEs 
01.9: The following are the methods for generating tax evaded income in SMEs. Which 
do you think Is the most frequently used In generating tax evaded income In Malaysia. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Complete suppression of GP 12.9 12 12.6 
Understatement of GP 58.1 40 52.9 
Overstatement of expenses 
(other than cost of goods solds) 27.4 44 32.3 
Understatement of asset 
(including property and inventories) 1.6 0 1.1 
Other Q -4 1.1 Total JDQ 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
The difference is perhaps explicable, no one methods is proven effective in 
camouflaging tax evasion. 
The focus of another three questions (Q2.7, Q2.8 and Q2.9) was to identify SMEs 
with the potential to use additional methods (for example, inter-company 
transactions or transfer pricing) in tax evasion schemes. Table 6.34 shows that most 
of the SMEs (82 per cent) do not have any other interest either through direct or 
indirect shareholding (including in sole proprietorships or partnerships). Only 15 
per cent indicated that they had other interests but with fewer than 5 businesses 
(Table 6.35). 
Table 6.36 shows that the majority of respondents (approximately 98 per cent) also 
had no dealing with tax haven countries. These responses imply that the respondent 
SMEs were not in a position to apply a sophisticated tax-planning scheme in 
evading tax. 
158 
Table 6.34 
TaxDavers'resDonse on the Interest In other SMEs business 
Q2.7: Do you have any other Interest in other SMEs business (associate, subsidiary or 
wholly owned company Including sole proprietorship, partnership etc. ) 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Yes 12.9 20.0 14.9 
No 82.3 80.0 81.6 
Prefer not to reply 4.8 2.5 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
Table 6.35 
Taxpayers' response to the number of business Interest In SMEs 
Q2.8: Please indicate the number of business that you have Interest in either through direct 
or indirect shreholding including sole proprietor, partnership etc. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
<5 11.3 20.0 13.8 
6 to 10 1.6 0 1.1 
More than 10 0 0 0 
Not applicable VA 80.0 85.1 
Total 100 100 100 
62 25 87 
Table 6.36 
Taxpayers' response on SMEs dealina with tax haven countries 
02.9: Have you any dealing vAth tax haven countries? 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Yes 1.6 0 1.1 
No 96.8 100 97.8 
Prefer not to reply J& 
-Q 
LI 
Total 100 100 100 
62 25 89 
The survey also raised the issue of business practices (Questions 1.4 and 1.5). 
Question 1.4 asked the respondents to rate business practices based on their moral 
acceptance using a 5-point scale of "I" (Not at all acceptable) to 'T' (Perfectly 
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acceptable). Table 6.37 compares the means and shows any significant differences 
in the responses of the respondents to seven situations regarding business practices 
in generating tax-evaded income. Both non-evaders and convicted evaders were 
quite clear in their view that all of the stated lists of business practices were not at 
all morally acceptable (overall mean response less than 2.5). This again implies that 
both groups show some positive attitude to tax ethics. However, there were some 
significant differences where convicted evaders were more accepting of these 
practices as being morally acceptable, probably due to their previous actions. 
Table 6.37 
Taxpayers views on the moraliv acceptable business practices. 
QIA Which of the following business practices would you regard as morally acceptable? 
Mean response 
Non evaders Evaders Overall F value Sig 
Not filling tax return 1.85 2.40 2.01 7.54 0.007 
Not reporting full income 2.05 2.36 2.14 2.143 0.147 
Reporting main income, but not some 
other income 2.00 2.72 2.25, 10.004 0.002 
Overstating business expenses 1.92 2.44 2.07 7.781 0.007 
Being paid cash for a job and not 
reporting it on tax return 2.03 2.64 2.21 9.066 0.003 
Non disclosure of fact to the tax 
practitioners 2.03 2.64 2.21 10.82 0.001 
Writing off personal expenses as 
business expenses 2.03 2.64 2.20 6.786 0.011 
N 62 25 87 
The mean response of individual response on the scale of I =not at all acceptable to 
and 5= perfectly acceptable 
The respondents regarded these unacceptable practices (QI. 5) to be quite widely 
used, with the mean responses from both groups greater than 3 (Table 6.38). 
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Table 6.38 
Taxpayers views on the Involvement of SMEs In morally acceptable business practices. 
Q1.5: In your opinion what proportion of SMEs do the following? 
Mean response 
Non evaders Evaders Overall F value Sig 
Not filling tax return 3.31 3.32 3.31 0.006 0.937 
Not reporting full Income 3.53 3.44 3.51 0.408 0.525 
Reporting main income. but not some 
other Income 3.47 3.72 3.54 3.937 0.050 
Overstating business expenses 3.29 3.76 3.43 9.454 0.003 
Being paid cash for a job and not 
reporting it on tax return 3.44 3.52 3.43 0.289 0.593 
Non disclosure of fact to the tax 
practitioners 3.31 3.48 3.46 1.365 0.246 
Writing off personal expenses as 
business expenses 3.47 3.60 3.51 1.13 0.291 
N 62 25 87 
The mean response of individual response on the scale of 1 =none, 2= few, 3= half, 4= most 
and 5=all 
6.5.7 Factors influencing tax evasion by SMEs 
The related prior research on tax evasion indicates that there are various factors 
influencing tax evasion. In this study, the respondents were asked to identify from a 
list the most important factors determining why SMEs do or do not pay the right 
amount of tax (QI. 2 and QI. 3 in Table 6.39). The results are shown in Table 6.39. 
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Table 6.39 
Taxpayers' response to why SMEs do and do not pay the right amount of tax 
Q1.2: The folloyAng is a list of some of the main factors why SMEs do not pay the right 
amount of tax. Which do you think is the most Importance factor. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
Burden of paying tax Is too great 51.6 72.0 57.5 
Everyone else fiddles their tax 14.5 16.0 14.9 
Ineffeciency of tax administration 14.5 4.0 11.5 
Complicated of the tax law 11.3 8.0 10.3 
Tax system Is unfair 8.1 0 5.8 
Other 0 9 0 
Total 100 100 100 
N 62 25 87 
01.3: The following Is a list of some of the main factors why SMEs do pay the right amout 
of tax. Which do you think Is the most Important factor. 
The threat of finelpenalties 
The threat of being caught 
To avoid audittinvestigation 
Think other people are honest in 
paying their tax 
Believe In paying their fair share 
Other 
Total 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evader Overall 
19.4 16.0 18.5 
3.1 20.0 8.0 
59.7 52.0 57.5 
11.3 8.0 10.3 
6.5 4.0 5.7 
9 9 2 
100 100 Im 
N 62 25 87 
More than half of the respondents believed that 'the burden of paying tax is too 
great' as the most important factor determining why SMEs do not pay the right 
amount of tax (see Q1.2, Table 6.39). In contrast, almost 60 per cent of the 
respondents indicated that 'to avoid audit or invcstigation by IRB' is the most 
important factor that influences SMEs' decisions about whether to pay the right 
amount of tax (see Q 1.3, Table 6.39). 
It is interesting to note (given that respondents could only tick one answer) that 
none of the negative reinforcements such as 'threat offines1penalties' and 'threat of 
being caught' were seen as major factors having an effect on SMEs in paying the 
right amount of tax. Looking more closely, these categories are not mutually 
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exclusive: perhaps the respondents were thinking of the threat of being caught if one 
is audited. It is a fact that of those audited by IRB, a large fmction is subjected to 
penalties and fines. 
6.5.8 Probability of detection by IRB 
Several scholars have established that most taxpayers would evade tax because it is 
unlikely that the evaders would be caught and penalised by the tax authority (e. g. 
Allingharn and Sandmo, 1972; Alm ct aL, in a series of experimental studies, 1992a, 
1992b, and 1992c). When examining the responses to Question 1.7, it is clear that 
both non-tax evaders and convicted evaders believed that their chances of being 
caught were quite low (Table 6.40). Over 87 per cent of the non-evaders and 76 per 
cent of convicted evaders thought the chances of SMEs getting caught by the IRB 
were only between 25 and 50 per cent. Whether this is an accurate estimate or not is 
hard to gauge. However, evidence from the IRB's annual report reveals that a 
minuscule fraction of tax returns is audited. The case is, however, similar to that in 
the US where, according to Anderoni et aL (1998), in the mid 1990s, 1.7 per cent of 
tax returns were audited. 
It is also worth highlighting the higher percentage of responses in the 50 -75% 
category by the convicted evaders. This may be attributable to the fact that they 
have been caught, making them more likely to think that they would be detected. 
One possible explanation given by the survey respondents for these perceptions of a 
low probability of detection could be the existence of an incompetent and 
inadequately staffed tax administration. 
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Table 6AO 
Taxpayere response on the chances of the likelihood SMEs being caught by IRB 
Q1.7: In your opinion, to what extent (in percentage), if any, do you think tax evading 
SMEs are caught by IRB. 
Percentages 
Non evaders Evaders Overall 
None 0 0 0 
< 25% 8.1 8.0 8.0 
Between 25% to 50% 87.1 76.0 83.9 
Between 50% to 75% 4.8 16.0 8.1 
> 75% 2 2 0 
Total 100 100 100 
IV 62 25 87 
6 5.9 Focus groups outcomes 
The Tax Evaders and Non Tax Evaders 
The taxpayers focus groups aimed to canvas the opinions, experience and the 
impact that the administration of the tax system has on tax evasion by SMEs (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 for further detail). Figure 6.2 summaries the 
principal analysis of data from the SMEs focus groups. 
In summary, the SME taxpayer survey suggests that there is evidence to support the 
assumption that STýEs do evade tax, and that this evasion is thought to be 
widespread and frequent in Malaysia. The proportion of SMEs evading tax, 
however, is less than 50 per cent. SME taxpayers also believe that it takes place all 
the time. Tie burden of paying tax is too great' is considered to be the most 
important factor for why SMEs do not pay tax and 'to avoid audit or investigation 
by the IRB'is the factor most influencing them to pay the right amount of tax. 
The results of the SME taxpayer survey also revealed the understatement of gross 
profit to be the most frequently used method by SMEs in evading tax, followed by 
overstatement of expenses (other than cost of goods sold). SME taxpayers employed 
no additional or sophisticated tax-planning scheme. They considered that the 
probability of detection by the IRB is only between 25 and 50 per cent. 
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The results also suggest a heavy reliance by taxpayers upon accountants/tax 
practitioners in relation to book keeping and dealing with tax matters. There is also 
a tendency among SMEs to switch or terminate the tax practitioners. 
The following chapter discusses the results obtained from file data/actual cases from 
the IRB's investigation files. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CASE FILES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results obtained from the analysis of the 200 actual cases taken 
from the IRB's files. Given the confidentiality requirements surrounding tax data due to the 
secrecy provision of section 138 of the Income Tax Act 1967, 'parallel' files (files 
consisting of the final report of the cases and administration procedure for settlement) at the 
Investigation and Intelligence Division were analysed. Only certain data were made 
available for the analysis. 
The aim of this chapter is to establish an understanding of the practices within the IRB and 
SMEs with regard to tax evasion. Each section analyses data obtained from the files with 
respect to the methods of detection and settlement by the IRB, approaches/methods used by 
SMEs for evading taxes and the degree of culpability. The inforTnation was gathered using 
a formatted sheet to ensure systematic and consistent data collection (see Chapter 5 for a 
detailed discussion and Appendix III for a sample of the worksheet). 
7.2 Method of detection of SME tax evasion by Inland Revenue Board 
The main activity carried out by the IRB to counter tax evasion is investigation work. As 
revealed by the actual cases, the IRB has not set any criteria as to which areas of taxpayers' 
affairs would be examined to confirm the accuracy of the accounts or tax returns submitted, 
but it is logical to assume that the following areas would be the subject of scrutiny: 
calculation of capital allowances and verification of source documents such as sale and 
purchase agreements, conformation of deductibility of legal and professional fees, valuation 
of closing stock for the previous year, heavily qualified auditor's report, and so forth. This 
assumption is logical because the detection procedure is undertaken manually and is based 
almost entirely on the subjective judgement of the IRB staff concerned and the director of 
the Investigation and Intelligence Centre, according to the guidelines and procedures of the 
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IRB. The guidelines and procedures are outlined in the IRB Audit and Income Tax Back 
Duty Manual, which is strictly confidential. 
The IRB undertakes substantial precautions to maintain the secrecy of their detection 
procedures; however, taxpayers and tax practitioners are nonetheless assumed to know the 
rules of the procedures and should therefore be able to be aware of the detection strategy 
(Anderoni et al., 1998; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985). In the real world, however, taxpayers 
seem to possess quite poor knowledge of the audit function. Tax practitioners are 
considered to have a better knowledge of the factors that trigger an investigation compared 
to taxpayers, but Anderoni et aL (1998) suspect that there is substantial heterogeneity of 
beliefs even among this group: for example, some may actually be willing to overreport the 
tax liability if doing so would result in a significant reduction in the chance of being 
detected - whereby an audit is triggered if and only if reported income is too low or below 
norm. 
Based on the data gathered, the conventional methods used by the IRB in detecting tax 
evasion can be grouped into three categories: (1) accounting/intelligence gathering; (2) 
third party information; and (3) related cases information. Table 7.1 shows that financial 
accounting analysis and intelligence information gathering have been the most commonly 
and widely used methods of detecting SME taxpayers' tax evasion. Financial accounting 
analysis uses financial ratio or analytical review to interpret the financial data of the 
business. 
Table 7.1 
Method of detection by Inland Revenue Board 
Percentages 
1997 2001 Overall 
Accounting/Intelligence 66 83 74.5 
Third party information 3 10.5 
Related cases Information 14 15 
Total 100 JDQ 
N 100 100 200 
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In general, the IRB employs two methods to gather intelligence information. First, general 
intelligence information gathering consists of physical surveillance, information from mass 
media including electronic media, and information from government agencies. These 
methods, however, as noted by Wallschutzky and Singh (1995), are not the most efficient 
that the revenue authority can use to detect tax evasion, as shown by the experience of 
developed countries (for example Australia, Canada and the United States), where 
computers are used to select cases for audit/investigation with the view to generating more 
scientific and risk-based selection criteria. Second, primary intelligence methods are used, 
including examination, analysis and interpretation of accounts submitted over the years, 
reviews and analysis of asset accumulation, house and business premises surveillance, and 
minimal undercover work to ascertain cash sales system. 
File data also indicates that third party information is the least significant of that used for 
the detection of tax evaders. Third-party information consists of the allegations made by an 
informer with regard to tax evasion. Information given is deemed to have been offered 
voluntarily, to be accurate and specific and to be supported by documentary evidence. It is 
possible that the informer will be able to show how evasion of tax has been committed, as 
all information is given merit in consideration of reward (if the informer has asked for it) at 
the discretion of the Director General of the Inland Revenue. Unfortunately, this has never 
been made public due to the secrecy provision of section 138 (1) of the Income Tax Act. 
As Table 7.1 shows, there has been a drastic drop in the use of third-party information, 
from 18 per cent in 1997 to 3 per cent in 2001. One possible explanation for third party 
information being comparatively less popular could be due to the information and 
allegations usually being vague and exaggerated. The IRB, however, does not ignore the 
information completely, since more than 10 per cent of cases were detected by using it. 
The nature of the information in existing investigation cases or settled cases (i. e. rclatcd 
cases information) is also considered by the IRB as a resource in detecting tax evasion. This 
infonnation may either lead to the discovery of new taxpayers or the detection of other 
taxpayers involved in tax evasion. The degree of usable information is again based on the 
subjective judgement of the IRB staff concerned. Fifteen per cent of the cases noted were 
detected using this method. 
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7.3 Methods of settlement by the IRB 
The nature and extent of an SME's evasion varies from case to case to such an extent that 
the scope of enquiry is largely individual and usually no two cases are alike. Thus, in most 
cases, the evasions are not restricted to a particular source of income and it is necessary to 
conduct a review of, or to investigate the whole of, a taxpayer's financial affairs. Therefore 
the nature of investigation and the amount of work required will depend upon the 
circumstances of the case. 
Nevertheless, the methods employed by the IRB, i. e. the techniques, fall into well-defined 
operations, a standardised, logical and systematic approach, the files are kept in an orderly 
manner and the work is easily followed if the necessity for a review arises at a later stage. 
This development of techniques involves the proper usage of forms or individual sub-files 
to categorise the progression to the achievement of a conclusion. Without this, the staff 
would find themselves drifting in an aimless way, dealing with items in a piecemeal way, 
and endless delays would ensue. 
As Table 7.2 shows, the accounting basis approach is the most common and widely 
accepted technique employed by the IRB to determine any understated income of SME 
taxpayers. This method is frequently used in the case of companies, especially where 
understatement of income is more prevalent, such as with private companies or family 
owned companies. One possible explanation in using the accounting basis approach may be 
due to the variety of tools it has to estimate the underreporting of income. 
Table 7.2 
Method of settlement bv IRB 
Percentages 
1997 2001 Overall 
Capital statement/Networth method 32 13 22.5 
Accounting method 67 86 76.5 
Other 1 1 1 
Total 100 100 1100 
N 100 100 200 
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Further analysis of the file data showed that where complete bookkeeping records are 
available, a proper investigative accounting procedure was employed to determine the 
issues of evasion. This includes the matching concept and ratio comparison to the business 
norm based on internal data*. However, where the accounting record is incomplete, an 
income reconstruction approach was employed by preparing receipts and payments 
accounts based on either bank statements or cash analysis, which may include business and 
private transactions, and ascertaining any discrepancies. 
The 'Rosette Principle 0.1 is also applied as a basis for computing the omitted income of 
other years of assessment. Where the IRB discovers one discrepancy in an account, such a 
discrepancy can form the basis for computing a prior or succeeding year's omitted income. 
I.. 
The capital statement/net worth method is also frequently used as an appraisal of the wealth 
accretion of the owners of SMEs: sole-proprietors, directors of companies, partners in a 
partnership or even salaried employees (for example, salaried employees having substantial 
unquoted shareholdings in the companies, etc. ) related to the company's cases. Initially, the 
capital statement/net worth method involves the collection and examination of the 
taxpayer's personal and business records to obtain particulars of assets and liabilities and 
for establishment of the lifestyle of the taxpayer. The purpose is to ensure that, as far as 
possible, all relevant facts are brought to light. It provides both a computation of the 
taxpayer's true income and a test as to its accuracy. 
To do so, the IRB compares increments in wealth with known income on an annual 
calendar year basi's to determine whether there has been any omission or understatement of 
income, shown by discrepancies in the comparison. The rationale behind this measure is 
that if SME taxpayers have understated their income, it would invariably benerit the owners 
who would have used this understated money to acquire landed properties and other assets. 
7-1 The principle was based on the case of Rosette Franks Ltd v. Dick (36 T. C. 100) in which the dicta of the 
case is as follows: "It is perfectly true that this is only one incident... but it was open to the comn-dssioners to 
conclude that this was not merely an isolated transaction but showed the kind of thing which was going on 
and they were entitled to come to the conclusion ... that there must been other similar incidents and therefore that the accounts of the company could not be relied upon to show the whole of the trading profit of the 
company". 
This view is confirmed in the Malaysian case of UGH v. DGIR (1974) 2 MIJ 33. 
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Although different, these two methods of approach used by the IRB seem complementary 
and frequently supplement one another, especially in the case of partnerships. 
Understatement of partnership income is brought to light by an investigation of the private 
wealth of individual partners using either capital statements or means tests. Evidence 
unexplained increases in such private wealth point to understatements in partnership 
accounts and would enable the IRB to investigate the business accounts. 
7.4 Methods used by SMEs in evading tax 
There are various methods for evading tax used by SMEs. The choice of method would 
depend on the opportunity available and the requirement of the SME taxpayer. Table 7.3 
categorises five common methods (including 'other') for tax evasion by SMEs. 
Understatement of gross profit is seen as the most commonly used technique, rather than 
overstatement of expenses (other than costs of goods sold), as a way of evading tax 72 . 
The underreporting of sales and overstating of purchases are noted as the largest 
adjustments in SMEs' tax evasion schemes to understate their gross profit. Common 
approaches used in underreporting sales involve omitted cash sales and omitted sales for 
which cheques received are paid into private accounts. Overstating purchases include 
fictitious purchases supported by false invoices and inflated invoices covering an element 
of personal drawing. 
Such an approach is possible because currently, smaller SME taxpayers (businesses that are 
registered with the Registrar of Business) need not have their annual accounts audited with 
their tax returns. Only limited companies are required to submit audited accounts (which is 
mandatory for all companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1965). This could, in 
most cases, lead SME taxpayers to present accounts which may be incorrect with 
understated sales, overstated purchases or stock adjustments leading to either a zero or a 
low tax liability. 
7*2 Only the main method is considered in each case based on the highest amount of tax evaded by the 
taxpayers. They could use single or mixed methods in their approach to evade tax. 
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The Director General of the IRB under section 82(5f -3 of the Income Tax Act, however, 
may require audited accounts to be produced by these SME taxpayers 
if the accounts or 
records produced are insufficient for ascertaining taxable income. A taxpayer who 
contravenes this section is guilty of a statutory offence and will be subject to a penalty. 
A unique approach that uses two sets of accounts was noted in two SMEs. With this 
practice, SMEs keep two sets of accounting books, one that records all the real values of 
revenue and cost that are used for internal control, and the other having false accounting 
information, which is used for tax or other purposes. By doing so, SMEs essentially 
separate tax evasion and internal control as two independent decision-making problems. 
Table 7.3 
Method used by SMEs taxpayers In evading tax* 
Percentages 
1997 2001 Overall 
Complete suppression of gross profit 100.5 
Understatement of gross profit 44 41 42.5 
Overstatement of expenses 
(other than cost of good sold) 24 43 33.5 
Understatement of assets 
(including property and inventories) 0 0 0 
Others 21 16 23.5 
Total 100 100 100 
N 100 100 200- 
*Only the main method is considered in each case based on the highest amount of tax evaded 
by the taxpayer. They could used single or mixed methods In their approach. 
Another area of concern for the IRB is the fonn in which assets are held. These assets are 
generally held in the form of landed properties and shareholdings in nominees' names and 
holding foreign assets. Of equal importance is retaining deposits in foreign banks. The IRB 
generally finds it more difficult to detect assets of tax evaders held overseas, even though 
the DGIR has wide discretionary powers to obtain information from any source on their 
7,3 The Director General, if he is of the opinion that any accounts or records produced by any person to the 
Director General for the purpose of ascertaining the income of a person are insufficient or inadequate for that 
purpose, may by notice under his hand require that person to produce, in respect of any period or periods 
specified in the notice and within a time so specified (that time not being less than thirty days from the service 
of the notice), accounts audited by a professional accountant together with a report made by that accountant 
which shall contain, in so far as they are relevant, the matters set out in section 174(l) and (2) of the 
Companies Act 1965. 
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own or a third party's economic circumstances under section 78 or 79 of ITA 1967, as the 
.4 Act is not applicable outside Malaysia. 7 . 
7.5 Degree of culpability 
There can be no hard and fast rule for determining the appropriate penalty for any offence, 
but since tax offences are truly factual, their characteristics feature - e. g. repeat themselves 
- regularly (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.4). The IRB categorises the culpability of 
the offence 
into three simple divisions according to the main characteristics of any case: 
(1) innocent error or mistake - cases where there has been no offence and consequently the 
question of culpability ' does not arise, for example calculation error in 
addition/subtraction; 
(2) negligence or culpable carelessness - this can arise where a statement of income 
(whether on a statutory return form, a non-statutory form, a repayment claim form, or 
in the form of accounts) sent to the IRB is found to contain some error or omission 
whereby a loss of tax has occurred; and 
(3) deliberate evasion orfraud - falsification deliberately planned with the clear intention 
of deceiving and cheating the IRB by, for example, the omission, manipulation or 
invention of figures or other records. 
The analysis of the file shows approximately 99 per cent of the offences to be in the 
category of deliberate evasion with another one per cent (3 files) being negligence or 
culpable carelessness (Table 7.4). As the information in the file does not constitute 
complete data on who committed the offences, it can be argued that the SME taxpayer 
remained responsible for the act of evasion either by themselves or through their agent. The 
" Section 78 of ITA provides the power to call for specific returns and the production of books, accounts and 
other documents for examination by the DGIR as well as any such information or particulars that are deemed 
necessary by the DGIR in order to determine the chargeability to tax or the tax liability of a person. Section 
79 of ITA 1967 allows the DGIR to require any person to provide to the IRB a statement containing 
particulars of all bank accounts, saving and loan accounts, deposits and so forth as well as all assets possessed 
by the person, spouse and dependant children. 
175 
general rule is that the taxpayer should sign the tax return even though a tax agent may 
have prepared it. However, where it is not practicable for the taxpayer to sign the tax return, 
the agent may sign it provided the tax agent has the authority to do so. Where the tax return 
is made by or on behalf of any person, it is deemed to have been made by that person or on 
his or her authority unless the contrary is proved (section 88 of ITA, 1967). Therefore, 
where the tax return is prepared by an authorised agent and signed by the taxpayer, it is 
deemed that the taxpayer is aware or cognisant of the contents. The tax practitioners can 
commit evasion on behalf of a client if they knowingly prepare and send incorrect accounts, 
computed together with the tax return to the IRB. 
Table 7.4 
Dearee of culDabili 
Percentages 
1997 2001 Overall 
Innocent error or mistake 0 0 0 
Negligence or culpable carelessness 1 2 1.5 
Deliberate evasion 22 QA 2U 
Total 100 100 100 
N 100 100 200 
7.6 The nature of tax evasion by SMEs 
According to section 91 (1) of the Income Tax Act, any assessment, including an additional 
assessment, must be issued within 6 years (previously 12 years) from the chargeable period. 
Section 91(3), however, empowers the Director General to raise assessment beyond the 
prescribed time limit where tax has been lost due to fraud, wilful default or negligence on 
the part of the taxpayer. However, judicial pronouncements categorically state that there is 
an initial onus on the IRB to establish fraud, wilful default or negligence on the part of the 
taxpayer resulting in tax being lost. Once the IRB succeeds in discharging this burden, the 
onus shifts to the taxpayers to demonstrate that the assessments disputed are excessive or 
erroneous. 
As Table 7.5 shows, most of the taxpayers have been investigated for a period of more than 
ten years. This could be due to the emphasis accorded to the above sections 91(l) and 
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91(3). Alternatively, it could also be indicative of the characteristics of tax evasion, which 
is repetitive in nature and takes place at all times in SMEs: there tends to be a continuous 
pattern associated with tax evasion, the effect of which is to reduce tax liability. 
Table 7.5 
The number of vears Investioation [)eriod reviewed bv IRB 
Percentages 
1997 2001 Overalf 
Between I to 5 years 15 30 22.5 
Between 6 to 10 years 25 52 38.5 
More than 10 years §Q 2A 44.0 
Total m 100 100 
N 100 100 200 
For a more realistic and practical flavour to the nature of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia 
an illustrative example in three case study are presented as follows. 
CASESYVDYI 
The principal activity of the company is selling stationery. The case was referred for 
investigation by the Assessment Branch, Kuala Lumpur. The Assessment Branch sought to 
clarify with the company a sum of RMI 14,493 written back to the 2001 Profit and Loss 
Appropriation Account but failed to make any headway. There was also some general 
allegation by an informer concerning cash withdrawals in the year 2000. 
Apart from the examination of the company's record, a capital statement covering the 
period from 1995 to 2001 was also issued to the Managing Director/Owner of the company. 
This was done because the books of account of the business, the sole proprietorship 
predecessor of the subject business were not available as they were said to have been 
destroyed by the flood which took place in Kuala Lumpur few years back. Throughout the 
course of investigation, the Managing Director/Owner of the business contented that all the 
irregularities detected by the IRB were in fact genuine book keeping errors caused by his 
staff rather than the products of his intention to evade taxes. Whether this contention is true 
or otherwise is a matter of opinion. 
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Examination of the books of account of the business noted specific cash sales omission and 
failure to account for certain rebates on purchases and damage claims, some of those 
irregularities detected are probably a product of bad book keeping compounded by the 
carelessness of the company's auditors. The following are good examples: - 
7heRMI14,443 written in the 2001 Pro tandLossA ropriation Account ? f, PP 
The adjustment was made merely to write off the total differences between the Creditors 
and Debtors Control Accounts and the subsidiary accounts of both debtors and creditors 
detected while the 2000 accounts were being prepared. The company's representatives 
contended that the differences arose because of the following book keeping error: 
(1) Setting off balances in the debtors and creditors subsidiary accounts without such 
set-offs being recorded in the main control accounts; 
(2) Cash sales being posted to the debtors columns of the cash book and the tool then 
posted to the control accounts; 
(3) The balances brought forward from the previous years being taken up twice, i. e. the 
net balances of the debtors and creditors after set-off being accounted once and 
again the balances of such accounts before set-off being accounted for. 
The absence of records pertaining to years prior to 2000 made the investigation into the 
exact nature of the RM 114,493 written back almost an impossible task. The bulk of the 
amount was made up of RM56,200 said to be amount due to X company appearing in 
the creditors ledgers and another RM54,390 was said to be difference in debtors 
balance brought forward from previous years in relation to the Statistical Department. 
The precise nature of the RM56,200 proved to be an exercise in fiitility, while RM54, 
390 appear to be the difference between the amount owed by a particular debtor as 
appear on a list of debtors at 31.12.2000 (which was extracted for audit purposes and 
filed among the auditors' working papers) -and the actual balance as per the debtors 
ledger. The later indicated a balance of RM204,714 at 31.12.2000 whereas the former 
listed it as RM 150,324. 
Since neither the company's representative nor the company's auditors made any effort 
to prove by objective evidence that the RMI 14,493 (admittedly a sum total of various 
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errors) does not affect the income figure in any year, IRB bring it in for tax. Such being 
so, the one question has to be decided is whether it is the company or the owner that 
should bear the tax. It has been agreed that since the RMI 14,493 probably related to 
the period before the company was incorporated, it is logical that the proprietor of the 
predecessor of the company should bear the tax. This amount has been reflected in the 
capital statement of the owner. 
Overstatement ofpurchases ofRM117,134 
This arises from the following journal entry put through at the end of 200 1: 
DR: Purchases RM 117,113 
CR: X Company RM56,200 
Y Company RM 6,634 
Debtors Transfer RM54,390 
The above items were part of the RM144,493 mentioned in example above. The 
company's representatives explained that the above adjustment was meant to reverse 
some of the RM 114,493 written off to the 2000 Profit and Loss Appropriation Account 
that was done pending further investigation by the company. The debiting of the 
purchases Account has the unfortunate effect of inflating purchases of 2001 by that 
amount. The correct account, which should have been debited, in the first place is the 
Profit and Loss Appropriation Account. 
Omission of Government Debtors Balances ofRM88,699 as at 31.12.2001 
On examining the auditors' working papers for 2001 accounts, it was noted that the 
whole list of Government Debtors balances which amounted to RM88,699 failed to 
find their way to the balance sheet for the year ended 31.12.2001 despite the fact that 
the individual items on the list had been ticked by the auditors with the related debtors 
accounts. 
No explanation was given either by the auditors or the company except that an 
adjustment of RM108,000 debiting the Debtor Control and crediting Sales had 
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subsequently been put through in 2002 to rectify this. The investigation and from the 
result of circularisation with various Government Departments, it appeared that: - 
(1) as far as could be ascertained, there was no omission of sales to Govenunent 
Departments; 
(2) the 2001 balance sheet was able to be reconciled in spite of the omission of the 
RMI 18,000 because there were compensating understatements of creditors as well 
as overstatements of debtors. The net result of this is an understating credit of about 
RM90,000. 
The adjusting entry pf RM108,000 in 2002 if in fact intended to bring back the RM88, 
699 omitted in 2000 would have the consequence double counting sales. 
The allegation with regard to cash withdrawals appear to be justifiable because from the 
investigation reveals that cash payments purported to be either for cash purchases or 
cash expenses but without adequate supporting external documentary evidences. The 
Owner/Managing Director, however insisted that they were expansed, for genuine 
business purposes. It was after some haggling that a comprise of adding back 60 per 
cent of them for tax purpose was reached. 
CASESTUDY2 
This case arose from an informer who brought in over 2,000 chits alleged to have been 
issued by the doctor as a means of evading tax. An inspection of the doctor's clinic and 
his house was made and the following were found: 
1. A cash count difference of RM56.00 - between cash-in-hand and recorded takings 
on that day during which the doctor was at the dispensary for only about two hours. 
2. There was an amount of RM2,999.00 - found in the house which was explained as 
comprising of- 
Doctor's personal cash RM1,000.00 
Daily takings on the I" and 2nd January 2002 
And some granny's praying money which totalled RMI, 999.00 
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3. Certain fees in a number of history cards, which were apparently omitted or 
understated. 
On the basis of the discrepancy of cash takings found on the day of inspection, assessments 
were raised to protect the Revenue while ftuther enquiry was made into the doctor's affairs. 
Instead of co-operating with the Revenue with a view to arrive at a settlement, taxpayer 
engaged a lawyer, Mr. W. E. to represent him and both he and his lawyer took the attitude 
that they would oppose any step by the Revenue to compute income believed to have been 
understated. Instead of furnishing relevant information required by the Revenue, taxpayer 
and his lawyer took every opportunity to fish out information so as to enable them to cover 
up every point that they think the Revenue might have against them. 
On the basis of the assessments, it was made in accordance with the cash count taken on the 
day of the inspection. The main crux of the case, however, depend on the large number of 
chits in the Revenue's possession with the informer's assistance, it was ascertained that the 
doctor had systematically used the chits for fees which he intended to omit from his Tax 
Returns and an analysis of the chits showed that his understatement of income had been 
very much more than the additional assessments raised. It should be noted that the chits 
available are not a complete set, which might have been issued by the doctor for the days 
concerned as the informer did have easy access to all of them. 
While the investigation was still in progress and the Revenue was still awaiting for 
information relating to taxpayer's assets and liabilities taxpayer's lawyer persistently 
pressured the Revenue to refer the case the Special Commissioners citing sub-section (2) of 
section 102 of the Income Tax Act 1967. 
From the very outset of the case, taxpayer has taken the stand that he has never made use of 
chits to evade tax and the only chits he used were for his free patients i. e. patients whom he 
treated without charge. Although shown the chits he has denied that any of the chits were 
his and this stand was maintained right up tolhe date of the hearing. It was during the 
hearing that the taxpayer and his lawyer became aware that the Revenue possessed far more 
chits than the original thought they could cover, which were the few chits shown to them at 
the commencement of the investigation. During the hearing, the Chairman of the special 
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Commissioners asked the appellant whether he could " match " some of the chits produced 
by the Revenue and his patient cards (the taxpayer had explain in the course of giving 
evidence that sometimes chits were used when cards were not available and the particulars 
from the chits had been transcribed to the cards subsequently). Taxpayer had replied that he 
could if he were given the chance to look at the chits in conjunction with his patient cards. 
The main feature of the chits is that except for a very few, all the rest do not bear any name 
or address of the patient. Due to the time lapse between the date of issue and the present 
date it would be virtually impossible to match the chits with the patient cards even 
assuming that taxpayer's story is true. But the true position is that whatever prescription 
written on the chits and the charges there on will not be written on the patient cards and this 
is the scheme whereby taxpayer omitted his income. 
In a desperate attempt to cover this point and to satisfy the Special Commissioners, 
taxpayer had copied some of the particulars of the chits which had been handed in as 
exhibits. It is now known that the taxpayer and/or his employees have written the 
particulars of these chits on to at least 3 of the patient cards, which were in taxpayer's 
possession. The relevant cards have been tendered to the Special Commissioners and it is 
apparent that the particulars from the chits had been respectively transcribed recently on to 
the above - mentioned cards. This is fraud of the most blatant kind and unless action is 
taken against the taxpayer and whoever is responsible for this fraudulent action, our work 
will be seriously affected in all future cases. Action against the taxpayer will also be a 
deterrent in all future investigation cases. 
It was proposed that: 
(1) An application be made to the Special Commissioners to have the relevant exhibits 
examined by the Chemistry Department: 
(2) A detailed examination of the relevant cards prescriptions, related illnesses of the 
patients, etc. are undertaken with the help of medical assistance, if necessary, with a view 
of initiating prosecution proceedings for which Head Office's approval is sought. 
Before the hearing was adjourned, the Chairman of the Special Commissioners directed 
that the appellant or his representatives be allowed to examine all the chits in the Revenue 
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in order to enable to match the chits with the patient cards. This directive was. given despite 
Revenue pointed out that such an arrangement will give appellant an opportunity to 
"manufacture" evidence and undermine the Revenue's position. As it is imperative to 
protect the Revenue, permission to retain all the taxpayer's patients' cards was made when 
they call to examine the chits in the Revenue's possession. This is a drastic step which will 
give rise to strong protests but it was absolutely necessary if Revenue are to prevent the tax 
evader from making a mockery of the law in general and the Income Tax Act in particular. 
CASESTUDY3 
The case was taken up purely on the basis that Mr. K was (and still is) a well-known person 
in Taiping, Perak. Accretion of assets at annual rests from 1990 to 2002 was adopted as 
basis for review from the very beginning. 
Mr. K's assets comprise principally of shares in private limited companies, shares in 
partnerships and a couple of sole proprieties business viz. GSH and TH Ice Factory. GSH 
was converted into a limited company in 1999. MrX made substantial gifts to his children 
throughout the period under investigation. Consequently net assets left in Mr. K's name 
amounted to only RM259,085 in 1992: the highest of which was in 1999 when the total was 
RM540,085. 
Numerous current accounts maintained with the various companies, businesses and 
partnerships and constant transfers of funds from one to another coupled with frequent 
gifts, have somewhat complicated the review exercise. However all these transactions have 
been sorted out and verified. 
The following items: 
(a) Claim of Turf Club Winning $53,556/- 
Although Revenue implicitly accepted the amount in 1993, credited to Mr. K's current 
account with GSH and some confirmatory slips were produced, these were rejected as 
being insufficient despite strong objections by the taxpayer. As a comprise, however, the 
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lottery winnings were allowed in 1991 but the same amount was spread over the period 
from 1991 to 2002 (i. e. RM4,463 each year) and were treated as gambling expenses in each 
of these years (taxpayer's tax rate is almost the same). 
(b) 'Gifts' debited in the accounts of GSH 
Mr. K could not regard these as gifts as the children who received these 'gifts' were shown 
in the accounts as debtors. 
These 'so called' gifts should correctly be loans. If they are to be regarded as gifts Mr. K's 
current account with GSH should be debited thereby reducing the balance of Mr. K's 
current account. This however is not what happened and it is not correct therefore to treat 
the items listed as gifts. 
The capital statement was accordingly adjusted. As the business had considerable sums 
charged as overdraft interest in the accounts, a proportion of these are disallowed. 
c) Personal and Private Expenses 
The estimates were grossly excessive and were revised to a more realistic figure. It wase 
pointed out that taxpayer stays at 88, Barrak Road, which is a shop house. 
d) Terms of payment and penalty 
Terms of payment consists of an initial payment of RM80,000 (a cheque has been issued) 
and 15 monthly instalments of RM20,000. The instalments may appear to be a habit 
protracted but it take into consideration taxpayer's financial position and the nature of his 
assets. Most of his assets as indicated before consist of shares in private limited companies 
and partnerships and these are not readily saleable. Moreover, the settlement has exceeded 
his net worth by about RM 120,000 and his liquidity position is a virtual zero. 
The penalty of about 57% is adequate in view of the excellent co-operation taxpayer 
(through his son) had given towards a settlement of the case. 
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7.7 Other observations 
According to Allingharn and Sandmo (1972), the probability of detection and penalties are 
the two main policies backed tools available to the revenue authorities to eradicate tax 
evasion. Hence, these two main areas were explored; (1) estimating percentage of SME 
taxpayers detected by the IRB; and (2) the percentage of penalties imposed by the IRB. 
7.7.1 Estimatingpercentage ofSME taxpayers detected bylRB. 
Estimating the percentage of tax evaders being caught by the IRB is an indirect way of 
measuring the rate of detection. However, without complete data, the only fallback method 
to determine the percentage of SME taxpayers detected by the IRB will be comparing the 
number of SME cases finalised to the total number of registered SME taxpayers. 
Table 7.6 indicates a very small proportion of SME taxpayers that evade tax are detected by 
the IRB. As the table shows, less than one per cent is detected. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that between 1997 and 2001, the number of cases finalised increased by 
approximately 1.18 times, whereas the number of registered SMEs had also increased by 
1.27 times. This may indicate a higher level of detection, as the number of cases finalised 
has increased. 'On the other hand, it might also indicate that tax evasion within SMEs is 
becoming serious, as measured by the cases finalised. 
Table 7.6 
Estimated percentages of SMEs taxpayers detected by IRB 
Year No. of No. of SMEs Percentages 
registered cases of detection 
SMEs finalised % 
(million) 
1997 1.1 485 0.04 
2001 1.4 572 0.04 
Source: IRB Operation Division and Investigation and Intelligence Division reports. 
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7.7.2 7he percentage ofpenalties imposed by IRB 
The adequacy of the penalty structure may affect the rate of tax evasion within SMEs. If it 
is not properly enforced, the objective of deterring tax evasion behaviour might not be 
achieved. 
Data gathered are summariscd in Table 7.7. From the table, it can be seen that the average 
penalty imposed is in the region of 58 per cent of the amount of tax which has not been 
charged or has been undercharged. The high penalty imposed by the IRB emphasises that 
the penalty acts as a vehicle to improve compliance among SME taxpayers. This reliance 
on penalties has been based on the relation specified in deterrence theory. The theory 
assumes that there is a perceived likelihood of apprehension and that there is a severe but 
fair penalty for the offence (Rossi and Grasmick, 1985). However, there is the possibility of 
a backlash effect, as argued by Schmolders (1970: 302): Taxation according to the legal 
definition of ability to pay is realised to a fair extent but at the price of an intensive 
confrontation with tax enforcement and control-The logical consequence of such 
relatively coercive tax enforcement technique is the high degree of alienation between 
citizens and the state and between the penal code and the code ofpenalties in case of tax 
fraud. This alienation, in turn, negatively inj7uences the willingness to cooperate with tax 
authorities. 
Currently, the severity of the penalties varies with the nature of the offence and the amount 
of the penalty is frequently based on the discretion of the Director General of the IRB (as 
the law only stipulates maximum penalties). Similarly, if a taxpayer has been successfully 
prosecuted in court, the court has the discretion to determine the total fine to be imposed. 
Furthermore, the Director General also has the power to compound offences before the case 
is due for prosecution in court. In practice, the maximum amount is usually not imposed. 
This may have some drawbacks for the Malaysian penalty provision in general, particularly 
the fact that the maximum penalties are in fixed currency amounts: as argued by 
Wallschutzky and Singh (1995), (1) over time, they lose their real significance as they are 
eroded by inflation, and (2) it might not be possible to adequately discriminate between 
large and small offences. 
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Table 7.7 
The percentage of penalty Imposed on SMEs tax evaders 
Year No. of cases Amt. Of Amt. Of Penalty 
finalised* additional tax! penalty imposed 
Imposed* 
RM(million) RM(million) % 
1997 100 15.6 9.2 58.9 
2001 100 12.4 7.2 58.1 
Source: Investigation and Intelligence Division 
* Based on the number of file reviewed 
Clearly, if compliance is to be affected by SME taxpayers' perceptions of IRB enforcement 
activity, they need to be aware of the level of that activity. It should also be that SME 
taxpayers perceive that activity to be of such a level that it puts them at risk. The IRB 
should therefore be seen to be having a greater presence in this type of enforcement 
activity. Not only must they do more, they must be seen to be doing more. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the analysis of file data of actual cases with regard to tax 
evasion by SMEs. Analysis has revealed that detection procedures were undertaken 
manually and based entirely on the subjective judgement of the IRB personnel concerned, 
which is not efficient. Most of the techniques adopted for settlement are complementary 
and frequently supplement each other between accounting basis and capital statement/net 
worth analysis. 
The understatement of gross profit is the most common and most widely used method by 
SMEs to evade tax. The underreporting of sales and overstating of purchases were noted as 
the largest adjustments in the SMEs' tax evasion schemes. Analysis also revealed the 
offences to have the characteristics of deliberate evasion, which takes place all the time. 
The IRB also emphasised the rate. of penalty as a vehicle to improve compliance among 
SMEs, as the rate of evasion detection is very small. 
187 
The following chapter describes the opinions of the IRB personnel drawn from the open- 
ended questions and identifies further characteristics of tax evasion within SME taxpayers. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PERCEPTIONS OF INLAND REVENUE BOARD STAFF 
8.1 Introduction 
The initial survey instrument for the collection of this data was supposed to be a group 
interview with IRB officers using a semi-structured questionnaire. However, due to 
unforeseen circumstances, the group interview could not be conducted. The semi-structured 
questions (with a slightly revised format, see Appendix M were, however, later distributed 
to all fifteen heads at the Investigation and Intelligence Centre of the Inland Revenue Board 
of Malaysia as an open-ended questionnaire (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion). Eight 
completed open-ended questionnaires were returned. 
Drawing from the responses to the open-ended questionnaire from IRB personnel, this 
chapter examines the perceptions of IRB personnel of the IRB's stance on and practical 
overview of tax evasion by SMEs. It begins with general views on tax evasion and SMEs. 
This is followed by the current view on how the IRB emphasises detection, civil settlement 
tools and the recent trends in deterring tax evasion. The next section explores the 
perception of forensic accounting of the IRB personnel. The chapter also looks at the 
recommendations and improvements suggested by them. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a summary. 
8.2 General view on tax evasion and SMEs 
The perceptions of tax evasion and SMEs were assessed through the focal argument in most 
of the literature (Ahsan, 1995; Silvani, 1992; Terkper, 2003) that tax authorities in 
developing countries, including Malaysia, are handicapped in their fight against tax evasion 
by at least three elements, namely: (1) an incompetent, corrupt and inadequately staffed tax 
administration set up; (2) poor information gathering and processing technology beset by 
weak accounting practices; and (3) a legal system that is both unable and unwilling to 
enforce the penal and civil aspects of the prevailing tax code. It is further believed that 
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against this backdrop, high tax rates, especially within a graduated schedule, add impetus to 
evasion practices. 
Generally, most of the respondents believed the above factors as major handicaps to 
deterring tax evasion. Although some of the respondents were not of the opinion that IRB 
personnel are incompetent or that the IRB is inadequately staffed, many thought that they 
were. As one respondent put it: 
Inadequate or incompetent staff? Need I say more? With the current staff strength in the 
investigation centre, striking (winning) a lottery is a lot easier than getting investigated, 
especially in the Mang Valley. 
Respondents also perceived that IRB staff were not properly trained. They argued that there 
was no comprehensive training programme for the IRB personnel, especially in tax audit 
and investigation. The respondents noted further that IRB personnel were supposed to learn 
through experience. One respondent put it: 
Yhere is no comprehensive training programme for the investigation offlicers, unlike other 
countries like the United States and Japan. Yhey are supposed to pick up the tricks of the 
trade a's they go alone, so to speak ... and there is a need to set up special training similar to 
that ofIRS special agents and Japanese NTA. 
All respondents directly stated that corruption is not a factor among IRB personnel. They 
suggested ample evidence. They emphasised the following reasons: (1) the IRB has been 
rated the second least corrupt government agency by Transparency International's 
Malaysian Chapter 8.1 ; (2) the corporate culture of honesty and highly ethical values 
inculcated by British Colonials are generally still intact but there is no guarantee this will 
be so in the near future if this issue is not addressed by the management; (3) there are ample 
checks and balances in the audit and investigation process; and (4) there are fairly sound 
standards of tax audit and investigation systems and procedures which are generally 
adhered to. For example, one respondent remarked: 
8*1 Transparency International is a global non-governmental organisation devoted to combating corruption. Its 
mission is to create change toward a world free of corruption. 
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Con-upt? From experience thefirst thing that comes to the mind ofbusinessmenISMEs is to 
bribe their way to settle the case. They eventually learn we are not corruptible like other 
enforcement agencies. I am not saying the IRB is perfectly clean but the general perception 
is that the IRB is doing superbly in this respect 
Almost all of the respondents were of the opinion that the legal system seems to be quite 
adequate in the enforcement of criminal or civil provisions to serve as a deterrent and as a 
compliance tool. They further argued that failing to institute criminal proceedings against 
tax evaders probably contributed to the rampant tax evasion, especially among the SMEs. 
With the criminal division being set up recently and the management seriously committed 
to criminal enforcement, taxpayers will definitely have to rethink their tax lodgement 
activities. 
Most respondents expressed the opinion that there are fairly good information gathering 
systems in the IRB but they are done manually, not integrated, not technology enabled and 
not centralized. So as not to lose out on vital sources of resource materials for effective tax 
evader detection, efforts are being made to address this issue but it is still in the infancy 
stage. As one respondent summarised it: 
Iýformation gathering, processing and disseminating has never been ourforte. 
The respondents acknowledged that tax evasion is commonly attributed to high tax rates 
(e. g. Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Srivivasan, 1973). Some, however, commented that 
even with decreasing tax rates over the years in Malaysia, tax evasion is still rampant, 
especially among SMEs. They viewed the suggestion that a low tax rate equals low tax 
evasion is but a myth. This view was perhaps accurately summed up by Graetz and Wilde 
(1985: 359), as follows: 
The myth that high marginal tax rates cause non-compliance is the most pervasive of all. In 
fact, that lowering tax rates will induce greater compliance is a claim supported neither by 
the theory of tax compliance nor by empirical evidence. 
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In general, the theoretical literature shows that tax rates have an ambiguous effect on 
compliance depending upon taxpayers' attitudes toward risk, audit selection criteria etc. 
(e. g. Allingham. and Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973; Yitzhaki, 1974). Unfortunately, the 
empirical literature reports mixed results as well (e. g. Clotfelter, 1983; Pommerehne et al., 
1992; Alm et al., 1993; Joulfaian et al., 1998). The ambiguity of the compliance response 
to an increase in marginal tax rates is also observed for small corporations. Rice (1992) 
finds tax rates have a small effect on income underreporting. 
One respondent expressed the belief that a pivotal issue is the taxpayer's perceptions and 
attitudes and the perceived idea that 'the gain far outweighs the risk' could be the factor 
underlying tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia. Two respondents said that: 
I think our tax rate is comparable or even lower than other Asian countries. Whatever the 
rate it is I think Malaysians still don't like to pay tax. It is the catch me if you can 
attitude ... I think it is the lack of tax education 
Yhe current Malaysian tax rate is comparable or lower than other tax regimes in this 
region; yet tax evasion cases continue to surface in multitudes. Malaysian tax rates in the 
1970s and 1980s were punitive; going by logic alone, tax evasion should be on the decline 
but this is not so, why? It boils down to taxpayer perceptions and attitudes. 
The respondents believed that as far as SMEs are concerned, business survival and 
realisation of capital outlay is of the utmost importance, thus, responsibility toward proper 
compliance with tax laws is seldom taken seriously by SMEs. They further argued that it 
rested on a matter of perception and attitude; payment of due taxes is not considered a 
national duty or responsibility, which indicates that tax education plays a vital role in 
changing the perception notions. The general perception in the culture of paying 'minimal 
or reasonable' tax to the government and the political reality and consideration 'what I will 
get back in returnfor my tax contribution' were also associated with SME tax evasion. 
One respondent further made the point that the external auditor of SMEs is usually not of 
the highest repute (not among the big four auditors). The lack of a stringent application of 
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auditing standards by these auditors for fear of losing clients has seen SMEs become the 
sector with the highest incidence of tax evasion. As he put it: 
It is worth noting that the auditors engaged by SMEs are usually not of the highest repute, 
i. e. not among the big 4 auditors. Sometimes the auditors just put their signature on the 
accounts knowing that the actual accountlaudit was done by unqualified 
accountantslauditors. 
Some personnel also recounted their experiences as an illustration, indicating that most 
SMEs are family owned and managed and therefore the decision to evade taxes is easily 
made, probably due to loose or non-existent internal controls in the accounting system. 
SMEs are also companies with low paid-up capital and their sources of finance are limited. 
Tax evasion is one way of obtaining funds and to reduce the level of the debt equity ratio. 
8.3 Current practice perspective 
Responding to the current detection and civil settlement tool used, IRB personnel evaluated 
that it has not changed much from the expatriate days when the investigation techniques 
were first introduced. The new tools simply complement the old ones. In the written words 
of two respondents: 
Don't see any new tools replacing old. Criminal prosecution is on the way to complement 
the old. 
Afraid to change 'old tool'or experiment with something new. 
The respondents noted the following tools in ascertaining evaded income and tax 
computation of tax undercharged: (1) the net worth method; (2) accounts examination; (3) 
business economics method; and (4) bank deposit method. These tools are basically part of 
the forensic accounting technique for detecting fraud. One respondent even commented that 
he preferred these tools and worked the way he always had. He put it: 
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It is safe to do what you always do because you know you won't make a mistake and you 
won't get into trouble. Mindyou, the capital statement methodput At Capone in jailfor tax 
evasion. 
The tools predominantly used in intelligence work can be categorised into two methods: (1) 
general intelligence method, which includes physical surveillance, information from mass 
media, including electronic media, and information from government agencies; (2) primary 
intelligence method, which examines, analyses and interprets accounts submitted over the 
years, reviews and analyses asset accumulation, house and business premises surveillance, 
and minimal undercover work to ascertain cash sales systems. 
Most of the respondents believed that competence in terms of knowledge and skills is 
required for efficiency and effectiveness in detecting tax evasion: however, no structured 
training programme has yet been developed for effective training, especially for 
investigation personnel. The existing personnel, who possess tertiary qualifications, are 
from various disciplines of educational backgrounds. Even though they stated that they 
have received in-house training in accounts and tax law, the training programmes are not 
comprehensive or well tailored, thus they have to learn from experience and this could be 
too laborious and tedious. For example, in the US, the IRS gives agents selected for 
forensic investigation work two years of specialised training on how to conduct forensic 
investigations. During the IRS training session, IRS agents are taught various methods of 
proof and interview techniques. Between classes, agents return to the local office to work 
on some on-the-job training material under the guidance of an assigned coach who may 
supervise two or three trainees. 
It was noted that prior to becoming a Board, the recruitment of tax officers was mainly the 
responsibility of the central agency of the Public Service Department of Malaysia (PSD). 
As such, graduates of varied disciplines were recruited as tax officers. The PSD did not 
discriminate in the selection of graduates partially due to the fact that many graduates were 
government scholars with bonds to fulfil. After becoming a Board in March 1995, the 
responsibility of recruitment rested with the IRB. The IRB has recognised that graduates of 
certain disciplines such as accounting, economics and law are advantageous to have. The 
IRB has also recognised that it needs to engage expertise or consultants in certain 
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specialised industries such as insurance, banking and finance. It is a step in the right 
direction, as the current staff and the new recruits will never be adequately equipped to 
handle investigation or audit of these specialised industries. 
From the literature review, it was apparent that different governments give different 
emphasis to tax evasion. The file data also shows that the type and extent of evasion varies 
from case to case to such an extent that as a rule no two cases are alike. The IRB personnel 
supported the assertion that the tax evasion method used by SMEs varies from case to case. 
This is due to the unique nature of the business that SMEs are involved in (for example, the 
type of industry and location of the business entity - remote, suburban or in a township) 
and the prevalent opportunities for tax evasion. 
It was noted from IRB personnel's experience that SMEs would evade taxes in any way 
that is possible by under-declaring profits all the time. Notably, inflation of cost of sales 
and suppression of sales/income were common methods used by* SMEs to evade taxes. 
There was a split in the response concerning the implementation of criminal investigation 
as opposed to the current civil system. Some believed that the IRB has to start somewhere 
and no time is better than now with the implementation of self-assessment. They were of 
the opinion that the results that could flow from publicity generated in a criminal tax 
investigation case would be manifold. As two personnel put it: 
Civil tax investigation gives the impression that tax evasion is a misdemeanour only, 
whereas a criminal investigation has a stigma; that ofa cheat, defrauder. 
The introduction of criminal tax investigation was timely as it fitted neatly into ongoing 
discourse about reforming the procedure of detecting tax evasion, reshaping the tax system 
and how it is administered in the new millennium 
Indeed, the IRB is in the midst of implementing criminal tax investigation, but the other 
half of the respondents are in doubt about its effectiveness. They argued the following: (1) a 
comprehensive training programme has not been developed; (2) an effective organisational 
195 
structure to drive the programme is not in place; and (3) an effective legal framework and 
amendments to the existing tax provision are still pending. 
8.4 IRB personnel's perceptions of forensic accounting 
In order to ascertain the awareness among IRB personnel in respect of forensic accounting, 
a brief definition of forensic accounting was given in the questionnaire: 
Forensic accounting is the application offinancial skill and investigation mentality to 
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it 
encompasses financial expertise, fraud knowledge and a strong knowledge and 
understanding of business reality and the working of the legal system. According to some of 
its advocates it looks beyond the numbers and deals with the business reality of the 
situation (Bologna, 1993). 
A direct question was asked - What is your understanding of forensic accounting? ' 
Responses to the question suggest that the respondents held a strong understanding about 
forensic accounting. For example: 
It is the application of accounting andfinancial knowledge, within the rules of evidence, in 
legalproblems, whether in any criminal or civil proceedings. 
A method of lookingfor traces or evidence that points to an act, going back to the origins 
of an accounting entry and subsequent evolutions. In the case of SMEs, to detect acts of 
manipulation of accounts, which have resulted in altered states of profitability, thereby 
lowering the tax incidence. 
Not surprisingly, the understanding of forensic accounting results in the detailed 
examination of the financial records by IRB personnel as commented on the techniques or 
methods of working in detecting and settling tax evasion by SMEs. One respondent 
remarked: 
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Basically going through books of accounts with a magnifying glass; checking every 
accounting entry and its corresponding entry and its impact on the profitability of the 
SMEs. Of course with the advent of computerised accounting the audit trail is more tedious 
and cumbersome but it is nothing that a good accounting background and experience 
cannot overcome. 
The IRB personnel were of the opinion that forensic accounting is a powerful tool that 
could carry the detection and settling of tax evasion cases a step further. They argued on 
the basis that forensic accounting is more encompassing, comprehensive and intricate in 
respect of technique and approaches even though their current methods are essentially 
similar to that used in forensic accounting. Methods or techniques to be employed, 
however, will very much depend on the type of industry of the SMEs concerned. 
8.5 Recommendations and improvements from IRB personnel 
The most significant argument seems to be based on the organisational structure of the 
investigation function. All respondents suggested that criminal investigation should replace 
civil investigation, as the monitoring function of tax compliance would be carried out by 
field audits under the Self-Assessment System (SAS), which would be fully operational for 
all taxpayers by 2004. Civil investigations would be redundant. 
The IRB personnel also noted further recommendations for the investigation personnel to 
be trained, retrained and exposed to forensic accounting techniques to improve and sharpen 
their investigative skills. This included specific courses designed to'teach and train new 
investigation personnel. One of the respondents put it: 
77; e development of human resources is a fundamental pillar of an effective tax 
administration. 77; e most sophisticated tax administration system will not succeed in 
maximising efficiency in the absence of any well-trained, conscientious and honest tax 
personnel, especially in deterring tax evasion 
Personnel motivation was also put forward by a few of the respondents who argued it was 
vitally important forjob, satisfaction. A lack of development and career opportunities would 
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have a considerable impact on their expectations. Ibis will leave them unduly open to the 
temptation of moving to otherjobs or even corruption. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the perceptions of IRB personnel with regard to tax evasion by 
SMEs, current practices, forensic accounting and improvements they would like to see. The 
analysis revealed that they perceived that IRB personnel were not properly trained, that 
there was unsystematic information gathering, and that taxpayers' perceptions and attitudes, 
and SMEs' business survival and realisation of capital outlay, are the factors contributing to 
why SMEs are regarded as the sector with the highest incidence of tax evasion in Malaysia. 
The analysis also failed to reveal new tools to replace the existing tools in detecting and 
settling tax evasion cases. The introduction of criminal prosecution will simply complement 
the old tools as most of the legal provisions are within the Malaysian tax laws. 
With regard to forensic accounting, although IRB personnel held a strong understanding of 
it, they may not have achieved this through formal training. This, arguably, means that they 
will be unable to meet the challenges that will be demanded by legal counsels upon the 
introduction of criminal prosecution in the em of the SAS. 
IRB personnel also recommended some actions to be taken within the organisation, which 
needs improvement so as to deter tax evasion and reshape the tax system. 
The following chapter will triangulate all of the findings observed within the last three 
chapters, i. e. Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, in the context of the research questions as 
proposed in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
9.1 Introduction 
The last three chapters presented the results of the questionnaires from tax practitioners and 
SME taxpayers, the analysis of file data/actual cases, and the responses to open-ended 
questions from IRB personnel. This chapter triangulates all of the results obtained in the 
last three chapters within the context of the research questions. To a very large extent, the 
discussion of the implications of forensic accounting will draw on the literature review 
presented in Chapter 4 because of its relatively recent emergence in Malaysia. Moreover, 
forensic accounting has been the subject of numerous overviews in practitioners'journals 
(mostly outside of Malaysia) rather than the academic literature. Assumptions and 
limitations of this particular study are also discussed. 
9.2 Existence and extent of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia 
The first research question exarnined the existence and extent of tax evasion by SMEs. 
There is a prima facie case for suspecting the existence of tax evasion by SMEs in 
Malaysia. Based on the quantitative and qualitative appraisal from the survey, file data and 
IRB personnel, it is suggested that the existence of tax evasion by SMEs is serious. SME 
tax evasion is seen as both widespread and frequent in Malaysia. There was general 
agreement with three statements about tax evasion in Malaysia by the SME taxpayers? ": 
Tax evasion is common in Malaysia; There is nothing morally wrong with paying less 
taxes; Tax evasion is a form of gambling. gambling for extra income in light of the 
likelihood of detection and the imposition ofpenalties. These statements provide support 
for widespread and frequent tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia (Table 6.26). Eighty five per 
cent of tax practitioners in this study perceived that SMEs do evade tax (Table 6.12). 
9" The SME taxpayers were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each of five statements 
regarding tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia on a five point Likert scale of I (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The mean responses to these three statements were greater than 3.5. 
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The above findings are strengthened by the evidence from the file data, which shows an 
increase in the finalisation of investigation cases between 1997 and 2001 by approximately 
1.18 times (see paragraph 7.7.1 and Table 7.6). This finding might indicate that, 
notwithstanding a greater number of cases, tax evasion by SMEs is getting worse (as 
measured by tax and penalties recovered (see Table 2.4]). The IRB personnel in their 
comments also believed that the tax authority in Malaysia is handicapped in its fight against 
SME tax evasion. 
Respondents are, however, split in their opinions about the estimation of the extent of the 
involvement of SMEs. Approximately 52 per cent of tax practitioners believed that over 50 
per cent of SMEs do evade tax (Table 6.12). On the other hand, 60 per cent of SME 
taxpayers indicated that less than 50 per cent of SMEs evade tax (Table 6.27). This 
response, however, must be viewed with the understanding that it is based on self-reporting 
using the direct question, "To the best ofyour ability, please estimate the percentages of 
SMEs that evade tax in Afalaysia " as data on the extent of tax evasion may be confidential 
(not available for external analysis) or not completely reliable (such as those derived from 
national accounting sources). Indeed, self-reported data suffer from bias: respondents may 
not remember, they may have misunderstood, they may have no cognisance of the issue or 
they may deliberately conceal the information, as has been argued by most tax literature 
(e. g. Hite, 1988; Elffers, 1991a). Tittle (1980), however, concluded that self-reports were 
generally 80 to 90 per cent accurate (cited in Hite, 1988). Most empirical investigations 
(e. g. Vogel (1974) has gone some way towards this aim), however, have relied on survey 
methodologies and respondents' verbal descriptions of their past behaviours to assess the 
occurrence and extent of tax evasion. 
The fact that tax evasion is illegal makes it difficult to obtain reliable estimates of its 
magnitude. The initial findings, however, suggest that the overall perception of SME 
taxpayers and tax practitioners regarding SMEs is that they are seen as a high-risk segment 
in the Malaysian economy as far as tax evasion is concerned. This finding is congruent with 
those of Wallschutzky (1984), Hite et al. (1992) and Joulfaian and Rider (1998). The 
findings may have implications for the future strategies of the government of Malaysia and 
the IRB in focusing on this sector in order to deal with tax evasion. 
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93. The characteristics of tax evasion in SMEs in Malaysia 
The evidence in the literature review has revolved around several different focal points 
concerning the characteristics of tax evasion and has contributed substantially to the 
knowledge about SMEs. This evidence provides an opportunity to explore a selection of 
issues and the characteristics of tax evasion covered by these studies within the Malaysian 
SMEs' perspective, as outlined in the research questions. 
9.3.1 Are tax evasions by SAfEs in Malaysia cyclical or repetitive in nature? 
The anatomy of tax evasion and its dynamic content raise the question of whether tax 
evasion by SMEs is cyclical or merely repetitive in nature. To the best of my knowledge, 
this question has not been addressed in the tax literature despite its primacy in 
distinguishing intentional and unintentional in understanding the fundamentals of the tax 
system. 
In this case, most of the tax practitioners and SME taxpayers are of the opinion that tax 
evasion by SMEs is repetitive in nature. About three-quarters of the respondents (Table 
6.13 and Table 6.28) are of the opinion that tax evasion by SMEs takes place all the time. 
Evidence from file data (Table 7.5 and paragraph 7.6) and the IRB personnel's experience 
shows that an absolute majority of SMEs would evade taxes in any way possible all the 
time rather than in situationally based circumstances (for example, in a period of high 
inflation or a period of economic boom or downturn). 
This finding, however, can be reconciled with Schneider and Este (2000), who argued that 
once taxpayers are engaged in the underground economy (UGE) (which includes tax 
evasion)9,2, it is difficult to get them to stop (as it develops all the time according to the 
principle of running water, it adjusts to changes in taxes, to sanctions from tax authorities 
and to general moral attitudes and so forth). 
9-2 Schneider and Este (2000) defined the UGE to include unreported income from the production of legal 
goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions, by agents that are not registered or who do 
not pay taxes - hence all economic activities which would generally be taxable were they reported to the tax 
authority. 
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9.3.2 Are tax evasions by SMEs in Malaysia characteristically deliberate (intentional) or 
accidental (unintentional) in nature? 
Based on the questionnaire survey (Table 6.17, Table 6.18, Table 6.31 and Table 6.32), the 
results reported in this study show that the respondents believe that SMEs accidentally and 
deliberately understate and overstate profit so as to pay less or more tax than they should, 
respectively. Approximately, an overall average of 13 per cent responded positively that 
SMEs are not engaged in the above unethical activities. The overall involvement is 
estimated to be approximately 25 to 50 per cent of the SMEs. Data from the actual 
cases/file data (Table 7.4 and paragraph 7.5) provide further evidence for the above 
perception, with approximately 99 per cent of the cases reviewed involving deliberately 
planned falsification with the clear intention of deceiving and cheating the tax authorities. 
The same is true of the view given by IRB personnel, which indicates that most SMEs are 
family owned and managed and therefore the decision to evade taxes is easily made. 
In contrast, in an Australian study, McKerchar (1995) concluded that SME taxpayers may 
unintentionally evade tax as a result of their apparent unawareness of their taxation 
knowledge shortfall. This may be because of differences in cultural, political and 
institutional circumstances between the two countries. Apart from this, the SME taxpayers 
in the two countries also differed in terms of perceptions toward their tax authority 
regarding the effectiveness in detecting tax evasion. 
A key question here concerns the remedies: if intentional tax evasion is rampant, then the 
solution is to ramp up enforcement. However, if a major portion of tax evasion is 
unintentional, than education, assistance in preparing tax returns and simplification of the 
tax law would be better-targeted policy responses. 
9.3.3 SME -tax practitioner relationships 
As in other countries, tax compliance is facilitated by the efforts of tax practitioners and 
other private advisors who assist SME taxpayers in tax return preparation. The results of 
this study indicates that most SMEs rely on tax practitioners for guidance to comply with 
their income tax requirements (Table 6.29). This indicates that SMEs are likely to lack the 
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technical knowledge to properly complete an income tax return; they may not be familiar 
with recent tax changes, and would in all probability find it cost inefficient to attempt to 
develop this expertise in house. Although the availability of tax practitioner assistance 
undoubtedly reduces the overall compliance burden, the high cost of this assistance is 
nonetheless the most commonly reported source of compliance problems by SMEs in the 
literature, as argued by Erard (I 997b). The relationship between SMEs and tax practitioners 
can also be seen as a contribution that tax practitioners make to taxpayers in giving them 
confidence that their tax matters are under control and that their tax-paying behaviour is 
lawful (Tan, 1999; Hite and McGill, 1992). Erard (1993: 194) views this contribution as a 
socially beneficial role in reducing many of the infonnational and computational barWers 
to compliance with tax laws. 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) argued that most taxpayers actively seek out tax 
practitioners whom they believe will aid or at least be comfortable with their behaviour. 
This is what is shown to be perceived by SME taxpayers in Table 6.29 (Q2.3). More than 
50 per cent of the respondents claimed that they had never switched accountants/tax 
practitioners in dealing with tax matters. This behaviour appears to be consistent with the 
literature on small business fimns, which indicates that although owners rely on tax 
practitioners for their compliance work, they also prefer someone whom they can work 
with or someone who communicates well and has a personal interest in them (Cameron, 
1992; cited in Tan, 1999). There is, however, a tendency to switch tax practitioners for 
some reason that has not been raised by this research, as perceived by the convicted evaders 
(Table 6.29, Q2.3). Prior research (Hite et aL, 1992) has shown that taxpayers would switch 
or terminate their tax practitioners if they disagreed with the advice given, or if they had 
been investigated for tax evasion. It is even likely that the tax practitioner would cease to 
serve them if he/she thought that they fitted the profile of tax evaders. The findings hold 
true for this research, interpreted from Table 6.29, even though more than half of the 
respondents had never switched their tax practitioners. 
Hite et A (1992) demonstrated that taxpayers' and tax practitioners' expectations are not 
necessarily consistent. Taxpayers may simply want to pay the correct tax and the tax 
practitioners may think the correct tax is the lowest tax liability. Taxpayers expect and pay 
their tax practitioners to minimise their tax. Tax practitioners are operating in a competitive 
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market, and while tax law is sufficiently ambiguous to allow them to use the law to suit 
taxpayers' purpose of tax evasion or avoidance, tax practitioners will direct their 
professional experience and skills to exploiting legal loopholes to serve their clients' 
interests (Klepper et aL, 1991). Therefore, the decision to retain or change tax practitioner 
generally very much depends on the clients' working relationships with their practitioners 
rather than being based solely on the type of advice given. Taxpayers generally tend to be 
loyal to their tax practitioner if a good working relationship is maintained. These findings 
are quite similar to the findings in this research as shown in Table 6.17, Table 6.18, Table 
6.29, Table 6.31, Table 6.32 and Table 7A. More than half of the taxpayers had never 
switched tax practitioner, which seems to suggest that a good working relationship exists 
between taxpayer and tax practitioner, supported by the tax practitioners deliberately 
understating or overstating the tax liability of the SMEs so as to pay less or more tax, either 
at the instruction of the taxpayer or following advice sought and given by the tax 
practitioners. However, it can be argued that the SME taxpayers remain responsible for the 
act of evasion either undertaken by themselves or by their agent. The tax practitioners can 
commit evasion on behalf of a client if they knowingly prepare and send incorrect accounts, 
computations or tax returns to the tax authority. 
9.3.4 Other observations 
The other observation to note is that the type and extent of evasion in SMEs varies from 
case to case in Malaysia. Tax evasion is not restricted and appears to be highly concentrated 
in particular sources of income within the SMEs, as argued by Kesselman (1988) and 
Joulfaian and Rider (1998) in studies using US data. File data/actual cases and the IRB 
personnel supported the assertion that this variation is due to the unique nature of business 
that SMEs are involved in (for example, type of industry and location of business entity - 
remote, suburban or in a township) and the prevalent opportunities that exist. 
9.4 Factors influencing tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia 
The questionnaire survey from tax practitioners revealed that they viewed incompetence, 
corruption and an inadequately staffed tax administration set up as the main factors 
influencing tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia (Table 6.14). The IRB personnel, however, 
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view themselves as not being well or properly trained. This suggests that the IRB is 
ineffective in the present tax collection system. What is lacking is a comprehensive training 
programme for the IRB personnel, especially in tax audit and investigation: they are 
currently supposed to learn through experience. 
Respondents, however, do not believe that corruption is a factor with IRB personnel as 
evidence from Transparency International's Malaysian Chapter has shown that the IRB is 
the second least corrupted govenunent agency. The corporate culture of honesty and highly 
ethical values inculcated by British Colonials are generally still intact with ample checks 
and balances in audit and investigation processes. However, there is no guarantee that this 
will be the case in the future if these issues are not addressed by the management of the 
IRB. 
A critical analysis of the literature suggested a positive relationship between detection 
probability and taxpayer compliance (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.5), i. e. the probability of 
being detected is so low that it is advantageous to evade tax. Alm et al. (I 992c) argued that 
a purely economic analysis of the evasion gamble implies that most taxpayers would evade 
tax if they were rational because it is unlikely that cheaters will be caught and pcnalised. 
The perceptions of tax practitioners and SME taxpayers (Table 6.20 and Table 6.40 
respectively) in this study appear to support the above notion. On average, only 10 SMEs 
have been investigated/audited by the IRB annually over the last five years (Table 6.21). As 
such, the proportion of returns detected for tax evasion by the IRB could be less than I per 
cent per year, as shown by the estimate from file data/actual cases (Table 7.6). Similar 
detection figures are seen in the United States (Andcroni et al., 1998). What is perhaps 
most interesting to note is that those who evade tax had far more precise estimates of the 
probabilities of apprehension than the non-evaders. This fits nicely with the view that those 
who are active in tax evasion will have a better sense of the size of evasion than non- 
evaders. 
Examination of file data showed that an average penalty of approximately 58 per cent was 
normally imposed on the amount of tax which has not been charged or has been 
undercharged (Table 7.7). This penalty is reasonably low compared to the statutory penalty 
that could be imposed under section 114 of the Income Tax Act 1967, which is treble the 
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amount of tax which has been undercharged in consequence of the offence or which would 
have been undercharged if the offence had not been detected. The DGIR also has the power 
to compound offences (i. e., before a case is due for prosecution in court) and the penalty 
imposed is also at the discretion of the DGIR. As noted in the file analysis, in practice, the 
maximum amount is usually not imposed. 
'7he burden ofpaying tax is too great' is seen to be an important factor influencing SME 
taxpayers not to pay tax. On the other hand, 'to avoid audit or investigation by the IRB' was 
the main factor influencing the payment of the right amount of tax (Table 6.39). This 
finding is surprising, with the lowest tax rate in Malaysia being 2 per cent for personal 
income on the fimt chargeable income between RM2,500 and RM5,000, and a reduction in 
corporate tax to 20 per cent from 28 per cent for SMEs in the 2003 budget. 
9.5 Methods used by SNIEs In evading tax 
'Me questionnaire survey showed an overall perception among the tax practitioners and 
SME taxpayers (Table 6.19 and Table 6.33 respectively) that the most frequently and 
widely used methods by SMEs in tax evasion are overstatement of expenses (other than 
cost of goods sold) and understatement of gross profit. Evidence from the actual cases/file 
data (Table 7.3) and IRB personnel further support these findings. Sole proprietorships and 
small corporations in the United States and Canada exhibit similar patterns, with a high 
percentage of all non-compliance in the form of an understatement of gross profit (Erard, 
1997). 
The file data further revealed that the unden-eporting of sales and overstating of purchases 
are noted as the largest adjustments in the SMEs' manipulation of accounts so as to evade 
tax (see paragraph 7.4). The usage of these methods practically implies that SMEs do not 
apply a sophisticated tax evasion scheme. This is consistent with the responses from 
questions Q2.7, Q2.8 and Q2.9 of the SME taxpayers' questionnaire (see Appendix 11). 
SME taxpayers indicated that they do not- have any interest in other businesses, either 
through direct or indirect shareholding including sole proprietorships or partnerships, and 
no business dealings with tax haven countries (Tables 6.34,6.35 and 6.36). This further 
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limit the possibilities for the usage of sophisticated tax evasion schemes such as transfer 
pricing and so forth. 
Moreover, this fmding is supported by the existence of the current tax legislation: smaller 
SMEs, which are not incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 (for example, sole 
proprietorships/self employment, partnerships or businesses registered with the Registrar of 
Business), need not have their annual accounts audited with their tax returns. Therefore, 
SMEs will see that there is no need to invent new schemes for tax evasion, taking into 
account this flexible legislation. SMEs could collaborate with tax practitioners in 
manipulating and producing false accounts so as to pay the desired tax. The government 
and the IRB, however, should consider making it mandatory that the accounts of SMEs be 
audited before submission to the Registrar of Business and the IRB, as suggested by 
Wallschutzky and Singh (1995) and Mottiakavandar et al. (2003). Even though this 
measure may increase the cost of compliance for SMEs, with the implementation of this 
proposal, attitudes towards positive tax compliance behaviour would, however, be expected 
to improve. 
9.6 The role of the tax practitioner 
Roth el - aL (1989a) emphasised the role of tax practitioners in tax compliance and suggested 
that tax practitioners are sought out ipecifically to discuss tax matters and they frequently 
affect the actual risks and rewards of compliance, transmit values and affect the costs of 
compliance. They affect taxpayers' tax schemes by interpreting compliance requirements 
and offering judgements about the consequences of various actions. Tax practitioners are, 
therefore, in a position to influence the level of tax evasion activities observed by the tax 
authority (Tan, 1999). 
Tle perspective of tax practitioners as intermediaries is considered important for two 
reasons. First, tax practitioners can be pro-tax authority and calculate a tax liability that is 
acceptable to the Revenue in terms of legal interpretation without negotiation and is 
deemed acceptable by the tax authority. Second, tax practitioners can be more pro-taxpayer 
in terms of taking a more aggressive stance alongside their client in an attempt to reduce the 
tax liability further. The question addressed in this paper, however, is whether or not there 
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is an expectation that tax practitioners will take a stance against tax enforcement agencies 
and an expectation that they will do so at the expense of their professional integrity. 
Based on the questionnaires (Questions 2.3 and 2.5, see Appendix I and Tables 6.15 and 
6.16 respectively), the study provided evidence indicating that tax practitioners in Malaysia 
claim to have a pro-tax authority stance, with their role being to perform duties within the 
boundaries of the tax law and their refusal to continue to act on behalf of an SME client if 
the client does not accept advice on an issue of disclosure. The data suggests the 
contribution of the tax practitioner influences the SME taxpayer's behaviour within the 
boundaries of the law. It suggests that the tax practitioners play a positive role in the tax 
compliance process, as they appear to be enforcing the law by giving conservative advice to 
their client. This accords with the findings of Duncan et al. (1989) and Pei et al. (1992). 
The above findings provide encouragement and support for the IRB and the government for 
introducing the self-assessment system (the system will be fully operational by the year 
2004) as the tax practitioners seem to help to enforce the tax law. Where taxpayers are tax 
compliant, this would invariably result in a swifter assessment process, which would in turn 
reduce both the taxpayers' and the tax authorities' compliance and administrative costs. 
The end result would facilitate swifter and easier collection of taxes by the tax authorities. 
Apparently, tax practitioners do believe that for whatever reasons, tax practitioners 
accidentally and deliberately understate or overstate the income/profit of SMEs so that they 
pay less or more than they should (Table 6.17, Table 6.18 and tax practitioners' 
questionnaire, Appendix I). This result can be interpreted as them being pro-taxpayer. This 
finding suggests that tax practitioners play a negative role in the tax compliance process, as 
they appear to be exploiters of the tax law (Kaplan et al., 1988a; Ayers et aL, 1989; Erard, 
1993). 
Taken together, these results suggest that tax practitioners in Malaysia play a dual role 
depending on the tax situations. These data support the claim of Klepper et al. (1991) that 
tax practitioners are both enforcers and exploiters of the tax law, given that they have 
unique knowledge of tax law. This might suggest that in ambiguous tax situations, tax 
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practitioners tend to be exploiters of tax laws and enforcers of the law in unambiguous tax 
situations, as argued by Klepper el aL (199 1) in their research findings. 
Deliberate and accidental evasion fin-ther reflects the issue of the competency and honesty 
of tax practitioners in Malaysia. With an overall average of 80 per cent of respondents 
assuming that tax practitioners deliberately and accidentally understate and overstate their 
clients' profit (Tables 6.17 and 6.18) as so to pay less or more tax, this may indicate a 
general lack of importance of ethical issues within the tax practitioner profession in 
Malaysia. To install professionalism amongst tax practitioners and to ensure public 
confidence, the necessary provision (section 114A) in the Income Tax Act (Amendment) 
1999 and the code of conduct was introduced by the Inland Revenue Board. The provision 
and the code of conduct may provide a safeguard for tax practitioners who feel pressured to 
develop clever strategies for evading or minimising their clients' tax obligation (Murphy 
and Sakurai, 2001). The provision will also protect taxpayers from tax practitioners who 
may misinterpret their clients' wishes or lack the ability or integrity to prepare accurate and 
correct tax returns. The code of conduct is expected to impinge on the ability of tax 
practitioners to support taxpayers' reporting positions, especially with the current self- 
assessment principles, and accordingly is perceived as being important in defining the tax 
practitioner's ethical role along the spectrum of de facto government agent at one end to 
taxpayer advocate at ihe other (Klepper et aL, 1991; Marshall et d, 1998). 
Kleeper and Nagin (1989) noted that in 1979 about 44 per cent of all tax returns in United 
States were prepared by tax practitioners; yet these returns accounted for 74 per cent of all 
non compliance. Although no such statistics is available in Malaysia, many schemes used 
by SMEs, to defer or reduce their taxes, are devised undoubtedly with the help of tax 
practitioners (Table 7.3). Interestingly studies conducted in North America, Schisler (1994) 
indicates that the tax practitioners' clients may be the ones who insist on such aggressive 
reporting. Hite and McGill (1992), however found in their studies that taxpayers preferred 
conservative advice over aggressive advice as their respondents appeared to be primarily 
interested in filling an accurate tax return. This study found that taxpayers, who are 
predominantly SMEs agree more with the conservative advice given by their tax 
practitioners (Table 6.15, Table 6.16, and Table 6.30). Wallschutzky (1984) noted that it 
may in fact that all studies are relevant only for their country of origin. Despite such 
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cautions behaviour displayed by SMEs, tax practitioners could still exercise significant 
influence over their client's compliance behaviour as the latter generally tend to rely on 
their adviser to assist them with their tax work. Being the tax experts, it appears that the 
advice given by them is generally accepted as correct by their clients who are unfamiliar 
with the tax law. Therefore, the literature which suggests SMEs to be instigators of 
aggressive reporting is not strongly supported. Rather, the majority appear to be cautious 
taxpayers, and are primarily interested in filing a correct tax return and in avoiding serious 
penalties. 
The apparent lack of these ethical issues may be explained by the relative newness of the 
provision and the standards of care within the tax profession in Malaysia. Furthermore, the 
IRB has been unwilling to test in the courts the statutory provisions and associated 
explanatory rulings of the code of conduct so as to allow authoritative guidelines to emerge. 
Bandy et aL (1993) noted that greater familiarity with the standards and code of conduct is 
likely to highlight the consequences for tax practitioners and lead to the adoption of less 
aggressive resolutions of tax law issues in ambiguous situations, as has occurred under the 
'realistic possibility' standard in the United States. 
In summary, the role of the tax practitioner in ethical decision-making, particularly in 
relation to unprofessional behaviour, raises some concerns. Even though tax practitioners 
see scope for abuse of the tax system, they are well in control of their professional 
relationships with clients. The best strategy for improving compliance is a system to give 
professionals the support they need to find a way to balance the competing pressures that 
threaten compliance, as suggested by Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001). 
9.7 The role of forensic accounting 
The literature on forensic accounting has been reviewed in detail in Chapter 4. This section 
will address the relationship between tax evasion by SMEs and forensic accounting. The 
literature review suggests that forensic accounting is a* relatively new discipline in 
Malaysia. It is a field that substantially interacts with economics, finance, information 
systems and the law in the usage of accounting for investigative purposes. The discipline is 
so relatively new that, up to now, there has been no formal definition accepted as the 
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standard (Thornhill, 1995). As a discipline, it encompasses financial expertise, fraud 
knowledge and a sound knowledge and understanding of business reality and the workings 
of the legal system. Its development, however, has been primarily achieved through on-the- 
job training as well as experience with investigating officers and legal counsel (Bologna et 
al., 1995). 
Evidence from the tax practitioners and IRB personnel shows that they view forensic 
accounting services as still not widely available or, if they are available, the practitioner 
may not have undergone formal and sufficient training and is thus unable to function or 
render all the services. They therefore need further exposure before fully understanding the 
concept of forensic accounting sufficiently. Tax practitioners acknowledge themselves as 
having a fairly good understanding of forensic accounting (Tables 6.23 and 6.24 
respectively). Awareness among IRB personnel, especially those personnel involved in the 
investigation of tax evasion cases, with regard to forensic accounting is also strong 
(paragraph 8.4). Although such investigation techniques in forensic accounting are not new 
to them, they need further exposure (even though the findings indicate a lack of 
sophistication in tax evasion by SMEs) to bring about the successful investigation and 
prosecution of those involved in tax evasion. Knowledge of forensic accounting by IRB 
personnel will be a powerful addition to the investigation officers' arsenal and will enhance 
their ability to combat tax evasion by SMEs. This will help and contribute effectively 
towards the successful investigation and prosecution of tax fraud, especially the evasion 
and avoidance of taxes. As Brennan et al. (2001) pointed out, the main thrust of forensic 
accounting involves the financial aspects of an investigation, and encompasses all the 
necessary investigating expertise and experience such as interrogative skills, knowledge of 
the law and the rules of evidence, investigative proficiency, and interpersonal skills. Thus, 
in the context of the tax authority, forensic accounting can be deemed as a discipline that 
combines expertise in accounting together with other investigative skills to examine 
instances of criminal wrongdoings with regard to taxes: the findings from the investigation 
will form the basis for the prosecution of the suspects in the court of law. 
Based on the questionnaire survey (Table 6.22), file data (Table 7.2) and the opinions of 
IRB personnel, the technique used by the IRB in detecting and settling tax evasion cases 
appears to be relatively effective with capital statement/net worth analysis viewed overall 
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as an effective method. This was further stressed by one of the IRB personnel, who stated 
that the capital statement approach put Al Capone in jail for tax evasion. The IRB bases its 
net worth approach on the following hypothesis: (1) a taxpayer's net worth at a point in 
time is the cost of all his or her assets (business and personal) minus his or her liabilities; 
(2) a taxpayer must have sufficient income (taxable and non-taxable) to account for (a) any 
increase in his or her net worth between the beginning and the end of the year, plus (b) any 
personal expenditure that he or she incurs during the year. Under this approach, taxable 
income is computed as all or part of the increase in net worth during the year, minus non- 
taxable income plus non-deductible personal expenses (see Figure 4.1 for summary). 
In summary, awareness of forensic accounting techniques by tax practitioners and IRB 
personnel is strong, having acknowledged a fairly good understanding of forensic 
accounting. Forensic accounting could be seen as a multi-skilled or multi-disciplined area, 
which creates an additional challenge for one to master. Expertise in accounting alone will 
not suffice without the expertise in other investigative areas. Similarly, expertise in other 
investigative skills without the knowledge of accounting will not assist the investigating 
officers in uncovering fraudulent activities. Accordingly, the development has to come in 
stages and as a team effort as investigation is not something that can be taught and not 
everyone can do it. 
Capital statement/net worth analysis is viewed overall as the most effective method among 
the various techniques used by the IRB in detecting tax evasion by SMEs. Although such 
forensic accounting techniques are not new to the tax authority, they however need further 
exposure as the type and extent of evasion by SMEs varies from case to case. Hence the 
area of forensic accounting should be added to the tools necessary to bring about the 
successful investigation and prosecution of those involved. 
9.8 Assumptions and limitations of the study 
There are several assumptions and limitations of this study that need to be considered in 
evaluating these findings so as to ensure that the results described are not misinterpreted. It 
is essential that all assumptions are stated and that any perceived limitations are affirmed. 
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This will allow the research findings to be justified in the context of these assumptions and 
limitations and minimise any misconstruing of the findings. 
This study involves a survey of the attitudes of tax practitioners and SME taxpayers 
regarding their perceptions of others' behaviour with some questions asking the 
respondents to consider themselves in hypothetical situations. It involves a sensitive area 
and the researcher was not able to determine whether the respondents were sincere in 
providing their answers. In other words, the issue is whether the answers provided were 
similar to how they would behave in a real situation, as all taxpayers engaged in tax evasion 
activities might not wish to be identified". Let us look into the evidence. 
The response rate was considered to be very low with an average of 20 per cent (Chapter 
6). As discussed in Chapter 5, the most common problem leading to a low response rate 
may be the structure and phrasing of the questionnaire. There was no mention of any 
problems or any comments made concerning the point of the questions, and thus those who 
responded seem to have understood what the questions were asking them. Therefore, once 
the respondents decided to reply to the questionnaire, they seem to have found no 
difficulties in understanding and answering the questions. The questionnaire was relatively 
short and easy to understand, as closed questions were used (in the direct and indirect style) 
so as not to cause respondent fatigue. The fact that the responses received from the 
convicted tax evaders were fewer than from the non-evaders strengthens the conviction that 
the low response rate was due to the sensitivity nature of tax evasion, with which the tax 
evaders do not wish to be identified. Many chose not to respond: however, those who did 
respond may have been more likely to have given their true and honest opinion, as they 
were not forced to respond, and they had no incentives to do so (monetary, gifts or so forth 
as an added incentive for increasing response rate) other than their own interest. 
The tax practitioner survey was based on a sample of 350 practising tax practitioners, 
approved and licensed under Section 153 of the Malaysian Income Tax Act. The sample 
contained 200 professional accountants 'authorised by or under any written law to be an 
9*3 Smith (1986: 78) comments that 'such extreme caution - verging perhaps on paranoia - contrasts sharply with the enthusiasm with which pub bores may appear prepared to regale even complete strangers with tediously detailed anecdotes about their transactions in the black economy and their view about taxation'. 
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auditor of companies' (Section 153(3) (a)), 100 from 'any other professional accountant 
approved by Minister of Finance' (Section 153(3) (b)), and 50 from 'any other person 
approved by the Minister on the recommendation of the Director General of the Inland 
Revenue' (Section 153(3) (c)). The bias was introduced in order to ensure that a large 
number of respondents would have specialist knowledge and experience, especially in 
forensic accounting. The tax practitioner sample was drawn from two databases - the IRB 
and the MIA database (sample construction is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5). It was 
not possible to follow up non-respondents, as the survey-had ensured anonymity as well as 
confidentiality in order to enhance completion rates. 
The SME taxpayer survey was limited to a sample of 400. The sample was constructed 
using the IRB database (sample construction is discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Again, 
anonymity and confidentiality were adopted for the SME taxpayer survey, making it 
impossible to carry out follow-ups. This procedure was used in an attempt to increase the 
response rate. Non-response bias was considered in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Though permission was granted to carry out research using actual case data from the IRB, 
given the confidentiality requirement under Section 138 of the Income Tax Act, only 
certain data was made available for the analysis in comparing the results with other 
observations. 
Again, given the confidentiality provision of the Income Tax Act, the stances or opinions 
expressed by the IRB personnel are their own views and should not be interpreted as 
representing the views of the IRB as a whole. 
9.9 Summary 
The chapter has presented the findings from the questionnaire survey, file data/actual cases 
and the opinions from the IRB personnel. The main outcomes from this chapter show that 
triangulation yields comparable and consistent data in the research findings between the 
three observations made. There was found to be a general consistency between the results. 
This confirms the validity of this research work. It can be interpreted that the researcher 
carried out the survey as prescribed for any fieldwork and also the file data/actual cases and 
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IRB personnel opinions strengthened the findings of the surveys. A summary of the 
triangulation result is presented in Figure 9.1. 
The research findings suggest that the extent of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia is serious. 
SME tax evasion is seen as both widespread and frequent. The findings also indicate the 
offences to be in the character of deliberate evasion without any sophisticated tax-planning 
scheme. Understatement of gross profit and overstatement of expenses other than cost of 
goods sold are the most frequently used methods. The fact that most taxpayers feel that it is 
unlikely that they will be detected and penalised by the tax authority is also another factor 
shaping tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia. 
The findings also show that SMEs in Malaysia rely heavily on tax practitioners to guide 
them to comply with their income tax requirements and that they will in general remain 
with the same tax practitioner. There is a tendency, however, to switch tax practitioners for 
whatever reason they think fit. 
In relation to the role of the tax practitioner, the results indicate that tax practitioners play a 
critical role in how SMEs approach tax evasion opportunities in Malaysia. They have a dual 
role in compliance within the tax system consistent with other findings. Tax practitioners 
are seen as pro-tax authority with their role in performing duties within the boundaries the 
tax law and refusal to continue to act on behalf of SME taxpayers if they do not accept 
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advice on the issue of disclosure. Tax practitioners are also seen as pro-taxpayer, as they 
appear to be exploiters of the tax law by deliberately understating or overstating the income 
of SMEs so that they pay less or more tax than they should. 
Awareness of forensic accounting techniques by tax practitioners and IRB personnel is 
strong, having acknowledged a fairly good understanding of forensic accounting. Capital 
statement/net worth analysis is viewed overall as the most effective method among the 
various techniques used by the IRB in detecting tax evasion by SMEs. Although such 
forensic accounting techniques are not new to the tax authority, they however need further 
exposure as the type and extent of evasion by SMEs varies from case to case. Hence the 
area of forensic accounting should be added to the tools necessary to bring about the 
successful investigation and prosecution of those involved. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the research and the results together with 
conclusions and recommendations for further research. It also proposes some strategies to 
overcome the major weaknesses in the existing tax system noted in the research findings so 
as to deter tax evasion, especially in SMEs. 
.6 
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CHAPTER10 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Ifyou drive a car, Ill tax the street, Ifyou tyy to sit, I'll tavyour seap Ifyou get too cold, I'll ftv the heat; 
Ifyou take a walk, I'll tax yourfeet 
Part of th e lyrics from Taxm an by Th e Beatles 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of this study, conclusions obtained from conducting this 
study and research evaluation. The first section presents a brief summary of this study. The 
next section provides conclusions obtained from conducting this research. The subsequent 
section will focus on research evaluation, i. e. recommendations to deter tax evasion by 
SMEs and suggestions for possible fin-ther research. 
10.2 Brief summary 
The principal objective of this study was to gain an insight into and assess the phenomenon 
of tax evasion by SMEs and explore the role of forensic accounting in Malaysia. The SMEs 
make a major contribution to the Malaysian economy, accounting for about 33.3 per cent of 
all private sector employment and 92 per cent of all private sector business (Bank Negara, 
2002). It is stressed that the existence of tax evasion will have important implications for 
the determination of macro-economic variables, the functioning of the national economy 
and the implementation of economic policy. The SME sectors are seen as having a high 
incidence of tax evasion in terms of voluntary tax compliance and they have more 
opportunities to participate in cash transactions compared to other taxpayers (Vogel, 1974; 
Wallschutzky, 1984; Joulfaian and Rider, 1998; Ahmed and Sakurai, 2001). There is, 
however, a strong voice in defence of SMEs. Coleman and Freeman (1994) and Terkper 
(2003) argued that SMEs are surrounded by an inefficient and unsupportive tax system, and 
often unnecessarily confrontational bureaucracy. The IRB, in its attempts to reduce or 
eradicate tax evasion through positive and negative reinforcement measures, has decided 
that it requires large-scale studies to be conducted in order to assess SME taxpayer 
behaviour and to ascertain what influences tax evasion activity. This study defines 
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characteristic behaviours of SME taxpayers and tax practitioners, factors affecting tax 
evasion activity and the role of forensic accounting. 
In this research, SME is broadly defined to include directors of SMEs, management of 
SMEs, sole proprietors, partnerships and businesses within the definition of the Small and 
Medium-Sized Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC) of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry by being companies having the following characteristics: 
(1) turnover of less than RM 25 million, (2) employee number not exceeding 150, (3) 
companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, including those registered under 
the Registrar of Business. Directors, managers and owners are also included in the scope of 
the category SME to reflect the practice of the tax authority of including SME 
entrepreneurs (owners, directors and managers) in most of the back duty cases of private 
companies, where a means test/net worth analysis is examined and unreported income is 
taxed and a penalty imposed. 
This study adopted a multi-method approach (qualitative and quantitative approach), as 
suggested by Jackson and Milliron (19 86), Hasseldine and Zhuhong (1999) and Richardson 
and Sawyer (2001). It was argued that by using different sources and methods, each type of 
data collection was strengthened and the weaknesses of any single method were minimised, 
helping to produce a more authoritative piece of research by increasing the strength of the 
research design. 
The data presented was constituted by views from SME taxpayers and tax practitioners and 
expressed in response to a mail questionnaire, file data/actual cases from the IRB 
investigation files, and from IRB personnel in response to open format questions. SME 
taxpayers consisted of non-tax evaders and convicted tax evaders. The tax practitioners 
comprised individuals according to the provision of the ITA under section 153(3): (a) a 
professional accountant authorised by or under any written law to be an auditor of 
companies, (b) any othe 
'r professional accountant approved 
by the Minister and (c) any 
other person approved by the Minister on the recommendation of the DGIR. By addressing 
the related questions to tax practitioners and IRB personnel, it was possible to draw on their 
specialist knowledge of tax laws and their understanding of the impact of both the technical 
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aspects of the legislation and the administration of the tax system concerning tax evasion. 
The tax authority's file data gave a further understanding of the practices within the IRB 
and SMEs with regard to tax evasion. 
A total of 87 usable responses were returned by SME taxpayers, providing an overall 
response rate of approximately 25 per cent. Of the 87 SME taxpayer respondents, 62 were 
from the non-tax evaders group and the remaining 25 were convicted tax evaders. Usable 
questionnaires were obtained from 60 tax practitioners resulting in a response rate of over 
19 per cent. Appropriate statistical tests were performed in analysing the data. 
A total of 200 tax investigation files were reviewed for the years 1997 and 2001 and all 
fifteen directors in charge of the Investigation and Intelligence Centre were sent an open-.. 
ended questionnaire for their personal opinions. Eight responses were received from the 
IRB personnel, representing more than half of the directors of the Investigation and 
Intelligence Centre of the IRB. 
10.3 Research findings 
The results of this research as a whole have implications for future strategies of tile IRB to 
focus SMEs sectors. The results also aid in setting the future direction and role of forensic 
accounting technique in detecting' and deterring SMEs tax evasion. The following 
summaries the research findings based on the research questions addressed in Chapter I 
(Section 1.3). 
10.3.1 Insight into the extent and impact of tax evasion by SMEs 
10.3.1.1 To what e-xtcnt do SMEs commit tax cvasion in Malaysia? 
There is a prima facie case for suspecting the existence of tax evasion by SMEs in 
Malaysia. The findings suggest that tax evasion by SMEs is widespread and frequent. 
Though there was a split opinion in the estimate of the extent of the involvement of SMEs, 
the majority of questionnaire respondents believed that not less than 50 percent of SMEs 
evaded tax. What is perhaps the most interesting outcomes is that those who evade tax had 
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far more precise estimates of the probabilities of apprehension than non evaders. This fits 
nicely with the view that those who are active in tax evasion will have a better sense of the 
size of evasion than non-evaders. 
10.3.1.2 What are the impacts of tax evasion by SMEs? 
Specific impacts are difficult to make especially as the fact that tax evasion is illegal makes 
it difficult to obtained reliable estimates of its magnitude. In addition, the absence of a 
significant effect of probability of audit and severity of penalties on SME taxpayer that it is 
advantageous to evade tax. There is, however, sufficient evidence to conclude that tax 
evasion by SMEs is a significant problem, particularly in light of community perceptions 
that the problem is escalating. There also appears to be a perception that there is little 
likelihood of detection and, in any case, that the consequences of being detected are not 
severe. While there is no reliable estimate of the revenue foregone, it is clear that the 
Malaysian community is denied the benefit of billions of ringgit each year that could be 
funding improvements in health, education and other government programs. 
10.3.2 Understanding cases of tax evasion by SMEs in practice 
10.3.2.1 What are the characteristics of tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia? 
(i) Is tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia cyclical or repetitive in nature? 
In this case, the finding indicates that tax evasion by SMEs is repetitive in 
nature. Experience and research (Schneider and Este, 2000) shows that 
SMEs would evades taxes in any way possible all the time rather than in 
situationally based circumstances - once engaged, it is difficult to stop them 
(as it develops all the time according to the principle of running water; it 
adjusts to changes in taxes, to sanctions from tax authorities and to general 
moral attitudes and so forth). 
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(H) Is tax evasion by SMEs in Malaysia characteristically deliberate 
(intentional) or accidental (unintentional) in nature? 
SMEs are thought to accidentally and deliberately understate or overstate 
profit so as to pay less or more tax than th ey should (Hasseldine and Kaplan, 
1990). Similarly, Tooley (1992, cited in Tan, 1999) in his research on tax 
practitioner's attitudes towards taxation found that tax practitioners assert 
that their clients (majority are small firms) have the intention to overstate 
deductions or overstate incomes. The finding from this study believed the 
offences to be characteristic of deliberate evasion. This appears to indicate 
that SMEs tend to be deliberately understating the income/profit as to pay 
less tax than they should. In contrast, approximately less than 10 percent of 
SMEs are believed to be involved in accidentally or deliberately overstating 
their income (Table 6.17, Table 6.18, Table 6.31 and Table 6.32). 
10.3.2.2 Hat are thefactors influencing tax evasions by SMEs in Malaysia? 
The findings revealed considerable variability in factors influencing tax evasion by SMEs. 
It appears that tax practitioner's perceived incompetence, corrupt and inadequate staffed tax 
administration. In contrast, SMEs taxpayers in the opinion that the burden of paying tax is 
too great as the factor not paying the right amount of tax and to avoid audit/investigation *as 
the factor for paying right amount of tax. The chances of being detected and penaliscd by 
the tax authority are also another indication that SMEs evade tax. 
10.3.2.3 "at are the approaches and methods used in the tax evasion by SMEs in 
Malaysia? 
There was a split in opinion with regard to the approaches used by SMEs in evading taxes 
with SME taxpayer perceived understatement of gross profit while tax practitioners 
understood overstatement of expenses other than cost of goods sold to be the most 
frequently used method. File data indicated that underreporting of sales and overstating of 
purchases are the largest adjustments in the SMEs tax evasion scheme, put through so as to 
understate their gross profit. This shed light on the method used by SMEs in evading tax. 
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10.3.2.4 What are the roles of tax practitioners? 
The findings revealed that a considerable percentage of SME taxpayers appear to rely on 
tax practitioners. This is because a possibility of increasing complexity in tax law. The 
prevalence of the use of tax practitioners indicates that SMEs can be influenced in their tax 
evasion decision. This also raises some concerns regarding ethical decision-making in tax 
practice, particularly in relation to unprofessional behaviour in tax compliance. The study 
also suggested that tax practitioners in Malaysia play dual roles. Tax practitioner is seen as 
pro tax authority with their role in performing duties within the boundaries of the tax law 
and refusal to continue to act on behalf of SME taxpayers if they did not accept advice on 
the issue of disclosure. Tax practitioners also seen a pro taxpayer, as they appear to be 
exploiters of the tax law by deliberately understate or overstate income/profit of SMEs as to 
pay less or more tax than they should, given that they have unique knowledge df tax law. 
10-3.3 Explore both the actual and potential role of forensic accounting in relation to tax 
evasion 
10.3.3.1 What are theforensic accounting techniquesfor detecting tax evasion 
By definition, forensic accounting is the application of financial accounting and 
investigation standards acceptable by the courts, to address issues in disputes, in the context 
of civil and criminal litigation (Nurse, 2002; Manning, 2000; Bologna and Lindquist, 
1995). 
The literature generally assumes that any detection of tax evasion by an individual or 
corporate automatically leads to full detection and therefore triggers penalties that are 
Proportional to the total amount of evaded taxes. In the real world, however, tax evasion is 
almost never fully detected (Feinstein, 1991; Anderoni et. al., 1998) because it is either too 
far outside the law or completely 'off the book' (Rice, 1992). The use of forensic 
accounting techniques searching for tax misdemeanours by using a mixture of accounting, 
law, computer technology, ethics and criminology have been applied by some tax 
authorities to detect tax evasion. Unfortunately the respective tax authorities closely 
guarded the detailed methods they used. 
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The framework of forensic accounting fitted neatly into reforming the procedure of 
detecting tax evasion among SMEs for the IRB in the new millennium with the introduction 
of criminal tax investigation as opposed to the existing system of civil penalties. Awareness 
of forensic accounting among tax practitioners and IRB personnel are, in general fairly 
good. 
Capital statement/Net worth analysis is considered as overall, the most effective method in 
detecting tax evasion in SMEs compared to ratio/analytical analysis, income reconstruction 
and digital analysis using Benford's law. However, the type and extent of evasion within 
SMEs varies from case to case to such an extent that mostly no two cases are alike; the 
accounting basis methods (ratio/analytical analysis and income reconstruction) are widely 
accepted by the IRB. The capital statement method is used as an appraisal of wealth 
accretion of the personal wealth related to the company cases by the IRB. 
10.3.3.2 To what extent can forensic accounting to be relevant in detecting tax 
evasion by SMEs in Malaysia 
Forensic accounting appears to be suitable for an adoption to detect tax evasion or other 
irregularities by SMEs but new techniques and tool are necessary to perform thorough 
investigations, especially on new types of business or industry such as the computer 
assisted analytical procedures using Benford's Law or Discriminant Function Formulas 
(DIF) currently adopted by US tax authority. While general forensic accounting procedures 
apply to most fields of business, the tax investigators must quickly become knowledgeable 
of industry-specific practices to immediately identify how to approach an investigation so 
as to not only avoid loss of time in the initial stages of work but also to discover 
information which may prove beneficial to the outcome of the cases. 
10.4 Recommendations 
There appears to be considerable scope for improving the tax collection practices of the 
Malaysian tax system so as to deter tax evasion, especially by SMEs. Drawn from the 
research findings of the survey questionnaires, data files- and IRB personnel opinions, 
significant benefits could be derived from making it easy and cost effective for SMEs to 
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meet their obligations. In summary, the sector is characterised by ineffective mechanisms 
for the control of SMEs by the tax authority. the current enforcement system includes a 
detection probability which is low and methods of selecting cases for detection which are 
not efficient. Further, a heavy reliance is placed by the tax authorities on penalties and its 
penalties are inadequate to change the behaviour of the average SMEs. 
The strategy for improvement can be broadly categorised as follows: (1) increase the 
probability of detection; (2) provide environments conducive to voluntary compliance; and 
(3) regulate tax practitioners. 
10.4.1 Increase theprobability ofdetection 
One way to encourage compliance is to increase the probability that tax evasion will be 
detected and penalised. This can be done in two ways- (i) by structuring SMEs' taxpaying 
so as to make tax evasion more visible to the IRB, and (ii) by devoting more resources to 
detecting tax evasion. 
10.4.1.1 Increasing the visibility of tax evasion 
If all the information needed to correctly calculate SMEs' taxes were readily available to 
the IRB, tax evaders would face an enormous risk of getting caught if they attempted to 
evade taxes. Though the IRB has a computerised system in place to take over the manual 
system for some services relating to tax matters, the system is, however, not integrated, not 
technology enabled and not centralised (see Chapter 8, paragraph 8.2). The IRB should 
introduce a cornputerised central master file for handling tax returns and other relevant 
documents. Such a system could enable the IRB to systematically ascertain whether SMEs 
have failed to file tax returns, to check the mathematical accuracy of returns filed, and to 
compare the information contained in a taxpayer's return with the corresponding 
information filed by third parties, in or-der to establish a consolidated central file for each 
SME that is constantly updated and to streamline the classification and selection of tax 
returns for audit or investigation. The effectiveness of the central master file, however, 
depends on the quality and variety of the information reported to the IRB. 
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Currently, SMEs registered with the Registrar of Business are not required to submit 
audited accounts with their tax return. Hence the government and the IRB should consider 
making it mandatory that the accounts of SME businesses be audited. With the 
implementation of this proposal, attitudes towards positive tax compliance behaviour could 
be expected to improve. Moreover, with the implementation of the SAS, tax audit functions 
would be the main focus of the IRB. 
10.4.1.2 Increasing resourcesfor tax evasion detection 
The most costly and familiar enforcement function of the tax authority is the examination 
or audit/investigation of tax returns to detect tax evasion. Most literature has argued that the 
enforcement activity should be based on appropriate selection criteria; over-extensive 
enforcement is impractical since any additional rise in revenue would be offset by increased 
administrative costs. 
A good inforination system, using computers, would facilitate rapid detection of tax 
evaders. Computerisation which integrates a wide array of data would be of great 
significance for the IRB in adopting modem tools for detecting tax evaders, such as using 
computer analysis on the basis of statistical analysis. A computer-based risk analysis and 
case selection system, combined with a significant increase in the electronic capture of IRB 
data, would increase the IRB's potential to analyse data and increase the audit and 
investigation coverage. This would strengthen and increase the efficiency of the IRB in 
detection activities, which are currently dependent on the traditional methods of obtaining 
information from various resources manually, which is not efficient. The IRB could model 
the system on the Discriminant Function Formulas (DIF) adopted by the US tax authority. 
The DIF uses mathematical formulae to establish average taxes paid and weighted averages 
for deductions in the case of each income bracket. The averages are programmed into the 
computer and tax returns are thus compared with the averages. 
Another computer-assisted analytical procedure uses Benford's law. Nigrini (1996) 
concludes that Benford's law, when used correctly, is a useful analytical tool for identifying 
accounts for further analysis and investigation because it does not use aggregated data, 
rather it is conductedon specifics using all the data available. Therefore it should assist the 
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IRB in their quest to detect tax evasion in financial statements so as to increase their ability. 
According to Nigrini (1996), Benford's law provides expected frequencies for the digits in 
tabulated data. The hypothesis is that the human element inherent in fabricated (fraudulent) 
numbers would cause the digits to deviate from the expected frequencies. He developed a 
Distortion Factor Model that allows the direction and extent of manipulation in a data set to 
be quantified. In general, when the actual proportion of lower digits exceeds the expected 
frequencies, the model indicates that the numbers have been manipulated downward and 
need further analysis and investigation, and vice versa. 
Ile IRB should at the same time explore new training and development initiatives to 
support the programme of change in the organisation. This would equip them with the skills 
and necessary knowledge and allow them to develop more effective enforcement and 
prosecution procedures. 
The enforcement activities should also be supported by an appeals system so as to ensure 
the tax off icer remains within the limits of the law. This would also act as the mechanism 
for solving disputes, which could arise during the course of enforcement, between IRB and 
SMEs. The appeals structure might be integrated with the judicial system or a special tax 
court. However, it is recommended that the rules must be simplified and made flexible to 
make it easy and cost effective for SMEs to seek redress that includes representation in 
their personal capacity or by tax practitioners who may not be lawyers. 
The IRB could also establish a special programme that uses other investigatory techniques 
to focus on SMEs in known problem areas, as tax evasion is not restricted and appears to be 
highly concentrated in a particular source of income (Kesselman, 1988; Joulfaian and 
Rider, 1998). 
In addition, to introduce criminal penalties for evasion and other tax offences is 
recommended, as these are rarely imposed in Malaysial", even though the legal system is 
deem to be quite adequate for the enforcement of criminal or civil provisions. The criminal 
Only one taxpayer in Malaysia has been known to be sentenced to imprisonment, for one day in 1989, and a fine of RM750 (L120) for each of the offences for not submitting a tax return (Berita Harian, I November 1989). 
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penalties publicly condemn tax evasion and deter it by punishing the most egregious 
offenders (Roth, 1989a). On the basis of case studies of several such investigations by the 
IRS, they concluded that the widely publicised arrest, indictment, trial and conviction in 
these investigations appeared to produce at least a temporary decreases in levels of tax 
evasion activities. 
An effective penalty regime also needs to be introduced. Penalties are generally higher 
under the SAS/voluntary system because of the fact that returns or computations are 
accepted at face value by the IRB. Any penalty regime will need to distinguish between 
circumstances in which SME taxpayers either intentionally or unintentionally evade taxes. 
Working with other government agencies could also be of benefit in providing new 
information to the IRB. Integrating the information not only ensures that adequate 
information is gathered but also that cost is minimised by avoiding duplication and 
overlapping information or procedures. This would also strengthen the efforts of all of the 
enforcement agencies of the nation in the fight against irregularities within SMEs. 
The public must also witness the serious attempts of the IRB to punish tax evaders. By 
publicising the imposition of penalties, the IRB would be sending a deterrent message to 
others who were contemplating violating tax laws that they may suffer a similar fate. 
10.4.2 Provide environments conducive to voluntary compliance 
Owing to the lack or inadequacy of information, especially in SMEs, the IRB can assess the 
taxes on the basis of notional or presumptive income rather than on the basis of the income 
the SMEs actually received or to which they are legally entitled, which is known as 
for-fait'01. The rationale for the use of this method derives from the assumption that it is 
unrealistic to expect SMEs with turnovers below certain levels to keep the kind of records 
needed for the determinations of their actual income and that a certain proportion of tax 
revenue due from such business will be lost through * tax evasion because the tax 
administration cannot make adequate verification of actual income reported in each case, 
given the large number of business involved (United Nations, 1997). 
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Under theforfait assessment method, the determination of taxable income is the outcome of 
consultations between the tax administration and taxpayers. The tax administration 
estimates the general expenses and incomes of taxpayers on the basis of a minimum of 
information provided by the latter or available in their files with the tax administration or 
derived from general economic data. The aim here is to determine the taxpayer's normal 
income, in other words, not the income which the taxpayer in fact earns in a taxable year 
but the amount that a business which can be compared to the taxpayer's business would 
normally earn on an average basis. 
In general, forfait assessment is simple and makes it possible to carry out an assessment 
when this cannot be done on the basis of actual income. The method also eliminates 
requests for refunds and enables the IRB to use the limited number of skilled staff available 
to combat tax evasion. However, in order to ensure that this assessment method is applied 
in an effective manner, a substantial amount of general information must be assembled in 
advance to enable the IRB staff who make assessments by this method to become fully 
acquainted with the business activities of the taxpayers and hence to be capable of weighing 
the validity of the arguments and supporting documents submitted to them. 
Currently, tax law in Malaysia requires tax deductions at source from the following income 
of a resident individual: salary or wages and interest. Taking 'into account their 
effectiveness in reducing the scope of tax evasion, the IRB should adopt this withholding 
system as extensively as possible to SMEs. Such a withholding system should not, 
however, impose additional costs on those people who are responsible for making 
deductions or who must disclose their income to the IRB. The industries that would be 
covered by the withholding system should be those in which compliance has been low. A 
greater use of withholding may lead to an increased willingness of taxpayers to submit 
returns, especially if deduction of tax at source results in slight overpayment. 
The IRB could also consider setting up SME advisory services. The role of the advisory 
service would be to provide assistance with meeting tax obligations, with a view to 
improving voluntary compliance. 
10.2 Forfait or methode forfaitaire originated in France. 
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The emphasis would be on providing information and support as early as possible in the 
business's life cycle, because many SMEs fail in the first two years of operation or are 
closed down by taxpayers so as to avoid paying the tax on their operations. Providing 
services early reduces the risk of tax evasion and the risk of a business failure/close down 
because of tax requirement. 
10.4.3 Regulating taxpractitioners 
Tax practitioners who prepare tax returns or advise clients about tax matters provide an 
important component of the tax system. Since more than half of all SMEs' tax returns in 
Malaysia are believed to be prepared by the tax practitioners every year (Table 6.29, Q2.1 
and Q2.2), they affect a much larger proportion of returns than IRB examiners. Although 
the final responsibility for the contents of a tax return legally rests with the taxpayer, the 
return is completed on the advice of the tax practitioners, who bear limited responsibility 
for the advice given. 
As observed in this study, a significant number of the tax practitioners believe they either 
accidentally or deliberately understate or overstate profit/income for their clients so that 
they pay more or less tax than they should. One source of IRB control in this area is from 
its authority to administer and enforce regulations governing administrative proceedings 
within the IRB. Tax practitioners are more easily monitored than SME taxpayers since they 
are a much smaller group. 
Currently, section 153 of the ITA provides for tax practitioners. Subsection I states that No 
person holding himself out as a tax agent, a tax consultant or a tax adviser (or under any 
other like description) shall be permitted to act in Malaysia on behatrof any personfor any 
of the purposes of this Act unless he is a tax agent as defined in this section. Their duties 
and responsibilities are governed by the code of conduct recently issued by the IRB and 
they can be disciplined by a fine, the amount of which can be between RM2,000.00 and 
RM20,000.00, or imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine and imprisonment, 
as stated in the ITA (amendment) 1999. 
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As a stringent measure, a further legislative provision along the lines of one in the US is 
proposed as follows: 
7he Director General of the Inland Revenue (DGIR) may reprimand or institute 
proceedings to suspend or disbar any tax agent who the DGIR has reason to believe 
violated the rules ofpractice. Except in certain unusual circumstances, the DGIR will not 
institute a proceedingfor suspension or disbarment against practitioners until thefacts (or 
conduct) which may warrant such action have been given in writing to that practitioner and 
the practitioner has been given the opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with 
the rules. 
10.5 Suggestions for further research 
As very little research of this kind has been conducted in Malaysia, the opportunity exists to 
build upon this empirical work by initiating further studies and substantiating what has 
already been achieved and defined. Further research is necessary in Malaysia in order to 
gain credence and credibility such as that in developed countries. An international 
comparison of tax policies for the SNIEs would provide opportunities to improve and 
eradicate tax evasion in Malaysia. 
It is also necessary that future research be undertaken to assist the IRB to develop and 
refine more sophisticated techniques that would enable it to detect tax evasion in general. 
Given the increasing sophistication of such tax evasion activities, failure to develop and 
refine detection techniques will render the IRB less effective than they should be. Thus, 
developing and refining the techniques is an urgent initiative for the IRB to enhance the 
investigation and enforcement officers' ability to investigate and prosecute those involved 
in tax evasion. 
Given the lack of research on corporate income tax evasion, as pointed out by Rice (1992), 
the methodology could also be duplicated for large corporate enterprises. This could further 
assist the IRB in reducing corporate tax evasion in Malaysia. 
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With the introduction of the SAS, most taxpayers will depend on tax practitioners for tax 
advice and assistance. As a consequence, tax practitioners are therefore in a position to 
exert a strong and direct influence on the compliance and tax administration process (Erard, 
1993). It is important that Malaysian tax practitioners be constantly reminded of their duties 
and obligations to assist clients in paying the proper amount of taxes. Thus, another aspect 
of future research could be to investigate the relationships of tax practitioners to the 
population at large with a view toward integrating these practitioners' roles more fully into 
the compliance system in Malaysia. 
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CONFIDENTIAL 
TAX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
OUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY 
The survey is carried out to crucially support a doctoral research study under the supervision 
of Professor Claire Marston and Professor Jim Haslam, Division of Accountancy and Finance, 
Heriot-Watt University. The study investigates the scope and significance of tax evasion and 
forensic accounting in Malaysia. its aim is to gain insights into the extent, impact and 
understanding of cases of tax evasion in practice by SMEs. It also aims to explore the actual 
and potential role of forensic accounting in relation to tax evasion for the Inland Revenue 
Board of Malaysia. 
You have been selected randomly as a respondent for this questionnaire. I assure you that 
replies are completely anonymous and will be carefully protected. It is not possible to trace 
any questionnaire to identify the person completing it. I would like to stress that all of the 
information provided will be kept strictly confidential. PLEASE NOTE that this Information 
will not be provided to anyone and the questionnaire will be destroyed once the 
research has been completed. 
I hope that you will find time from your busy schedule to complete the questions. It Is very 
important for me. On completing, please return the questionnaire in the stamped addressed 
envelope provided as soon as possible. 
Thank you In advance for your co-operation In support for this research study. 
If you have any queries about the study please do not hesitate to contact me: 
Nik Abdullah Sani Bin Nik Mohamed 
Ph. D. Student 
Division of Accountancy and Finance 
School of Management and Language 
Heriot-Watt University 
Edinburgh 
EH14 4AS 
United Kingdom. 
Email: N. S. NiLb-MLohamed@hw. ac. uk Tel: 44 (0) 131 - 451 5111 ext. 3273 261 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
TAX EVASION BY SMES AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
To promote common understanding of terms and concepts used in this questionnaire and to 
facilitate responses, a brief glossary of main terms is provided. 
Definition of terms used in this study 
"IRB" refers to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia. 
"SIVIE" (Small and Medium Enterprise) refers in this context as follows: 
L) Self employed people/Sole Proprietor 
13 Partnership 
13 Turnover of less than RM25 million 
13 Employee size not exceeding 150 
LI Companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, including those registered 
under the Registrar of Business. 
"Tax Evasion" constitutes a breach of Income Tax Act 1967. 
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PART 1: TAX EVASION BY SMEs AND FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 
The purpose of this section is to obtain a general view on tax evasion in SMEs and forensic accounting. /t is 
commonly believed that SMEs exhibits high rates of tax evasion and this is attributed to various factors. The 
questions below will enable this study to provide some insight into the phenomenon of the tax evasion 
and the role of forensic accounting including gauging what are the elements that effect tax evasion by SMEs 
and its detection in Malaysia. 
Question 1.1 
In your opinion, do most of the SMEs evade tax? 
Please tick the appropriate box. 
Yes 
No 
Do not know 
Please explain briefly if possible: 
Ouestion 1.2 
F-1 Please explain 
F-I Please explain and go to Question 1.9 
F-1 Go to Question 1.9 
To the best of your ability, please estimate the percentages of SMEs that evade tax in Malaysia. 
Please tick the appropriate box. 
Less than 25% F-l 
Between 25% to 50% F-1 
Between 50% to 75% F-1 
More than 75% F-1 
263 Q., Tax Practitioner 
Question 1.3 
The following are understood to be common methods for generating tax evaded income in SMEs. 
Please tick one method which you think Is th e most frequently used in generating tax evaded income 
in SMEs in Malaysia. 
Complete suppression of gross profit F-1 
Understatement of gross profit 
F7 
Overstatement of expenses 
(other than cost of goods sold) 
Understatement of assets (including 
property and inventories) 
Other (please specify) 
..................................................... ..................................................... 
F-1 
For the most frequently used method indicated above, please briefly indicate the common approaches 
to its application, In your view. 
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Quesfion 1.4 
The following are the factors which may lead to tax evasion and related manipulation in SMEs. Please 
tick one factor which you think Is the most common factor that may lead to tax evasion and related 
rnanipulation in SMEs In Malaysia. 
Loopholes in tax system F71 
Applying the wrong accounting principle 
/concept F -1 
Incompetent, corrupt and inadequatetly 
staffed tax administration setup. 
Tax Authority unable to enforce the 
penal and civil provision of the prevailing 
tax code 
Tax Authority unwilling to enforce the 
penal and civil provision of the prevailing 
tax code 
Other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
..................................................... 
Please explain briefly your above choice: 
F-1 
F-I 
F-1 
F-71 
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Questiotion 1.5 
In your opinion, is tax evasion cyclical in some SMEs? Cyclical mean it happens within a specific period 
or circumstances for example once in every ten year period. 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Yes F-I 
No F-I 
oo not know F-I 
please briefly explain further your answer: 
C)uestion 1.6 
Irl your opinion, is tax evasion a repetitive action by some SMEs? Repetitive means a yeady affair done by 
SMEs. Please tick the appropriate box. 
yes 
No 
[)o not know 
please briefly explain further your answer 
Fl 
F_ý 
r71 
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Question 1.7 
In your opinion, which Is the most likely period in which SIVIEs will evade taxes? Please tick one period 
vvhich you think is the most common period that SMEs will evade taxes. 
Early stage of the business F-1 
jr, a period of high inflation F-I 
The period of economic boom F-1 
The period of economic downturn F-1 
All the time 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
please briefly explain your above choice: 
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Question 1.8 
please indicate three (3) methods which in your opinion might help to deter tax evasion and briefly explain 
your choice. 
-1) Method one and briefly explain your choice: 
2) Method two and briefly explain your choice: 
Method three and briefly explain your choice: 
if you have not answered the above please tick the appropriate box. 
No Opinion F-I 
Other (please specifý) F-1 
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TEXT BOUND 
INTO 
THE SPINE 
C)u0stion 1.9 
ThO following are the common methods for detecting tax evasion used by the Revenue Authority. 
How would you rate the effectiveness of the method in detecting tax evasion. 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Very 
poor Poor Average Good 
1 2 3 4 
Ar, - alytical Review/Ratio Analysis F-1 
C, a Pital Statement/Net Worth Analysis F F F 
IrIC: orne Reconstruction E] El F-1 E-: 1 
Digital Analysis Using Benford's Law 
(analysis Of digit and number patterns to 
detect abnormal recurrences of digits, F-1 F-7 
digit combinations and number patterns) 
other ( please specify) 
...................................................... 
E] 
other pf ease s pecify) 
...................................................... ...................................................... 
please briefly explain your above rankings: 
Very 
good 
5 
Fl 
F-I 
F-1 
F--i 
71 
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., 40uestion 1.10 
VVtIat is your understanding of Forensic Accounting? Please tick the appropriate box. 
Forensic accounting is the application of financial skill and an investigative mentality, conducted within the 
C. ontext of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it encompasses financial expertise, fraud knowledge and 
a strong knowledge and understanding of business reality and the working of the legal system. According 
to some of its advocates it looks beyond the numbers and deals with the business reality of the situation 
None r-1 
poor F-1 
Average 1-71 
Good F-I 
Very Good F-I 
plesse explain briefly if possible: 
Cluestion 1.1i 
in your opinion is there a better way to detect tax evasion by SMEs than forensic accounting 
. 
techniques? 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Yes F-I 
NO 
C)O not Know 
please explain briefly if possible. If you have answered 'Yes' kindly explain your technique. 
PART II: PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND INTEGRITY 
Question 2.1 
Do you think tax practitioners, whether due to client pressure or for whatever reasons, accidentally 
or deliberately understate their client's profit so that they have had to pay less income tax 
than they should. Please tick the appropriate box. 
yes F-I 
No F-1 Go to Question 2.2 
prefer not to reply F--j Go to Question 2.2 
if you have answered 'Yes, to what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax practitioners are involved? 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Accidentally Deliberately 
understate understate 
Less than 10% of tax practitioners F-1 F-1 
E3etween 10% to 25% of tax practitioners F-I F-1 
E3etween 25% to 50% of tax practitioners 
F-1 71 
13etween 50% to 75% of tax practitioners F-1 F7 
More than 75% of tax practitioners F-1 F-1 
please briefly explain the approaches commonly used by the tax practitioners: 
271 0: Tax Practitionot 
Ouestion 2.2 
Do you think tax practitioners, whether due to client pressure or for whatever reasons, accidentally 
or deliberately overstate their client's profit so that they have had to pay more income tax 
trjan they should. Please tick the appropriate box. 
yes 
No 
F)refer not to reply 
F-1 
F-I Go to Question 2.3 
F-1 Go to Question 2.3 
If you have answered 'Yes', to what extent (in percentage) do you think, tax practitioners are involved? 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Accidentally Deliberately 
overstate overstate 
Les5 than 10% of tax practitioners F-1 F-I 
E3etween 10% to 25% of tax practitioners F] 1: 1 
B e'tween 25% to 50% of tax practitioners 
17 F-1 
13etween 50% to 75% of tax practitioners Fý F-1 
More than 75% of tax practitioners F-1 F-1 
please briefly explain the approaches commonly used by the tax practitioners: 
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'C: )uestion 2.3 
Innagine yourself in this situation: 
C)r-je of your client has been paid RM100,000 in cash for work that was done outside the regularjob. 
As a tax practitioner which action would you take in reporting that income to IRB. 
p14--ase tick the appropriate action. 
Nolt - declare it F-1 
Declare only a portion of it 
F-1 
Declare it in the most advantagenous 
nner within the l F -1 ma aw 
Declare as advised by the client F-I 
other (please specify) 
..................................................... 
..................................................... 
F-] 
C)Uestion 2.4 
What do you think the chances are that your client will get caught by the I RB if they/tax practitioner reported 
less/none of the income above (Question 2.3). 
please tick the appropriate box. 
None 
Less than 25% F 
l3etween 25% to 50% 
E3etween 50% to 75% F-1 
More than 75% r 71 
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Question 2.5 
What action do you think tax practitioner should take, if client does not accept advise on an 
issue of 
disclosure. Please tick the most appropriate action. 
I r-iform IRB 
Refuse to complete the tax return 
Refuse to continue to act for the client E: 1 
Fill in incorrect return and inform the IRB 
C)ther (please specify) 
..................................................... 
... .................................................... 
Question 2.6 
How many of your SME clients have been investigated/audited by the IRB on average per year over the 
last five years. Please tick the appropriate box. 
None F-I 
Less than 10 clients F71 
10 - 50 clients 
F-I 
More than 50 clients F-I 
p^RT III: YOU AND YOUR FIRM 
Sorne personal information to help in clas 
Ljostion, 3.1: Age 
20 years and below 
21 to 30 years 
31 to 40 years 
41 to 50 years 
50 years and above 
QLjestion 3.2: Ethnkity 
sifying your response. Please tick In the appropriate 
box. 
F-I 
F-71 
F-I 
F-I 
F-1 
Malay Fý 
Chinese 
Indian 
Other (please specify) 
.............................. 
F7 
n Quest/0 3-3., Gender 
Male E: 1 
Female 
Question 3.4: Member of Professional Bodies 
MIA/MACPA 
ACCA/CA 
MIT 
r, 4ATAIAgent under Sec 153 of Income F-1 
i Tqx Act 1967 
Other (please specify) 
F7 
.............................. 
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Question 3.5., Number of years of tax experience 
Less than 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
More than 10 years 
auestion 3.6: Number of SME Clients 
Less than 100 clients 
100 to 500 clients 
501 to 1,000 clients 
More than 1,000 clients 
Ouestion 3.7. Location 
West Malaysia: 
Western Region (KL, Selangor) 
F-astern Region (Pahang, Terengganu, 
Kelantan) 
Northern Region (Perlis, Kedah, 
Pulau Pinang, Perak) 
Southern Region (N. Sembilan, Melaka, 
Johor) 
East Malaysia: 
Sabah 
Sarawak 
F-1 
F-1 
F-I 
r-i 
F] 
r-i 
F-71 
Fý 
F-1 
F71 
F-1 
F-I 
F-I 
276 (): Tax proctitionor 
pAF; tT IV: GENERAL OPINIONS 
If yc)u have any opinions or ideas about tax evasion by SMEs and the role of forensic accounting 
ote-Ctiniques that have not been covered in this survey, please can you explain further. 
;i 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION - IT IS MUCH APPRECIATED 
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 
OR NOT LATER THAN 30th April 2003 
'Fof: z 
vxrE REPLY RECEIVED 
SFpLY NUMBER 
0. Tax Proctitionor 
APPENDIX 11 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: 
SME TAXPAYER 
TAX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF 
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MAL"SIAN PERSPECTIVE 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: TAXPAYER 
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-T-AX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Cl U ESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
pLJRPOSE OF THE SURVEY 
-rhe survey is carried out to crucially support a doctoral research study under the supervision 
c)f -Professor 
Claire Marston and Professor Jim Haslam, Division of Accountancy and Finance, 
Heriot-Watt University. The study investigates the scope and significance of tax evasion and 
f c)rensic accounting in Malaysia. Its aim is to gain insights into the extent, impact and 
Ljnderstanding of cases of tax evasion in practice by SMEs. It also aims to explore the actual 
and potential role of forensic accounting in relation to tax evasion for the Inland Revenue 
E3oard of Malaysia. 
you have been selected randomly as a respondent for this questionnaire. I assure you that 
replies are completely anonymous and will be carefully protected. It, is not possible to trace 
any questionnaire to identify the person completing it. I would like to stress that all of tho 
information provided will be kept strictly confidential. PLEASE NOTE that this Information 
will not be provided to anyone and the questionnaire will be destroyed onco tho 
research has been completed. 
I hope that you will find time from your busy schedule to complete the questions. It is vory 
iMportant for me. On completing, please return the questionnaire In the. stamped addrossod 
envelope provided as soon as possible 
Thank you In advance for your co-operation In support for this research study. 
If you have any queries about the study please do not hesitate to contact me: 
Nik Abdullah Sani Bin Nik Mohamed 
ph. D. Student 
C)ivision of Accountancy and Finance 
School of Management and Language 
Heriot-Watt University 
Edinburgh 
EH14 4AS 
Urlited Kingdom. 
email: N. S. Nik Mohamed@hwacuk 
Tel: 44 (0) 131 - 451 5111 ext. 3273 280 
Q: Covering Letter 
ý'CIU 
ESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
-rAX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
-rcp promote common understanding of terms and concepts used in this questionnaire and to 
facilitate responses, a brief glossary of main terms is provided. 
Definition of terms used in this study 
F1 B" refers to the Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia. 
--SME" (Small and Medium Enterprise) refers in this context as follows: 
0 Self employed people/Sole Proprietor 
El Partnership 
C3 Turnover of less than RM25 million 
0 Employee size not exceeding 150 
13 Companies incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, including those registered 
under the Registrar of Business. 
--rax Evasion" constitutes a breach of Income Tax Act 1967. 
281 
0: Dofinition 
Fo^lz-T 1: TAX EVASION AND SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SMES) IN MALAYSIA 
believed 
T, ha purpose of this section is to obtain a general view On tax evasion in the SMES. It is Commonly 
0 11 ? at SMES exhibit high rates of tax evasion and this is attributed to various factors. 
The questions 
fýý14: 7vv will enable this study to provide some insights into the phenomenon of tax evasion by SMES 
11, in, cluding gauging what are the elements that effect tax evasion by SMES in Malaysia- 
QUestion 1.1 
', Tcp what extent do you agree With the follovAng statements about tax evasion? 
ýpjea-se tick the appropriate box for each statement. 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree Disagree Uncertain Agree agree 
234 5 
Tgpc evasion is common in Malaysia E: 1 El ED F-1 
TO)c evasion is a fraud that is committed 
against the government F-I 
TO)c evasion is justified if the tax system 
is unfair El 17 
There is nothing morally wrong with 
paying less than the proper amount 
F-1 (arTiount that one ought to pay according EJ E: 1 
to the law) 
Tax evasion is a special form of 
gambling: gambling for extra income ED ID 
jr, light of the likelihood of detection 
ED 
and the imposition of penalties. 
C)ther (please specify) 
...................................................... 
...................................................... 
282 0: Toxpayor 
Question 1.2 
-The 
following Is a list of some of the main factors why SMEs do not pay the right amount of 
tax. Please 
tick one factor which you think is the most important factor. 
-T-he burden of paying tax is too great. F-71 
They think everyone else fiddles their 
x 
17 
ta . 
inefficiency of tax administration F-1 
r, omplication of Malaysian Income Tax 
Law F-1 
-rhe tax system is unfair ED 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
Question 1.3 
'The following is a list of some of the main factors why SMEs do pay the right amount of 
tax. Please tick 
cme factor which you think is most important factor. 
-rhe threat of fine/penalties 
The threat of being caught 
To avoid audit/investigation by IRB 
They think other people are honest In 
paying tax. 
-rhey believe in paying their fair share 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
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1-71 
1-71 
F-_i 
Fl 
0: Toxpayor 
TEXT BOUND 
INTO 
THE SPINE 
UL-_stion 1.4 
V hic-h of the following business practices would you regard as morally acceptable? 
3ýj, &O-se indicate I for not at all acceptable ... 5 for perfectly acceptable. (Tick the appropriate box) 
Not at all 
acceptable 
1 2 3 
, 4,:, t filing in tax returns D 
Mcýt reporting all business income D ED EJ 
Repc)rting main income, but not some 
I incom El El E] e , ttler 
ýj - overstating business expenses ED 
Bei rig paid in cash for a job and not 
411repc)rting it on tax returns 
Nc2r" disclosure of fact to the tax agent r7 F-1 E] 
Writirig off personal expenses as 
business expenses EJ 0 E: 1 
C)ther (please specify) F-I F-I 0 
...................................................... ...................................................... other (please specify) 
..................................................... 
..................................................... 
F-I F-I F-I 
Perfectly 
acceptable 
4 5 
F-I F-I 
f7i F-1 
F-1 F-I 
F-1 Fi 
F, I F-I 
F-I M 
F-1 F-I 
71 m 
1--1 171 
4 
E 
t 
284 0: Toxpayer 
Cauestion 1.5 
I r, your opinion what Proportion of SMEs do the follovAng?. 
please tick the appropriate box. 
None 
p4ot filing in tax returns F-1 
r4cA reporting all business Income F-1 
F: zeporting main income, but not some 
her income El ot 
overstating business expenses 
F-1 
13eing paid in cash for a job and not 
ortin it t t 
F-1 
g on , rep ax re urns 
,N con disclosure of fact to the tax agent EJ 
VVriting off personal expenses as 
u siness ex enses 
E: 1 
b p 
(: )ther (please specify) 
. .................................................... 
ED 
. .................................................... 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
.................................. 
ED 
F, 
Few Half Most All 
F-1 ED m F-1 
D ED F-1 F-1 
Ej D F-1 E: 1 
E: 1 EJ m 
El F-1 m ED 
E: 1 D 0 F7 
ED ED F-I F-I 
D F-i ED F7 
EI] Ei] n r71 
0: Toxpilyor 
Question 1.5 
In your opinion what proportion of SMEs do the following?. 
Please tick the appropriate box. 
Not filing In tax returns 
Not reporting all business income 
Reporting main Income, but not some 
other income 
Overstating business expenses 
Being paid in cash for a job and not 
reporting it on tax returns 
Non disclosure of fact to the tax agent 
Writing off personal expenses as 
business expenses 
Other (please specify) 
Other (please specify) 
............................. 
............................. 
None Few Half Most All 
E] F-I F--I ID 
0 F-I 0 El 1: 1 
0 [: ] El [--I ED 
F-I F-1 F-: ] ED 
ED 
F-I 
D E-1 F-I 0 
ED F-I F7 0 F-I 
285 Q: Taxpayer 
6L 
je stion 1.6 
in your opinion, to what extent (in percentage), if any, do you think that SMEs are evading taxes. 
jzq, ease tick the appropriate box. 
4 
None F-1 
Less than 25% of SMEs F-I 
Between 25% to 50% of SMEs F-1 
EWtween 50% to 75% of SMEs F-1 
More than 75% of SMEs F-1 
please explain briefly if possible: 
. ouestion 
1.7 
In your opinion, to what extent (in percentage), if any, do you think tax evading SMEs are caught by the IRB. 
please tick the appropriate box. 
NOne F-I 
Less than 25% F-1 
Between 25% to 50% F-1 
EWtween W% to 75% r-l 
More than 75% F-1 
, plegise explain briefly if possible: 
286 0: Taxpayer 
auestion 1.8 
I ri your opinion, which Is the most likely period in which SMES will evade taxes? Please 
tick one period 
ýWhich you think Is the most common period that SMEs will evade taxes. 
arly stage of the business ED 
in a Period of high Inflation F-1 
II 
, 
Me period of economic boom D 
I- 
Me period of economic downturn D 
1, 
A11 the time 
E] 
Cnher (please specifý) El 
...................................................... 
please explain briefly if possible: 
ouesbon 1.9 
The following are the methods for generating tax evaded income in SMEs. Please tkk one method which 
you 
think is the most frequently used in generating tax evaded income in SMEs in Malaysia. 
C; cimplete suppression of gross profit 
tjnderstatement of gross profit 
C)verstatement of expenses El 
(other than cost of goods sold) 
(jriderstatement of assets (including 
property and inventories) 
other (please specify) 
... ................................................... 
...................................................... 
please explain briefly if possible: 
287 Q: Taxpayer 
4Duestion 1.10 
please Indicate three (3) methods which In your opinion might help to deter tax evasion by SMEs and 
, 11 1: ýPriiefly explain your choice. 
Method one and bdefly explain your choice: 
ý Method two and briefly explain your chofce. ' 
Method three and briefly explain your choice: 
If you have not answered the above question please tick the appropriate box: 
No opinion 
F-I 
Other (please specify) Fý 
288 Q: Taxpayer 
PART ll: YOU AND YOUR SME 
auestion 2.1 
VVho keeps the accounbng records/books of your business? Please tick the appropriate 
box. 
: Self F-I 
Spouselpartner F-I 
Friends F-I 
F_mployee 
F-I 
ACCOuntant/Tax Practitioner 
ID 
Not Applicable 
E-J please explain briefly 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
ED 
ouesbon 2.2 
Who deals vvith tax matters for your business? Please tick the appropriate box. 
self F-I 
Spouselpartner F-I 
Friends F-I 
employee F-I 
Accountant/Tax Practitioner 
Not Applicable 
other (please specify) 
...................................................... 
D 
Please explain briefly 
289 0: Taxpayer 
CýjLjestion 2.3 
1111 th your tax ma ers? 
Please tick the 
t4ave you ever switched accountantAax practitioner in dealing 
W tt 
ýI jvPPrOPrIate box. 
f4 C) 
prefer not to reply 
- 
Ii 
t4ot applicable 
please explain briefly if possible: 
ouesUon 2.4 
Imagine yourself in this situation: 
You have been paid RM1 00,000 cash for work that you have done outside your regular 
Job. Please 
tick the appropriate action that you will take. 
Not declare it El 
Declare only a portion of it 
ED 
Declare it In the most advantagenous 
Manner within the law 
El 
Declare it but offset it either by 
Linderstatement of gross profit or 
overstatement of expenses so as to 
pay less tax 
Other (please specify) 
0 
...................................................... 
290 0: 
Taxpayer 
4:: juestion 2.5 
j>o you think SMEs/taxpayers for whatever reasons, ever accidentally or deliberately understate their profit and 
ay less income tax than they should. Please tick the appropriate box. 
yes 0 
140 Go to Question 2.6 
prefer not to reply Go to Question 2.6 
if you have answered 'Yes'. to what extent (in percentage) do you think, SIVIEs are involved? 
flease tick the appropriate box. 
Accidentally Deliberately 
understate understate 
Less than 10% of SIVIEs F-71 El 
E; etween 10% to 25% of SMEs F-I F-I 
Ewtween 25% to 50% of SMEs ED F-1 
f3oetween 50% to 75% of SMES Fý F-I 
More than 75% of SMEs F-1 Fl 
please explain briefly if possible and Outline the approaches commonly used: 
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4CIuesUon 2.6 
1 
it and Do you think SMEs/ taxpayers for whatever reasons, ever accidentally or deliberately overstate their profi 
iýay more tax than they should. Please tick the appropriate box. 
lI 
y Y I es F 
r4o Go to Question 2.7 
,, Prefer not to reply Go to 
Question 2.7 
if you have answeredYes', to what extent (in percentage) do you think, SMEs are involved? 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Accidentally Deliberately 
overstate overstate 
Less than 10% of SMEs 1: 1 F-1 
Between 10% to 25% of SMEs F-I Fý 
Between 25% to 50% of SMEs 
El 0 
Between 50% to 75% of SMES El F7 
More than 75% of SMEs Fý 0 
please explain briefly if possible and oubine the approaches commonly used: 
292 0: Taxpayer 
Ouestion 2.7 
00 You have any other Interest in other SIVIE businesses (associate, subsidiary or wholly owned company 
iii-irJuding sole proprietorship, partnership etc. ) Please tick the appropriate box. 
'Yes F 
r-40 r 71 Go to Question 2.9 
Prefer not to reply F-1 Go to Question 2.9 
Ouestion 2.8 
Please Indicate the number of business that you have an interest in either through direct or indirect 
Shareholding Inc: Juding sole proprietorship, partnership etc. Please tick the appropriate box. 
Less than 5 
6 to 10 
More than 10 r7 
prefer not to reply F7 
C)uestion 2.9 
Have you any dealings with tax haven counbies? (For example banking facilities etc. ) 
please tick the appropriate box. 
Yes Fi 
NO F-I 
prefer not to reply F-I 
o uesbon 2.10 
Have You been audited/investigated by the IRB in the last 10 years? 
yes F-I 
NO f7 
prefer not to reply F-1 
293 Q: Taxpayer 
Fw^RT III: PARTICULARS OF RESPONDENT 
ri Sc), me personal Information to help in classifying your response. Please tick the approp ate 
box. 
eshon 3.1 Business category., 
Sole proprietorship/Self employed El 
Partnership 
ED 
Limited Company (Sdn. 13hd) 
El 
Other (please specify) 
.............................. 
Cluestion 3.2 Number of Employee 
Less than 25 F-I 
Between 25 to 50 
il 
El 
Between 50 to 75 
ED 
Between 75 to 100 
More than 100 
(Weston 3.3 Average Turnover Per Year 
Less than RM5 million 
ID 
f3etween RM5 million to RMIO million 
Between RM10 million to RM15 million 
Between RM 15 million to RM25 million 
17 
294 0: Taxpayer 
CWostion 3.4 Ethnklty: 
Malay F-1 
Chinese 
Indian 
Others(please specify) 
E-3 
................................ 
otiestion3.5 Gender. 
Male 
0 
Female El 
otiesfion3.6 Age: 
20 years and below 
F-1 
21 to 30 years 
F-I 
31 to 40 years 
F-I 
41 to 50 years 
50 years and above 
Question 3.7 Highest level of education 
Primary School 17 
SPMorPMR 0 
STPM or Diploma 
ID 
First degree and above 
17 
Other (please specify) 
............................. 
F-71 
I 
295 Q: Taxpayer 
auestion 3.8 Profession: 
Professional (self employed/ 
Sole proprietorship) 
Partner In a partnership firm 
Company Director 
Employee 
Other (please specify) 
.............................. 
Ouestion 3.9 Location: 
West Malaysia 
Westem RegiorXKL, Selangor) 
Eastern Region(Pahang, Terengganu, 
Kelantan) 
Northern Region(Perlis, Kedah, 
Pulau Pinang, Perak) 
Sourthern Region(N. Sembilan, Melaka, 
Johor) 
East Malaysla 
Sabah 
Sarawak 
F-1 
r71 
F--i 
Fl 
Fl 
F-1 
F-I 
F-1 
F-1 
F-1 
F-1 
296 Q: Taxpayer 
I 40uestion 18 Profession: 
Professional (self employed/ 
Sole proprietorship) 
F-I 
Partner In a partnership firm 
Company Director 
Employee 
Other (please specify) 
.............................. 
r71 
Fl 
r-i 
Fl 
Ouestion 3.9 Location: 
West Malaysia 
Westem ReglorýKLSelangor) F-I 
Eastern Region(Pahang, Terengganu, 
Kelantan) 
Northern Region(Perlis. Kedah, 
Pulau Pinang, Perak) 
Sourthem Region(N. Sembilan, Melaka, 
Johor) 
East Malaysia 
Sabah 
Sarawak 
F-I 
F-1 
F-I 
F-I 
F-I 
296 Q: Taxpayer 
PART IV: GENERAL OPINIONS 
If you have any opinions or ideas about tax evasion by SMEs and the role of forensic accounting 
techniques that have not been covered In this survey, please can you explain further. 
[Forensic accounting is the application of financial skill and an Investigative mentality, conducted within 
the context of rules of evidence. As a discipline, it encompasses financial expertise, fraud knowledge 
and a strong knowledge and understanding of business reality and the working of the legal system. 
According to some of its advocates it looks beyonds the numbers and deals with the business reality 
of the situation. ) 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION - IT IS MUCH APPRECIATED 
PLEASE RETURN THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE 
OR NOT LATER THAN 10 MAY 2003 
FOR DATA ANALYSIS USE ONLY: 
DATE REPLY RECEIVED 
REPLY NUMBER 
IIIIIIIII 
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APPENDIX III 
PRE DESIGN TABULATED FORMAT SHEET 
(FOR FILE DATA ANALYSIS) 
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NOTE TO DATA COLLECTION: FILE REVIEW. 
As to ensure a systematic data gathering the folloviing abbreviation is to be used in 
carrying out the document analysis. 
HEADINGS PARTICULARS 
No. Listing the numbers of document/file analysed. 
Master Register A register where the sample will be base. The name of the SMEs 
Number (MR. will be replaced with the MR. No. as to camouflage the SMEs 
No. ) selected for the review inline with the secrecy provision of the 
Income Tax Act. 
Business SMEs categorised within the research. 
Category/ 
Principle To indicate in the column with the number provided., 
Activity For example if the sample is small limited company then the code 
will be 5. 
1. Director 
2. Management of SME 
3. Sole proprietor/Self Employed 
4. Partnership 
5. Small limited company [Sdn Bhdj 
Plus to fill in the nature of business e. g. grocery, stall trader etc. 
Year of List the year the case is investigated. 
investigation 
A: Methods of evasion used by the taxpayers: 
Fill in the column with the number provided. 
For example if the method used is understatement of gross profit 
by using fictitious purchases then the code will be 2. A. a 
1: Complete suppression of gross profit 
2: Understatement of gross profit 
A: Purchases 
a. Fictitious purchases possibly supported by false invoices 
b. Inflated invoices covering an element of personal drawings 
C. Ante-dated purchases 
d. Private expenditure included in purchases 
e. Capital expenditure included in purchases 
f. Excessive reserves for liability 
9. Omitted rebates or allowances L------ E--[-ý-P-ýýýýLrchases 
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1. Others 
B: Sales 
a. Omitted cash sales 
b. Omitted cash sales cheques received are paid into private 
accounts 
C. Sales cancelled by means of false credits notes or false written 
off as bad debts 
d. Post dated sales 
e. Under valuation or omission of debtors 
f. Lump sum deduction from total sales 
g. Omission of bad debts recovered 
h. Others 
3: Overstatement of expenses (other than cost of goods sold) 
A: Expenses 
a. Private expenditure included in expenses account 
b. Capital expenditure included in repairs 
c. Excessive reserves for liabilities 
d. Expenditure not allowed for Income Tax Purposes concealed 
e. Over statement of expenses by means of dummy or fraudulent 
vouchers 
f. Others 
B: Wages 
a. False statements of wages in respect of particular workmen 
b. Dummy workers 
C. Personal staffs paid through the business and included in 
wages book e. g. domestic staff, gardener. 
d. Proprietors drawings included in wages 
e. Others. 
4: Understatementloverstatement of assets (including 
property and inventories) /liabilities 
A Creditors 
B. Debtors 
C. Cash/Bank Balances 
D. Work In progress 
E. Stock 
F. Other 
5: Other 
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B: Methods used by the Revenue In settling the cases: 
To indicate in the column with the number provided. 
1. Capital Statement 
2. Account/Examination of books 
3. Others 
C: Methods used in analysing the cases beforelduring 
Investigation. 
To indicate in the column with the number provided 
1. Ratio Analysis/Analytical Review 
2. Third party's information 
3. Intelligence information gathering 
4. Others 
D: Attitude and behaviour 
To indicate in the column with the number provided. 
1. Innocent error or mistake 
Unintentional evasion due to technical or ruling interpretation. 
2. Negligence or culpable carelessness 
Cases where a statement of income whether on a statutory 
return form, a non statutory form or in the form of an account 
sent to the Revenue is found to contain some error or 
omission whereby a loss of tax has occurred. 
3. Deliberate evasion 
Ignorance of the law as to mislead the Revenue. 
E: Total amount of tax loss and penalties recovered 
NOTES/ Important points to ponder. 
COMMENTS 
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PRO FORMA QUESTIONS FOR IRB OFFICERS 
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TAX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Pro forma questions for IRB officers. 
A: General View on Tax Evasion and SMEs 
The focal arguments on tax evasion In developing countries In most literatures view the 
following as the major handicaps to the tax authority In its attempt to deter tax evasion. 
0 Incompetent, corrupt and Inadequately staffed tax administration set-up 
aA legal system that is both unable and unwilling to enforce the penal and civil provision of 
the prevailing tax code 
0 Poor information gathering and processing technology beset by weak accounting 
practices. 
0A high tax rate with a graduated schedule which adds impetus to evasion practices 
01. Can you briefly explain the overall context - the key problems or issues to address - with 
regard to the above in relation to tax evasion in the SMEs sector in Malaysia? 
02- In your opinion, why Is the SMEs sector regarded as the sector with the highest rate 
incidence of tax evasion? 
B: Practical Overview 
It is recognised that different governments give different emphasis to tax evasion. The 
purpose of the following questions Is to obtain an overall understanding of the tools and 
practices framework. A comprehensive view may not be possible in all cases. Nevertheless, it 
is hoped that the interviewee can provide an Indication of overall emphases and recent 
trends. 
03. What kinds of tools are being predominantly used, and how are they being used. 
3.1 For detecting? 
3.2 Information gathering and processing / Intelligence work? 
3.3 Settling the cases? 
3.4 Are new tools being added to complement the old? 
3.5 Are new tools replacing old tools? 
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Q4. In practice, competence In terms of knowledge and skills required for the efficiency and 
effectiveness In detecting tax evasion. What actions have been taken by IRB to facilitate and 
increase the officers' competence? Briefly explain in the following context: 
" Qualification and experience of existing staff 
" Use of external expertise(consultant) 
" Information support adequacy 
" Training program 
" Other 
Q5. The type and extent of evasion varies from case to case to such an extent that the scope 
of enquiry work is largely unique in each case especially in dealing with the SME cases. Can 
you briefly explain what are the characteristic and factors affecting it? 
Q6. In what circumstances do you think SMEs will evade tax and what are the most common 
methods used to evade taxes? 
Q7. Is the tax authority ready to Implement criminal investigation as opposed to the current 
civil system? How will this help in deterring tax evasion by SIVIES? 
C: Forensic Accounting 
Forensic accounting Is the application of financial skill and an investigative mentality, 
conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it encompasses 
financial expertise, fraud knowledge and a strong knowledge and understanding of business 
reality and the working of the legal system. According to some of its advocates it looks 
beyond the numbers and deals with the business reality of the situation. 
Q8. What is your understanding of forensic accounting? 
09. Briefly explain the techniques or methods of working (detecting and settling) especially In 
dealing with SMEs cases? 
Q10. In your opinion Is there a better way to detect tax evasion by SME than forensic 
accounting techniques? 
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D: Recommendation 
Q1 1. What improvements would you like to see? 
Structure (organisational positing etc. ) 
Process (technique etc. ) 
Competence (skill deficiencies, training needs etc. ) 
Other? 
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307 
12 February 2003 
To Whom It May Concern 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
'rAX EVASION BY SMEs AND THE ROLE OF FORENSIC ACCOUNTING: 
A MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Mr. Nik Abdullah Sani b. Nik Mohamed is currently a candidate in the Doctoral Studies Program 
in the Division of Accountancy and Finance, School of Management and Languages at Heriot- 
Watt University, Edinburgh, UK. He is in the middle of conducting a research survey, investigating 
the scope and significance of tax evasion and forensic accounting in Malaysia. 
The respondents for the survey questionnaire include SIVIEs, taxpayers and tax practitioners. 
Your cooperation is requested to assist him in gathering information and data required for the 
research. The information provided is very much needed in order for him to complete his 
research. The results of the survey will provide valuable information and added knowledge about 
the phenomenon of tax evasion by SMEs and the role of forensic accounting especially in 
Malaysia. 
I hope that you will take the time to complete the enclose questionnaire. I thank you for your 
cooperation. I 
Yours Sincerely, 
Professor CL Marston BSc MAcc PhD FCA CTA 
Professor of Accountancy 
School of Management and Languages 
308 
ESMýe Fairbairn Building Heriot-Watt University Edinburgh EH14 4AS United Kingdom 
Telephone +44 (0)131451 3497 Fax +44 (0)131 451 3498 
Ertlail enquiries@.,, Ml. liw. ac. uk www. smi. liw. ac. uk 
61tinburgh Campus - Scoltisb Borders Campus 
